But there are many, you say, whose regularity of deportment evidently arises not from considerations of present convenience, but from their belief in a future retribution. The fact is not to be controverted. But before we can use it in proof of moral goodness, it is necessary to ascertain, whether this abstinence from crimes, proceeds from a love to moral rectitude, as such, or from the fear of future punishment. For, whether human actions proceed from the fear of temporal or eternal punishment they are essentially the same. If the fear of being disgraced, or imprisoned tomorrow, be a motive insufficient to constitute an action virtuous, it cannot be constituted such by the fear of being disgraced or punished beyond the grave. All that can be proved in favor of a person, thus actuated, is, that a wrong disposition has not the same degree of ascendancy over him, which it might have over some others in the like circumstances. It will hardly be asserted by any person, in the least habituated to contemplate moral subjects, that fear of personal disadvantage or suffering is essentially virtuous. Therefore, so far as the regularity observable among men, is the result of no higher principle than fear, it affords no evidence of human virtue. It only proves, that vice or moral corruption, has not taken such entire possession of the mind, as to exclude from it all considerations of reason and personal interest.

A plausible objection to the doctrine, we are endeavoring to prove, may be supposed to arise from those social feelings, and those attachments of consanguinity, which are extensively, if not universally, discoverable among men.

I answer; if these social feelings are indeed virtuous, or morally good, the objection is much to the purpose; and although it would not invalidate the proofs, already adduced of general depravity, it would prove that there is, in the heart of man, by nature, real virtue yet remaining.

Social feelings, parental affection, etc., are amiable qualities, essential to the existence of civil society, and extremely conducive to the happiness of man; but there is nothing in them, I apprehend, either virtuous or vicious. One man is naturally

inclined to cheerfulness; another to gravity. This difference probably arises from bodily organization.

But whether it does or does not, there is nothing of morality in it. To ascertain the moral character of a man, we do not inquire, whether he is naturally cheerful or gloomy.

The reasons for believing that social feelings, parental affection, etc. though they may be under the influence of moral principles, are not of themselves moral qualities, are the following.

1. They are by no means proportionate to the good or bad characters of men. In some persons, whose lives are dishonest, impure and profane, you perceive parental affection, as strong as it is in the most virtuous. Crimes the most atrocious have been perpetrated under the influence of parental feelings. Nor does the strongest friendship for an individual necessarily prove any real love of virtue. It was the excessive fondness of Achilles for Patroclus, which induced him to sacrifice human victims, and to express the barbarous desire of feeding on the body of Hector. It was the friendship of Zopyrus for Darius, which induced him voluntarily to mangle and mutilate his own person. But these sufferings were, in regard to the Babylonians, the covering of deep dissimulation and perfidy.

Virtue sometimes requires, not indeed to eradicate these feelings, but to act in opposition to their dictates. Instance the elder Brutus, whom, as a magistrate, duty required to punish his own sons for conspiring against the State. Now, if the social or parental affections, were in themselves morally good, the stronger these affections were, the more, other things being equal, would there be of moral goodness; or, if these affections be the result of moral goodness, when they are strongest, the heart must of necessity be the most virtuous.

It may be replied, that in the cases above mentioned, the irregularity proceeds from the excess of a virtuous principle. By the term virtuous principle, must be meant either virtue itself, or something distinct from it. If the latter, i. e. if social affections be something distinct from virtue, it is precisely what I am endeavoring to prove. But if by virtuous principle, is

meant virtue or moral goodness, the objection implies, that moral evil arises from an excess of moral goodness. Now moral goodness consists in conformity to the requirements of God. It is therefore just as absurd to speak of excess in virtue, as of excess in the straightness of a line. It is just as absurd, to say that criminal irregularity can arise from excess of virtue, as to say, that two lines may coincide so precisely, as not to coincide at all.

2. My other reason for believing that social feelings and the attachments of consanguinity, are neither virtuous nor vicious, is, that they are not peculiar to moral agents. Many irrational animals, by associating together, contract a fondness for each other; and, as to the quality of attachment to their young, it is no less strong in the lion and tiger, than in the sheep and dove. Now, if these qualities are common to all animals, whether they possess reason or not, and whether their natures be mild or ferocious, their existence in man proves nothing as to his moral character.

