LECTURE XXVIII.

HUMAN DEPRAVITY.

As it appears to be universally conceded among the advocates for revelation, that the advent of Jesus Christ had an important relation to the moral condition of man, it should seem, that the ascertaining of this moral condition well deserves our first inquiries.

Our views as to our own characters, ought doubtless to correspond with truth. If guilty but of slight aberration, penitence and self-abasement may rise to a degree, altogether disproportionate to our crimes. And persons ought to abstain from excess, as well in condemning, as in applauding themselves. On the other hand, if our disobedience is general, unyielding, and inveterate, our conviction and humility, it is evident, ought not to be superficial.

cases.

Besides, the effects which Christianity ought to produce on the human character, will be very different in the two supposed In the former, all reformation is not superseded; in the latter, nothing will be satisfactory, but a change that is radical and extensive; and whether the change is produced by ourselves, or ab extra, the force to be applied, so to speak, must be in the two cases very different.

As all sin is a transgression of law, it is impossible to form any correct estimate of the demerit and the extent of sin in any supposed instance, without having just thoughts as to the extent of what the law requires. By the term law I do not mean the

Mosaic law, or any particular establishment, human or divine; but that eternal, immutable rule of rectitude, conformity to which the Almighty demands of all his intelligent offspring. This law results necessarily from the nature and relations of things, and not merely from the will of any being whatever; i. e. while things exist, as they are; while there is a God of such attributes; and while He has creatures in such and such conditions, it is impossible, but that certain feelings and actions on the part of these creatures should be suitable, and those which are opposite unsuitable. Under given circumstances, the will of no being can change right into wrong, or wrong into right.

tures.

This immutable law, to which the Almighty requires his creatures to conform, takes cognizance, not of overt actions alone, which are only modifications of sound or motion; but regards these, together with the purpose and choice of intelligent creaWe are not unfrequently led to entertain wrong opinions of the divine law, by our views of civil legislation. If a man offers no injury to the State or to individuals; if he contributes his part to the support of the one, and discharges his debts to the other, he is, in the estimation of civil law, an upright man. The law requires nothing, which he refuses to yield. Whether in discharging his debts, or in supporting or defending the State, he is actuated by a regard to personal convenience and aggrandizement, or by a generous love to public happiness, is a matter concerning which human laws make no inquiry.

Hence, we readily believe it to be no difficult matter to satisfy the demands of God. While our fellow men receive from us little injury, and some benefit; while the name of our Maker is not blasphemed, nor mentioned contemptuously, we scarcely imagine that the justice of God can have any further demands.

In the true spirit of such reasoning, the Pharisee said: I thank God, I am not as other men are: I fast twice a week; 1 pay tithes of all that I possess." Under the influence of the same mistake, though perhaps not with an equal degree of pride and self-complacency, the young nobleman, when differVOL. I.

50

ent parts of the law were brought to his recollection, replied: All these things have I kept from my youth.

Now it is extremely evident, that if there is a fitness in actions, there is prior fitness in disposition and feelings. If it is suitable that I should, by my countenance, tone of voice, words and actions, express gratitude to a friend who has saved my life at the hazard of his own, it is previously suitable that I should feel gratitude. This is, indeed, comprehended in the phraseology; for strictly speaking, I cannot express my gratitude, if I have no gratitude to express. If there is an acknowledged propriety in certain words and actions, relating to Deity and our fellow men, it is because there is a previous propriety in those dispositions, of which these words and actions are the sign. No parent is satisfied with the attention and caresses of a child, if he does not consider them as the sign of an affectionate temper. It is this which causes pleasure to thrill through the heart and glitter in the eyes. Let the professions of a person be what they may, and let his actions, by which you are benefitted, be ever so numerous, your gratitude inevitably ceases, the moment you are ascertained, that his view sare exclusively fixed on his own ernolument. The case is not different in regard to our Creator. His law takes cognizance of the tastes, desires, and purposes of men; and a moral corruption is to be estimated by the agreement, which there is between the former and the latter. So far as men pursue those objects which God and reason approve, they are innocent or virtuous. So far as they pursue different ends, they are sinful. It is a maxim, taken from the morals of Aristotle, that many actions, which seem worthy of commendation, lose all their value, when we investigate the principle that produced them.

