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THE progress of the Allies in Spain, during the past month, has undoubtedly been most rapid and glorious, and has certainly tended essentially to revive the drooping spirits of the British Minister, and the War-Satellites in England.-Indeed, an extraordinary exertion had become indispensible in the business and management of the Spanish War, on more accounts than one.—First, the British Ministry had, by a most reprehensible negligence in the last campaign, so far committed themselves, that they were reduced to the most disagreeable alternative of either admitting that we were incapable of performing the task we undertook in the succour of Spain, and to which they had so often pledged themselves, or that they had grossly trifled away their time and means to the disgrace of their Country and the disappointment of their Allies. As most agreeing with their own feelings, and relying on the popular disposition to overlook former delinquency in temporary success, they chose the measure of exertion, and fixed the seal of infamy to their former misconduct.-The Wellesley Faction had told them what might be done, and what the world and the country expected them to do; and, while they could not gainsay the assertion, they did not dare refuse its performance.-A farther delay or misapplication would have been to have tempted their fate too far; a dexterity peculiar to the present race of Ministers had already borne them out against every accusation; but, not to have made one effort in furtherance of their own designs, and in compliance with the expectations of the Country, would have been to court their inevitable destruction, and to have given the palm of victory to their opponents.-Besides, the Noble Commander in the Peninsula, who already found his reputation at stake in the protracted species of warfare he was constrained to pursue, would, no

VOL. III.

doubt, feel it due to his honour and reputation to remonstrate :--identified, as will be readily believed, with the views and systems of his Noble Kinsman, and the party attached to his principles in the State, it is not to be supposed that he would tacitly submit to be identified in the dilatory policy of those, who had been so openly and justly arraigned as the cause of all the disgrace and discomfiture in the progress of the Spanish War.-To a mind, formed for activity and enterprize, ambitious for glory, and calculated to ensure success even from the most moderate means, the utter neglect of those means, and the useless protraction of a contest, for appearance merely, must be peculiarly galling. -Lord Wellington knew what might be afforded him, and what it would require to accomplish the desired object; and the disappointment was most bitter. He knew the full effect and consequences of the several advantages he had gained, from the retreat of Massena from before Torres Vedras, to the capture of Rodrigo, Badajoz, and the rest; and that even the Battle of Salamanca entwined a barren laurel round his brow. He saw and contemplated with the most bitter disappointment the failure of his hopes before Burgos; and witnessed the horrors of his retreat to Portugal with the most poignant feelings. In fine, it had been his constant doom to set off defeat against advantage, and keep a never-failing register of alternate fortune.-For five years he had been rendered the foot-ball of casualties, of jealousies, and inconsistency; sent forth, as it were, "with half a spear," to go through the business of the battle, and made to wrestle with a vigilant and active competitor while shorn of half his strength.-On the one side was the jealousy of Spain, which would suffer the victory to be wrested from his grasp, or rendered nugatory in his hand, while she stood bye inactive; again, the authors and supporters of the war, the very men who sent him forth to fight, and in whose hands the sinews of that war were placed, through a perversity only to be equalled by their undeserving, had blighted all his efforts, and made them, like the bubble on the wave, to rise and swell, and then be seen no more. In fact, he appeared to have been placed foremost in the gap, to bear the buffets of the storm, without the means to avoid or overcome them.-Under such circumstances, it is surely no wonder that an active spirit should become impatient; and thus it is, that from remonstrances abroad and accusations at home, the Ministry have brought their minds to exertion; the ordnance-stores have been put to their proper uses, our disposable force has been set in motion, and, what is still of greater moment to the undertaking, the prejudice of Spain has been removed. The British General has at

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length obtained the entire undivided control of all the forces of the Allies; and, thus cemented under one head, the consequence, as might be foreseen, has been complete success. The Battle of Vittoria, for brilliancy and effect, has no parallel in the history of the times. An army of 70,000 men, the veterans of France, commanded by the ablest Generals, and fighting under the eye of one of the Imperial Dynasty, with the regards of the world upon them, and the dearest interests of their Imperial Master resting on their valour and exertions, we find made to bend under the superior talents and energy of a combined force led on by a British Hero, and at length obliged to abandon all their artillery, baggage, and in fine every thing that, in the French term, constitutes the materiel of an Army, and to seek their safety within their own dominions.-Never was victory more complete, more fairly or more gloriously won; the details of which will be read with interest to the latest times, and deserve to be placed on the Country's annals, a record for posterity to reverence and regard with a worthy pride. The plan of the campaign had been most perfect in all its parts, and its success bade fair to realise every hope; but, as if a fatulity was fixt to accompany every attempt in the Spanish cause, a leading feature in the operations has failed, which will have the tendency to protract, if not entirely to subvert, the object of the Commander-inChief.--An Expedition, under the orders of SIR JOHN MURRAY, had been directed to form a diversion on the side of Catalonia, which, it was reckoned, would have the effect of distracting the attention of the enemy, while the main force of the Allies would be directed to another quarter; and, to prove the importance and solidity of this plan, we find the probability of success completely verified, had the same prudence and vigour been shewn by all parties as was done under the immediate guidance of Lord Wellington.--But the failure of General Murray, if it have not been a death-blow, has at least been a detriment to the design of the Campaign.-The Expedition landed without opposition at the place appointed, took possession of the strong fortress of St. Philippe, on the Col de Balaguer, commanding a most important pass, and sat down before Tarragona; this place, from the effect of former contests, had been most materially weakened, nor does there appear to have been more than an inconsiderable garrison for its defence; it however resisted the attempts of a formidable army for ten days, provided with a train of heavy artillery, during which time a breach had been formed, and little remained to do but to receive its capitulation; when the bare appearance of succour induced the British Gene

