₹

stinct, which is not deduced by what is called reasoning,' that is to say, by conclusions drawn from premises,' in that case it is plain that the question, as to the certainty of our knowledge, is altogether left out of the discussion: for in this sense, we do not know by Reason, that the whole is greater than its part, or that two and four are equal to six; and yet no one, we take for granted, can, for a moment, doubt as to the truth of these axioms, because the denial of them involves a palpable contradiction in terms. If, on the other hand, we admit that these Truths are known by Reason, but only exclude from its province all belief in mere matters of fact, which depend solely upon the evidence of our senses; here again, the discussion is still nothing more than a dispute, as to the proper use of words. It involves no debate as to the foundations of our belief; which, for any thing that is here said, may possibly be just as certain in the one instance as in the other, even though the names, by which we distinguish them, are not the same.

There are so many difficulties in most metaphysical disquisitions which seem entirely to arise from want of precision in the application of the words Reason and Truth, and of one or two other phrases connected with these terms, that perhaps our readers will feel inclined to excuse us, if we venture to subjoin a few observations, before we conclude, upon this much controverted subject.

One of the senses in which the word Reason is commonly used, as we are told by Mr. Stewart, designates the particular faculty by which we distinguish Truth from Falsehood. We believe this definition to be substantially correct. It is evident, however, that before we can make any use of it, in a metaphysical discussion, we must, first of all, be accurately informed, as to the precise signification of the word Truth. In answer to any inquiries as to this point, it is probable we should be told, that 'a Truth is a proposition which cannot be denied without involving ourselves in a contradiction of terms; and it is distinguished from what we call a Fact, by being deducible a priori.' This, no doubt, is an intelligible answer; and would perhaps, for common purposes, be satisfactory. It is, however, no answer to a metaphysical inquirer; because it merely presents us with a test, by which Truth may be distinguished; whereas what he wants, is a definition of the thing itself. The laws of gravitation, of impulse, of reflection and refraction, it would have been impossible to know, except from actual observation and experiment; but a person, who had never measured the angles of a triangle, might easily be certain, that they are equal to two right angles. The fact, in this case, is familiarly known; the difficulty consists in detecting the principle upon which it depends.

It cannot be doubted, but that the distinction, which exists in the respect which we have just stated, between the truths which

are

are the objects of geometry and the facts which form the foundation of natural philosophy, does not consist simply in the difference of the channels, through which the knowledge of them may be conveyed into the understanding. If in the one case it is made known to us by Reason, and in the other by Experience, or Instinct, or any other supposed principle of the mind, this is plainly, because the objects of our knowledge are, in the two cases, antecedently different; and to state what that antecedent difference is, and to be informed of the circumstance in which it consists, seems to be precisely the purport of our question, when we ask for a definition of Truth or Reason.

Bearing this, then, in mind, as the point to which our inquiry is directed, let us examine what is the proper signification of these words, as applied to the subject from which we have just been taking our examples. It is now admitted by every writer, that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, is merely relative; that is to say, we know nothing respecting the qualities either of our own minds or of the things around us, as they are in themselves, but only as they stand related to each other. When we talk of the properties of bodies, in common discourse, we affirm nothing, in our thoughts, respecting the secret manner in which they operate upon our senses; nor do we conceive any opinion, as to the causes on which their respective operations depend; we merely reason upon a supposition, that they notoriously affect, in a given manner, our particular constitution, or produce such or such effects upon each other. It is, then, these Relations, that are in our mind, when we speak of the qualities of matter; which, as our readers are probably aware, have usually been divided into Primary and Secondary. We shall not trouble ourselves to examine the several accounts which have been given of the principle, by which these are distinguished from each other; not only because this would occupy more room than we can spare, but because we conceive that the classification itself is incomplete. If we take up any particular substance, be it what it may, and attempt to classify its Properties, or, to speak more philosophically, the Relations in which it stands to the things around it, we shall at once perceive that they arrange. themselves not under two but under three heads. Suppose, for example, we take a piece of wax; its taste and smell are manifestly Relations in which it stands to our particular constitution. Its property to be melted by fire, is a particular Relation in which it stands to another given substance; but its size, that is, its exten sion, its solidity or capacity of filling space, its state of rest or motion-these are ideas which we acquire, not by comparing its particular qualities as wax, with the particular qualities of any other substance, but by a comparison of those qualities which belong to it

as

as a body in general, with those qualities or accidents, which belong to other bodies in general.

That every material substance actually stands in this threefold relation to other substances, is not an hypothesis, but a plain statement of a fact, which, we take for granted, no one will dispute. According to Locke's division, it is evident that those qualities, which result from the particular Relations of specific substances among each other, are entirely omitted. The primary qualities as enumerated by him, consist entirely of the general relations of bodies, as universal parts of matter; while the secondary are formed altogether from the relations of bodies to our particular constitution. Taking, however, his arrangement for granted, it will still be true, that the difference between them does not consist in any fanciful resemblance which, as he supposes, exists between the primary qualities and the ideas of them in our minds; but must be sought for, in the circumstance which we have pointed out. And this may easily be proved. The taste of sugar, or the pain which intense heat creates, would have been just as well understood as they are at present, supposing them to be the only sensations, which we had ever experienced, from these respective senses; but had we never seen or touched but one object in our lives, it is clear that we never could have predicated of it, that it was either large or small, or have described its shape and nature as being either round or square, quick or slow, or indeed have formed any notion whatever respecting it, except that it was the cause of certain sensations arising in our minds: for except from comparison of bodies with each other, the ideas which we attach to such words as round, square, large, small, quick, slow, and innumerable others which might be mentioned, could not possibly have been conveyed to our understandings.