You will reply, perhaps, that however plausible this conclusion appears, there must be some sophistry in the argument, as St. Paul, in his epistles to the Romans, and to Timothy, (Rom. 1: 31. 2 Tim. 3: 3) mentions the want of natural affection, as evincing extreme wickedness. If the quality itself were not morally good, its absence, you imagine, could not be evil.

I answer, that this inference is not the legitimate offspring of the premises. It does not certainly follow, that a quality is morally good, because the want of it proves moral disorder. Were a judge on the bench, after examining the evidence on both sides, clearly to perceive where the truth lay, no person would, from this circumstance merely, form any conclusion as to his moral character. His perception of the truth might be no more virtuous, than his perception of the witness who gave testimony. But another judge, hearing the same cause under the same circumstances, might be so far governed by his passions or interest, as not to perceive the truth; in consequence of which he forms a wrong decision. In the latter case, the

wrong decision proves the vice of the judge; though a right decision would not have proved his virtue. Again: Voluntary intemperance always proves vice; but it is not true that voluntary temperance always proves virtue. So, the telling of truth. is, in itself, neither virtuous nor vicious; but the telling of that which is not true, is good evidence of moral depravity. It may, in like manner, be true, that natural affection is not a moral quality; and yet that it always exists in man, till smothered or extinguished by excessive crimes.

Let us next consider what evidence the Scriptures give concerning the character of man.

As they were given by inspiration of God, their testimony, if rightly understood, fully substantiates any doctrine. But, when facts are contrary to the seeming import of any passage, there is a strong presumption, that the seeming is not the real import. As to the moral condition of man, facts and the most obvious sense of Scripture perfectly coincide.

1. The object of our Saviour's advent implies, that the character of man is vitiated: The Son of man came to seek and to save that which was lost. Again: The Son of man came into the world to save sinners. It is likewise asserted, that Christ

tasted death for every man; that he gave his life for this world. It appears then, that our Lord's coming had relation to the state of the whole human race. But if his coming had relation to the whole human race, and the object of it was to save sinners, it follows, that all men were of this character. And further, as the object of his coming is declared, in other words, to be the salvation of them that were lost, it follows, that this too, was universally the condition of man. The former, perhaps, would be more readily conceded, than the latter. If man is accountable; if there is in existence such a thing as moral obligation, the moral delinquency of man cannot be questioned. No one will assert, that man is entirely innocent; but from these passages of Scripture, it appears, that his departure from innocence is such, as to expose him to perdition.

2. Christ speaks of the world, as being hostile to his religion.

(John 7: 7.) The world cannot hate you, but me it hateth, because I testify of it, that the works thereof are evil. Here are two important assertions: 1. That the works of mankind are evil; 2. That they hated our Saviour for exhibiting this truth.

Those who follow the example and doctrines of Christ, are said to be a community, acting on moral principles, differing from those which influence the world in general: They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world. In connexion with this, Christ repeats the idea, which has just been noticed, viz. that there is hostility between his disciples and other men: I have given them thy word; and the world hath hated them. This sentiment is often conveyed in the same words. The least that can be possibly meant by such language, is, that the general current of human feelings is less favorable to Christians on account of their religion. But, so far as Christians obey their religion, they resemble their master, and him, by whom their master was sent. This is not merely an inference now made; it was expressly asserted by our Saviour, who said: They have both seen and hated both me and my Father. There was, then, at least in all to whom this language applied, a dislike of moral rectitude; a dislike of good men, of Christ and of the Father. Considering what was shown under the last particular, viz. that the gospel declares all men to be sinners, even in so high a degree, as to be exposed to perdition, it seems unreasonable to limit the term world, in the preceding passages, in which Christ speaks of the world's enmity to his religion; or to suppose, that none are comprehended in it, but certain individuals of uncommon depravity.

3. That infernal being, to whom the Scriptures give the name of Satan, or the Devil, is denominated the god of this world. His devotees are, therefore, the inhabitants of this world. They are, therefore, obedient to his dominion. It would be easy to show, that not an evil principle merely, but an intelligent agent is here meant. But let it, if you please, be conceded for a moment, that by the term Satan is meant a principle of evil;