ral to relinquish all his advantages, and not only these, but also his essentials, and retire from the place with precipitation. The French Army at the Battle of Vittoria, it is true, lost all their artillery, but they lost it gallantly fighting in its defence; they did not abandon it at the bare appearance of an enemy, whereby their misfortune did not stamp their disgrace; but at Tarragona the disgrace and disaster go together. The French General, when apprised of the sailing of the Expedition, immediately put himself in motion; he left his lines on the Xucar, and, taking with him about half his force, not exceeding 12,000 men, he hastened to the coast; here he found his way considerably impeded by the judicious occupation of St. Philippe by the British, which obstructed the cannon-road to Tarragona, and obliged him to take another direction, which greatly protracted his advance; nevertheless, as soon as he gained the heights, he spread fires across the mountains to give the garrison assurance of approaching succour, and to give at the same time a false appearance of strength to the enemy. A division of French troops also advanced from Barcelona, under General Mathieu, which together had the effect of possessing the British General with such apprehensions for his immediate safety as to determine him to disembark, and with such precipitation as to leave his train of artillery behind, which he had the mortification to see dragged into the town by the enemy, who gave him three cheers as they drew them off. As it is expected that a Court-Martial will be instituted to inquire into the particulars of this transaction, it would probably appear invidious to pass a deliberate opinion upon it; but, with the public documents of the two Generals, MURRAY and SUCHET, before us, we cannot think ourselves out of order, or guilty of any impropriety, to canvass and compare their several statements, and offer such opinion as reason and observation warrant.-To speak first of numbers, the advantage, according to what can be collected, appears to have been with the Allies.-SUCHET, in his camp on the Xucar, it is well ascertained, had not more than 24,000 men, of the divisions of Habert, Harispe, and Musniers; of these, we find him to have dispatched the last, with two brigades of the former, to the relief of Tarragona, as himself declares, about 8000 infantry and 600 horse; to these were to be added a brigade from General Decaen's force at Gerona, and the disposable troops under General Mathieu at Barcelona, in all about 3000 men, amounting, together with the Garrison of Tarragona, to not more than a body of fourteen or fifteen thousand men.-The British Expedition, consisting of the Sicilian and Spanish

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auxiliaries, amounted to nearly Twenty-Five Thousand! next in regard to circumstances;-the French forces had not yet arrived so as to come in contact, nor does it appear they could have done so before the probable surrender of the town; those from Barcelona had not made their appearance, those under Suchet were only announced by the smoke upon the mountains; and indeed the confession of Sir John Murray goes to say, that they might probably have attacked him in five or six days, a period, we should have thought, sufficient for the capture of a place allowed to be battered in breach, or at least sufficient to have permitted a decent retreat without the sacrifice of all the artillery, magazines, &c.- Even the possession of St. Philippe was an ample guarantee for a safe embarkation, as acknowledged by the French Commander. From these circumstances, therefore, the conclusion is fair that the retreat was unnecessarily precipitate, and the consequences most disastrous to the general cause,-Had Murray stood his ground, it is most probable that the Victory of Vittoria would have been the signal for the immediate evacuation of Spain by the French; the possession of Tarragona would have been indeed a tower of strength.-Sir John Murray says, the enemy was approaching, who might choose or no to give him battle, and who had an infinitude of resources in his rear: - but, we would ask, did Sir John undertake this enterprize with an expectation not to be opposed? was he ignorant of the enemy being in possession of the provinces round ?—or was he so totally unacquainted with the French character and energy as to imagine they would draw off their forces to a convenient distance while he took possession of their forts and garrisons?—If this were not so, if he did not believe that he should carry every thing by a coup-de-main, that in fact the enemy would be frightened at his approach, why was he thrown in a panic at the bare appearance of some part of their forces and the rumoured approach of others? We have shewn that the Allied Forces were both numerous and amply provided; they were also conveniently stationed as well for attack as defence, since the French General found he could not come upon them by the road he wished, owing to the possession of St. Philippe, and the retreat was secured by the same means, as acknowledged by the enemy; for Suchet writes," the English, covered by the fort of Balaguer, were placed out of the reach of a landarmy." Thus, it would appear, the retreat was amply secured, which should at least have warranted a trial of strength; while the fact of the enemy not being able to offer any molestation for several days should have guaranteed the safety of our battering-train, and preserved us