We arrive now (p. 34.) at the third head of this discourse, in which the preacher arrests the attention, and rouses the feelings of his audience, by way of peroration. He is here at once awfully impressive, and encouragingly consoling. May his remonstrance, (we refer our readers to the sermon itself, which they cannot but perceive is of a cast and species very different from ordinary fastday sermons,)-may his remonstrance have its full effect upon this United Kingdom! Looking back upon what has happened in preceding ages, may we all turn to God, and be saved from the wrath, both temporal and eternal, which must needs come on impenitent nations*!

L. C.

:

LOGICAL TRACTS: comprising Observations and Essays illustrative of Mr. Locke's Treatise upon the tuman Understanding with occasional remarks on the Writings of the two Scottish Professors, Reid and Stewart, upon the same Subject: and a Preface in Vindication of Mr. Locke against the Mistakes and Misrepresentations of the late Mr. Milner, of Hull; Dr. Horne, Bishop of Norwich; Mr. Kett, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford; and Dr. Napleton, Canon of Hereford. By Thomas Ludlam, M. A. Cambridge, 1803.

TH

HESE Tracts, as the ingenious and respectable author of them informs us in his Preface, are "intended for the improvement in the art of reasoning of such young students in divinity, as are able to read the Writings of Mr. Locke, Bishops Butler, Hurd, and Warburton, with those of Drs. Balguy, Powell, and Ogden;" and, though we do not agree in all the opinions, which the author has advanced in them, we have no hesitation in saying, that they are admirably adapted to answer this intention.:

The Preface, which is extended to 31 pages, consists, as mentioned in the title-page, of animadversions on the late Bishop Horne, Dr. Napleton, the late Mr. Milner,

* This sermon was printed at Dublin; it is most incorrectly edited.— We hope it will be reprinted, with becoming accuracy, in London.

and

and Mr. Kett, for what Mr. Ludlam considers as misrepresentations of Mr. Locke's meaning. Without deciding on the justness of these animadversions in every particular, we shall be content with observing, that they cannot be read without interest and advantage by any person of intelligence; and that they may be peculiarly useful to the admirers of the writers referred to, as a guard against being led by their authority into a prejudice against Mr. Locke, which might be productive of detrimental effects. Notwithstanding, however, the general excellence and usefulness of Mr. Locke's writings, particularly of his great work, the Essay on the Human Understanding, it must yet be acknowledged, that, in some of his writings and proceedings, he was justly deserving of reprehension; more especially if it be true, as mentioned by Bp. Warburton (Alliance between Church and State, b. 1. near the end) that he assisted Tindal in planning his pernicious book, entitled, "Rights of the Christian Church;" a book, to which Swift, in his "Remarks upon a book, &c." written in 1708, furnished the rudiments of an answer, equally abounding in wit, learning, and judgment, and to which Warburton, in his "Alliance," at length gave so complete and decisive an answer.

The observations on Mr. Locke are introduced by some strictures on Dr. Reid's "Inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense," as also on Mr. Dugald Stewart's "Outlines of Moral Philosophy," which, though more severe perhaps in their manner than was necessary, are remarkably acute, and appear to be founded in truth. Thus, at p. 14, he convicts Dr. Reid of a great want of precision; but this might have been done, and to equal effect, without accusing him of a design to mislead his readers. By adopting the principle of common sense into philosophy, it was Dr. Reid's design, a laudable one certainly, to guard against those dangerous conclusions, which such philosophers as Mr. Hume had attempted to draw from more recondite principles. He would, however, as Mr. Ludlam very justly contends, have done this more effectually, if, instead of showing the mischievous nature of Mr. Hume's conclusions, he had proved, as he might have done, the falseness of his reasoning.

Many of the observations are truly excellent, and display the most decisive marks of a justly discriminating mind. All the readers of Mr. Locke's Essay, and par

ticularly

ticularly the youth of our Universities, who are engaged in the study of that admirable work, will feel themselves under great obligations to Mr. Ludlam, for furnishing them with a guide, by which they may more easily attain to what is right in Mr. Locke, and be guarded against what is wrong. For our readers are to understand, that, though the general design of this work be to vindicate Mr. Locke from the misrepresentations of others, Mr. Locke is himself very frequently the subject of animadversion and censure.

It seems to make no difference to Mr. Ludlam, by whom an opinion is entertained, which he deems to be erroneous. In the cause of truth, he spares neither friend nor foe. No man has a better right than he, to adopt the poet's maxim:

"Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri,

"Quo me cunque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes."

As a specimen of the work, we give the following pas-sage, and lament, that we have not room for more.

