pour eternal and corroding fire over all creation! How fortunate for them that their God is not strictly just! But however just, they think this would be a hard case. Here Divine mercy is permitted to interfere! This is supposed to be a perplexing case. One of God's good attributes demands universal damnation-and another of his good attributes demands universal salvation.*

*That the reader may see that I correctly represent the contradictory views of our opponents, I will subjoin some statements here from a work against Universalism, by Rev. J. Parker, D. D., published some years since in Rochester, (N. Y.)

"It is essential to the very nature of a moral govern. ment, that there should be first a moral constitution of creatures, rendering them fit subjects of government; then laws adapted to this constitution; and, last of all, a righteous distribution of rewards and punishments." Page, 65. Very good--so I say, it must be a righteous distribution. Not a partial, nor revengeful one. But hear him again:"Yet obligation would not be felt, nor laws become effi cacious only in so far as their penal sanctions were regarded as fixed and absolutely certain." Page 66. Good again. So far the Doctor is right, just what I intend to prove true. But will he adhere to this? Will he build his argument upon this platform, which he admits to be essential to make obligation to be felt, and laws efficacious? Let us "He forgives the vilest sinner without one reproachful word, only tenderly exhorting him to go and sin no more; while at the same time, he assures the most unexceptionable moralist, who is yet destitute of true religion, that he cannot escape the damnation of hell."-p. 62. This is his "moral government adapted to the constitution of man," his "righteous distribution of rewards and punishments" and "penalties fixed and absolutely certain"! But let the Doctor explain it farther. "The apparent force of this argument is lost, at once, if it be admitted that both (that is both classes) alike deserve eternal punishment. But this is admitted by those who hope to be saved because they conceive themselves to be spiritual disciples of Christ. They admit that they deserve eternal punishment as really

see.

He cannot damn them all eternally to satisfy his justice; and at the same time, save them all to satisfy his

as those that actually suffer it"-p. 47. Such are his "righteous distributions," his "penalties absolutely certain and fixed," his "perfect government adapted to the moral nature of man.' Is this the way virtue is encouraged and vice suppressed? No wonder the influence of this doctrine has broken down all distinctions between right and wrong; cherished perfidy, cruelty, and persecution; and made the crimes of those, who "conceived themselves the spiritual disciples" far more numerous, dark, and appalling than those of skeptics themselves. But have patience reader, the Doctor must speak again. "It is because he is about to show himself mighty to save, and to display in awful contrast, his redeeming mercy, and vindictive justice,"--p. 73. Here we have redeeming mercy, and vindictive (that is revengeful) justice, both in the character of a perfect being, and an "awful contrast" between them! Most awful indeed! Again says he, "God is now acting upon a principle, which exhibits alike an intention to show mercy to some, and to punish others,"-p. 64. Is this the character--the partiality of heaven? or is it the madness and folly of mortals? The Bible says, "God will render to every man according to his deeds." (Rom. 2, 6) Again, "Are not my ways equal, are not your ways unequal, saith the Lord," (Ezek, 18, 29.) Speaking of the Divine government, our author says, "That mercy and justice shall be eternally set over against each other,"-p. 71. Against each other! What need then of a Devil, if heaven is to be divided against itself, and God is to officiate in both capacities? Again, "This first intimation to the senses, of the nature of the divine government, might teach us to expect that justice and mercy should hereafter be set over against each other,"-p. 69. So it seems these attributes of God are to stand opposed to each other to all eternity! One demanding one thing and the other the contrary. I should like to know which is good and which bad. For if one is right, the other standing over against it, must be wrong, unless among Partialists, right and wrong are the same thing. Partialist writers generally hold out the same views on Justice and Mercy.

mercy. So it is supposed, he will display his justice by damning some; and his mercy by saving others. That justice here has its victims, and mercy there its subjects. And both of these principles are to take up with their half allowance as better than nothing! That those who are damned are damned unmercifully; and those who are saved are saved unjustly! That God is just to such as are damned, but not to such as are saved. And that he is merciful to such as are saved, but not to such as are damned. This makes him just to some and unjust to others; merciful to some, and unmerciful to others! This appears to me a great curiosity. A God divided against himself! Perfect goodness split into two parts, the one in exact opposition to the other! A spectacle for all rational beings to look upon and wonder.