If what has now been said respecting the principles of our knowledge in all questions of real existence, should be allowed, it is evident that we shall, at once, be able to define the specific differences on which our ideas depend, when we talk of Truth and Reason, as distinguished from mere Facts, and from the information which we derive solely from experience. It is obvious, on mere inspection, that the subject of our reasoning in all discussions of pure mathematics, is extension or quantity, or motion, or some one or other among the general Relations, which may be predicated with certainty of all bodies, whatever their particular properties, in other respects, may be. Whereas, in chemistry, or electricity, or natural philosophy, the datum, from which we reason, is invariably some one or other among the Relations which bodies possess, as belonging to some particular class of substances, and not as mere parts of matter in general. Carrying then this distinction in our mind,

if we should now examine upon what principle it is, that we may deduce all geometrical truths (and the same might easily be shown of all other classes of truths) a priori, and why they cannot be denied without a contradiction in terms, the difficulty we think will be explained in a very few words. I require not to know whether the sides of a particular triangle be made of wood or metal, before I can affirm that its three angles are equal to two right angles; be cause this truth results, not from a comparison of the particular Relations, which belong to the substance from which it may happen to be made; but from a comparison of Relations, which necessarily belong to every substance which occupies space. Whether or not, however, a particular body will be dissolved if put into water, this is plainly a fact which I can only learn from experience; because this is not a necessary property of matter, which may be predicated universally of all bodies, but one which is only found in particular classes of them.

Again, if a person should deny that the loaf which is before me, will afford nourishment, there is in this no contradiction of terms; it is only saying, that the substance in question is not bread, but some other substance. But if instead of denying the particular Relation, in which the substance before me, stands to my particular constitution as bread, he should deny any of the general Relations belonging to it, as body; if he should affirm, for example, that it does not fill space, or that a part of it is greater than its whole, this is to affirm that body is not body; it is therefore a manifest contradiction in terms; it is not merely, as in the other instance, a particular error, but involves a proposition which is universally false.

We know not whether we have made ourselves so clearly understood as we might have wished; but we have trespassed so long upon the patience of our readers, that we must consult brevity, even at the risk of being obscure. The sum of what we have been saying may be included in a few words. Truth is an universal fact, and a Fact is a particular truth; and as Truth and Reason, like Fact and Experience, (to which they are opposed) are correlative terms in the present inquiry, if our readers are able to define the one, they can never be at a loss to explain the other. Whether, however, the definitions which we have been giving, be allowed or not, is of no material importance to the real argument; we have merely stated the principles to which our knowledge may be refer red; and if the distinctions which we have suggested be founded in nature, our conclusion will not be affected, by any difference of opinion which may still exist as to names.

We wish only, before we conclude, to add one remark which is, perhaps, of some importance. If the principle by which we have just been endeavouring to distinguish between the primary and secondary qualities be true, in that case the question as to the ex

istence

istence of a material world, would seem to be at once banished from philosophy. That the mind actually perceives certain properties in the bodies around us, which are known by the name of primary qualities, such as extension, figure, solidity-this is a matter of fact which no writer, we believe, has ever called in question. The doubt has been, as to their existence, independently of a substance perceiving them. But if what we have been saying be allowed, the assertion of this fact constitutes the very definition of such qualities; and is precisely the exact point of distinction, in which our knowledge of them altogether consists. Finally, we may observe, that this way of viewing the subject, if once adopted, puts at once an end to all debate as to the comparative certainty of our knowledge. It seems to have been frequently imagined, that such qualities, as solidity, extension, number, and others of the same class, are more palpably inherent in bodies, than colour, taste, combustibility, and so on. And in one sense, perhaps, this may be asserted; but assuredly not in any sense which need at all affect the character of our belief. The property of gold to be dissolved in a certain acid, is just as certain, as its property to exclude all other substances from occupying the place which it fills. We may, if we please, distinguish between these properties, in the common way, and say, that the one is conveyed into our minds by this faculty, and the other by that; that Reason tells us it is impossible, that two bodies should occupy the same point of space, in the same instant of time; but that we have only Instinct to guide us, in expecting that the piece of metal, which I hold in my hand, will be dissolved in the liquid before me. No doubt it is plain that our knowledge in these two cases is different in kind; but there is nothing, in all this, to prove that it is different in respect to its certainty. It is surely just as possible for particular substances to possess particular relations among each other, as to possess others, which are mutually common to all bodies; and it is an evident absurdity to say, that the difference between solidity and solubility consists in the difference between Reason and Instinct, be these words defined as they may; for the things themselves are plainly different; and the perception of this difference is that which constitutes all the knowledge of them which we possess.

We had intended, before we finally concluded, to have said a few words on the subject of Mr. Hume's philosophy, which occupies a space in the present Dissertation and in the admiration. of Mr. Stewart, altogether disproportioned, as we cannot help thinking, either to the ability which they display, or to the peculiar and most offensive character of the opinions, which it was the great and unworthy object of his metaphysical writings to enforce. With respect to the latter part of our remark, we do not doubt, in

deed