"The confusion of ideas, which prevails in both these Scottish Professors (Reid and Stewart) is truly wonderful. In chap, ii. s. 4 and 5, Dr. Reid confounds belief, knowledge, and judgment together. At p. 30, he tells us, that sensation and remembrance are natural principles of belief. At p. 34, 35, 37, he considers belief and knowledge as the same act of the mind. Yet no two acts of the mind can be more different, or more distinct from each other. Whatever truth admits of intuitive,or demonstrative, or sensible evidence, is knowledge: such truth is certain. Whatever truth does not admit of one, or the other, of these sorts of proof, is a matter of belief: whatever is only believed, upon mere human testimony, may be false; whatever is known, must be true. Knowledge produces certainty; belief only produces probability. The assent of the mind to knowledge is unlimited and unalterable. The assent of the mind to matters of belief, is neither unlimited nor unalterable. There may arise reasons for retracting our assent to the latter; it is impossible, that any reasons can arise for retracting our assent to the former. In the case of knowledge, we actually perceive, by the use of our own faculties, the relations between our ideas. In the case of belief, we tely upon the perceptions of other men, or rather upon

the

the account, which they are pleased to give us, of their perceptions.

"With a like confusion in his ideas, Mr. Stewart talks of the belief, with which consciousness is attended. See "Outlines, S. 1. Art. 9." He would not have talked in this manner, if he had attended to the difference between knowledge and belief. The information received from all experience, whether it be the experience we have of the state of our own minds, arising from internal consciousness; or the experience we have of the state of external objects, arising from their effect upon our corporeal senses, is attended with certainty: for, if we cannot rely upon this information, the attainment of certain knowledge is impossible: but belief is not attended with certainty. Belief, therefore, and knowledge cannot, as Mr. S. asserts, rest upon the same foundation. By judgment, we mean the power of estimating the probability of any matters proposed to our belief. It has nothing to do with knowledge or certainty.

"Dr. Reid seems to apprehend, that much mischief may arise from any endeavours to ascertain the meaning of the words we use. It is not a little wonderful, that a man, who appears to have thought so much, should have considered so little the only useful purpose of thinking; viz. that of attaining and communicating clear notions, and precise knowledge; and that he should not have been able to see, that it must be absolutely impossible to make any the least advances in science, unless we affix clear and distinct ideas to the words we use. Yet he tells us, in the section before us (chap. ii. sect. 5.) that it is happy no man pretends to define sensation and consciousness; for that those, who have defined and explained belief, have contributed to the production of the most incredible paradoxes." p. 8.

The Essays, three in number, are on the communication of knowledge, on the nature and use of abstract ideas, and on the difference between mathematical and moral proof. The last is excellent. In the two former, though we approve of by far the greater part of the things contained in them, we meet with some, particularly his observations on the word person, and on the idea of Moral Obligation, to which, if our limits would permit, we could state many serious objections. With this caution, we must leave them to the judgment of the discerning reader. Entertaining so great a respect for Mr. Ludlam, as we do, we Vol. VI. Churchm. Mag. June, 1804. Kkk should

should be extremely sorry to give him any offence; but we express our dissent from some of his opinions without the least apprehension of this. We are assured, as well from the communications, with which he has enriched our work, as from his other publications, that he would set no value on such converts to his opinions, as should adopt them on his authority, without being convinced by his reasoning.

At p. 35, the printer, thinking more of his profession, than of a mathematical demonstration, has made the ludicrous mistake of converting Q. E. D. into 2nd. edition. At p. 17, the word "animal," surely, ought to be preceded by the words "rest of the." We know not whether this be a mistake of the printer, or the author. We should have been glad, in a work of this kind, to have seen more attention paid to the punctuation.

P..

A WORD TO THE WISE, AND A HINT TO THE UNTHINKING.

W

HOEVER may be led to estimate this tract merely from its size, will form a very erroneous judgment of it indeed. "Inest sua gratia parvis" can never be more justly applied than to the very little publication before us, as it contains in a small compass, more sound sense and wholesome advice, than is to be found in nine out of ten of the generality of works with which the press teems. In a plain style, and with much earnestness of persuasion, the author inculcates the duty of Unity with the Church, and laments the too frequent examples of those, who through ignorance, want of reflection, or arrogance, have fallen off from their appointed teachers, and encouraged the spirit of schism and rebellion against constituted authority.

"Let me beg you to remember the reverence that is due to the Church of Christ, and to the appointed ministers of the Gospel; and let me earnestly entreat you not to follow strange teachers. Many of them may be good men, and I hope they are so, but they are certainly mistaken men; therefore let them not lead you from the appointed place of worship, and the appointed minister, to whom Christ has given authority to watch over your souls. We are told, that even our Saviour took not this honour on himself, but was called of God. We are told,