There is another clause in the Act of Settlement which sufficiently shows that His Majesty's German dominions are not to be considered as united to Great Britain. By a clause in this act, the King is prohibited from going out of the dominions of England, Scotland, or Ireland, without consent of Parliament. If Hanover was to be considered as united to Great Britain by the King's accession, this clause would have been absurd and unjust.

There is another provision in the Act of Settlement, which, unfortunately for the people of this country, has been so construed, as to deprive us of all that protection against the undue influence of the crown which the framers of that statute intended to establish. The provision is in these words:" That no person, who has an office, or place of profit under the king, or receives a pension from the crown, shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons." This provision in the statute has been construed to extend only to those offices which have been created since the act was framed. It has

also been construed to extend only to those pensions which are revocable at the pleasure of the crown; and it has also been ruled, that the person to whom such office, place of profit, or pension, is granted, may be re-elected to serve in the same Parliament. By these various constructions, this provision in the statute has been rendered nugatory.

There is another inroad on this provision, which the ministers now seem desirous of making; for it has been contended, in a late debate, that, although the place of President of the Board of Control is a place created since the Act of Settlement, yet as the gentleman on whom it has been recently conferred receives no salary, it is not an office, or place of profit, within this provision of the statute. But I cannot accede to this argument: the words used in the provision are manifestly not synonymous, but disjunctive, viz. office, place of profit, or pension. The expression, place of profit, was probably introduced to obviate the objection, that the place granted, though of profit, was not an office. And indeed it is

a difficult matter to ascertain what in the eye of the law is strictly to be denominated an office. But the situations in the contemplation of the legislature, when the act was framed, were threefold, office, place of profit, or pension; and the place of President of the Board of Control is manifestly an office, which exercises no inconsiderable share of the executive government.

To these remarks on the constructions of this provision in the Act of Settlement, I will add only one observation more. They are constructions to prevent the redress of that mischief which the people justly complained of, and which the legislature intended to remove; the adoption of these constructions is, therefore, to be lamented. For can any proceeding be more justly called an abuse, than that where placemen and pensioners are to impose the taxes, a portion of which they are themselves afterwards to receive. Nor can this provision in the Act of Settlement be justly called a restraint on the prerogative. It was, in truth, nothing more than a restraint on the exercise of that corrupting influence in Par

a member of the House of Commons protected him from being punishable for libel in a court of law, yet the two Houses, corruptly desirous of assisting the King's ministers in the completion of their oppressive designs, voted that privilege of Parliament did not extend to the case of libel. I think there is much ground for doubting whether the two Houses could, by such vote, abridge the privilege of Parliament; and whether a court of law is not, even at this day, obliged to recognize the member's privilege in matters of libel. When the court of Common Pleas set Mr. Wilkes at liberty, saying that his privilege as a member of the House of Commons precluded them from examining the subject, did they decide agreeably to the law, or did they decide erroneously? It has never been adjudged, or even suggested in any court of law, that they decided erroneously, as the law at that time stood. But the law of Parliament is part of the common law of England; and like every other part of the common law I do not see how it could be altered, except by the concurrence of the three branches of the legislature: in other words, how it could have been altered

except by a statute. If the courts of common law recognize that the votes of the two Houses have altered the law of Parliament without the concurrence of the

KingARY

they must admit that, on the subject of privilege, the two Houses have legislative power without the King's assent. I have also no scruple in saying, that the vote of the House of Commons, on this subject, restrained the member of that House from the exercise of his duties. For the language used in the House is not to be viewed as language confined within those walls. The opinions there delivered are to be considered as spoken to the country, they are to influence the judgment and the wishes of the country; and this cannot be effected, if the member is restrained from publishing his political opinions. If those publications are injurious to the country, either the House itself may punish its member, or direct the Attorney-General to file an information ex officio; but as the law is now held to be, since this vote of the House of Commons in the case of Mr. Wilkes, the Attorney-General has the superintendance of all those political opinions which any member may