You will easily perceive, I imagine, that in regard to what has just been mentioned, the divine requirements could not be less than they are. It can hardly be said, after a moment's reflection, that external actions alone ought to be matter of retribution; or that God, as a wise Governor and Judge, ought to suffer to pass unnoticed, the selfishness, pride, revenge, or ma

lignity of his creatures, even should these qualities never be exhibited to the view of men. Such a retribution as this, would be perfectly irreconcileable with our best ideas of the Supreme Being. That account which Deity gives of himself, is such, therefore, as to obtain the full approbation of human reason: I the Lord, search the hearts; I try the reins of the children of men, to give to every one according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings.

It is next to be inquired, whether the divine law is, in its application, general or particular. Are we bound to subject our feelings to this law on great occasions only, or at every moment of our rational existence? On this question as well as on the preceding, human reason will give a right decision. Where there is a right and a wrong, whether the occasion is more or less important, it is most evident that the right is to be pursued and the wrong rejected. Obliquity is essentially different from rectitude. Whether an offence is small or great, îts nature is the same. If, therefore, a small variation were allowed, a great one could not consistently be punished. I should be perfectly confident in appealing to any person of judgment and reflection, whether he could view his Creator with undiminished respect and reverence, were it ascertained, that although the divine law. prohibited perverseness of disposition and feeling when carried to a high degree, the same perverseness when existing in a low degree, escaped its cognizance? Is it possible that a perfect God, and a perfect law, should allow any, even the smallest degree of ingratitude, envy, or malignity? Is it possible that such a Being, and such a law, should not condemn every want of the opposite qualities? "All rational creatures," says Dr. Clarke, "whose wills are not constantly and regularly determined, and their actions governed by right reason, and the necessary differences of good and evil, according to the eternal and invariable rules of justice, equity, goodness and truth; but suffer themselves to be swayed by unaccountable, arbitrary humor and rash passions; by lusts, vanity, and pride; by private interest, or present sensual gratification: These, setting up their

own unreasonable self-will, in opposition to the nature and reason of things, endeavor, as much as in them lies, to make things be what they are not, and cannot be; which is the highest presumption and greatest insolence imaginable; it is acting contrary to that reason and judgment, which God has implanted in their natures, on purpose to enable them to discern the difference between good and evil. It is attempting to destroy the order by which the universe subsists. It is offering the highest imaginable affront to the Creator of all things." (Nat. and Rev. Rel. p. 51.)

No law could be reasonable and consistent, which does not require perfect obedience. On the same ground, on which we are required to abstain from any sin, we are required to abstain from all. Our depravity and guilt are therefore in direct proportion to our moral imperfection.

The justice and propriety of so much strictness in regard to innocent beings, the progenitors of our race, for instance, before their apostacy, will not perhaps be questioned; but is no allowance to be made, you inquire, for creatures, frail as we are at present, and surrounded by temptations? I answer, if strong passions, and what is called frailty, destroy moral agency, and render us incapable of doing either right or wrong, it must be granted that we are not subjects of retribution. But, by the term frailty, the objector would probably mean, either strong temptations, or an inherent propensity to sin. As to the first, if actions are innocent, merely because there are temptations to perform them, it is doubtful whether there is any sin in the world. On this ground, the first transgressors might have pleaded innocence. To comply with temptation is either right, or it is not. Compliance with temptation to do a wrong action, cannot be right; but if such compliance is wrong, it is justly punishable.

If the term frailty is used in the other sense, to signify inherent propensity to evil, such propensity is doubtless criminal, and exposes the transgressor to the displeasure of God. We should not excuse a man guilty of robbery, were he to tell us