Can

3. But how did this mystery of mysteries come to be? How happened it, that justice and mercy should be both attributes of God, if they are exactly opposed to each other? Are they both good principles? So it is supposed. How then can they be exactly opposed to each other? Can one truth contradict another truth? goodness require that a thing be done, and goodness require that it be not done, at the same time? If justice and mercy are not both perfectly good principles, they could not both be attributes of a perfectly good God. If there is any wrong in either of them, then there would be some wrong in the character composed of their combination! If justice be a good principle, and no wrong in it, and God is a perfectly good being, he must be perfectly just to every being. And if mercy is good, and no wrong in it, must not God be perfectly merciful to every being? If justice is a good principle, and does require the endless punishment of all men, what good being could object to it? Why is not a good God willing to have it so? Is he willing to have it so by his justice; and unwilling to have it so by his mercy? Then he must be neither willing nor unwilling! Why should a just God send his just son, to save mankind from a just

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punishment, and from his own just wrath? If endless punishment was just and right and good, how could any good being feel opposed to it? According to this theory, it would seem, that its devil has the greatest regard for justice of any being. For he is supposed to be desirous to have all men endlessly punished, as the theory says, they justly ought to be. If this thing called justice is a good principle, and requires the endless misery of all, why do not our good clergy pray that it may be the case? Why are they more desirous that mercy may prevail than justice, since they think them both good principles? yet exactly opposed to each other! Do they think their good mercy a little better than their good justice? If so, instead of each being curtailed by the other, the best should prevail to the total exclusion of the other. And if justice be not quite so good as mercy, all the justice there is in God must diminish so much from his perfection.

4. It is designed, that the reader, whatever he may be, if he possess common sense, shall be made heartily sick of the common notion, that Divine justice and mercy are opposite principles. For upon this gross absurdity, has been founded, almost the entire system of Popery, with the most essential corruptions of christianity in all ages. In the preceding chapter, I have defined justice to be always right; and mercy to be always right, when regulated by or not inconsistent with justice. A thief is arraigned and found guilty-justice would send him to the penitentiary; but it is said, mercy would save him. Why would justice consign him to prison? Not because it delights in misery, but because the public safety and security require it, and he has forfeited his right to liberty to the public good; and by a rule of justice adopted by the State for his good as well as that of others. If he should be suffered to escape, others might lose their property and suffer by him. Then mercy itself does not require that he escape. Mercy forbids that the rights of the whole community be jeopardised. Surely

mercy, looking with lenient cye upon all concerned, does not interfere with justice; nor exempt the offender from punishment. It could not be so cruel. Mercy, acting blindly and partially toward the criminal, might save him; but would violate its own nature towards others, so as to cease to be mercy, and become cruelty. But when mercy is viewed with reference to all its relations, it assimilates to justice and harmonizes with it. Exclusive compassion to the offender would consult his happiness, but involve the community in misery. Such compassion would be unjust and wrong, and cannot be like any attribute of God. But real mercy, which must embrace all considerations, in its good and kind aims, condemns the criminal, and thus promotes the greatest good of all concerned. Here, mercy and justice harmoniously combine in perfect right, and aim together at one and the same object-the greatest possible happiness of all.

5. So it will be perceived, that contracted or spurious mercy, which flows to some, regardless of the general good, may be unjust and wrong; but when acting with reference to the interests of all, it is right and just. Upon this ground they embrace and become one. They both aim at the greatest good which can be accomplished without sacrificing any rights. This must be exactly the character of Divine justice and Divine mercy. Hence they are both good principles in him; and both harmonize to form a perfect character. Hence God is infinitely just and infinitely merciful; perfectly just to all and perfectly merciful to all. This justice and mercy, divinely blended in all the inimitable beauty and glory of exalted loveliness and perfect good, regard the whole mass of kindred intelligences, with one great and impartial design of supreme benignity. He is, therefore emphatically "good unto all, and his tender mercies are over (not a part, but) all his works."-Psa. cliv. 9. And he is, "a just God and a saviour."-Isa. Iv. 21.