sent constitution of man, and with his actual relations. But it has already been shown, that the present system is adopted because it is upon the whole the wisest and best. Future punishment is a necessary part of that system: what the actual amount and duration of it will be, we do not know: with undoubting confidence we may leave it to the determination of that wisdom which is absolute, and of that goodness which is perfect. Absolute wisdom, perfect goodness, we may be assured, will inflict no more than is indispensably necessary. The infliction of so much misery for so much misery, which is all that punishment can be, if it be not corrective, is, indeed, wanton cruelty, and is, therefore, inconsistent with the attributes of the moral Governor of the world; but the infliction of a certain degree of misery in order to produce an immeasureable degree of happiness, is compatible with the highest wisdom and the most perfect goodness.

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Objection 11. It is implied in the very of a disciplinary punishment, that it is consistent: with the Divine perfections to subject a sinner to misery for his own good; why then is it not equally consistent with those perfections to subject him to misery for the sake of promoting the good of the system, provided that misery do not exceed the demerit of the subject? If the punishment of the sinner may lead him to repentance, so it may lead other sinners to

repentance, or it may restrain them from sin, and in a variety of ways may as much subserve the good of those who are not the subjects of punishment, as of him who is. And that the good of other persons may be of equal, nay of far greater importance to the system than the good of the transgressor himself, cannot be denied.

Answer. This argument assumes that the infliction of endless misery for the crimes of a few years is consistent with justice; but that this assumption is false, will be shown in the chapter on the Justice of God; and if false, the argument on which it is founded is of course fallacious. Moreover, it is not just to argue that, because it is consistent with the Divine. perfections to subject a sinner to misery for his own good, it is equally so to subject him to misery for the sake of promoting the good of the system, because this implies that the good of the individual and of the system is incompatible, whereas it is identical. In the fair and glorious system of creation, designed by infinite goodness, arranged by unerring wisdom, and effected by almighty power, the exquisite and endless misery of the majority is not made necessary to the happiness of the minority; but the happiness of the whole is secured by the ultimate happiness of every individual. That the happiness of the whole is as possible as the happiness of a few, and that a

system in which the ultimate happiness of the whole is secured, is more excellent and perfect than that in which the majority are rendered endlessly miserable, cannot be denied; we ought, therefore, to suppose that the former is the system which the Deity has adopted, because it is the most worthy of his attributes. The latter is not worthy of those attributes: it is not compatible with themi: it is inconsistent with goodness to give existence to any creature without making that existence, upon the whole, a good to him. Consequently, though it be just to subject the sinner to misery for his own good, yet it is alike irreconcileable to justice and to goodness to subject him to misery for the sake of promoting the good of the system, unless the balance of happiness, upon the whole, the whole of his existence considered, be in his favor. It is perfectly consistent with justice and benevolence to promote the good of the system by any disposition whatever, of any number of creatures, provided they enjoy, upon the whole, more than they suffer; but any disposition of them, for any purpose, which renders it necessary that they should suffer more than they enjoy, is a plain violation of rectitude; because non-existence, is no evil, but existence with a preponderance of misery is, and an intelligent being who acts voluntarily, and who gives existence to any creature, knowing that it will be, upon the whole,

an evil to him, performs as malignant an act as can be conceived. And, if this be true, though' but one creature suffer, upon the whole, a preponderance of misery, what language can express, what imagination can conceive the imperfection in which all the attributes of the Creator are involved upon the scheme that he brought into existence the great majority of mankind with the design of afflicting them with unutterable torments through endless ages, in order to promote the happiness of comparatively a few? It is a scheme as unworthy of the wisdom as it is incompatible with the goodness of the great Parent of mankind.

Thus, the more this subject is investigated, the more clear and overwhelming the evidence becomes, that punishment, under the Divine administration, is corrective, and if this position be established, the whole controversy is decided.

The inferences deducible from the preceding observations throw upon this subject a light and glory, which render it an object of gratifying as well as of impressive contemplation.

If the punishment which the Deity inflicts be corrective, it follows that no punishment can be without end; for a punishment which is both corrective and endless, is a contradiction in terms.

If all punishment be corrective, it follows that no more punishment than is absolutely

necessary to produce reformation, will be im posed; for he who endeavours to correct an evil, will accomplish his object as speedily and with as little loss of happiness as possible.

If all punishment be corrective, it follows that as much as is necessary to eradicate sin will be inflicted. This to the sinner is a most alarming consideration. God cannot inflict infinite misery upon a finite being, but we know not to how great an extent, within the limit of finiteness, it may be just and right and necessary to impose it. Of all the truths which can occupy the attention of human beings, this certainly is the most momentous. If there be certainty in religion, or truth in God, he who in the présent state neglects the improvement of his privileges, indulges evil habits, lives in sin, and dies in impenitence, must in a future world endure an anguish, of which at present he can form no adequate conception. It is reasonable to believe that this must be the case; for the bitter consciousness of self-degradation, and the horror of deep remorse, must be felt, and we require to know no more to be assured that the sensation must be intolerable. Such is the dictate of reason the declarations of scripture confirm it. They describe the punishment of obstinate and unrepentant guilt as a fearful looking for of wrath, treasured up against the day of wrath. It is a worm that dieth not; it is a fire that