of censure, without a hint of their being a Jewish peculiarity, without a word of caution against them, but in the strongest terms of commendation, must be intended as patterns. So says the apostle, who writes that "whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that we, through patience and comfort of the scriptures, might have hope:" Rom. xv. 4; comp. ch. iv. 23; 1 Cor. x. 11; 2 Tim. iii. 16; James v. 10. From the example, then, of godly rulers under the Mosaic law, we may infer the duty of Christian governors to promote Christianity, by using all the means which their authority places within their reach. 5. As the end of civil society is to procure for the citizens whatever constitutes real happiness, so the object of all good government is to promote it in the greatest possible degree. The "chief good" of man, as a compounded being, has a relation both to temporal and eternal interests. To the former nothing is so conducive as religion; of all agents in the civilization of mankind, and ameliorating their condition, it is unquestionably the most efficient, inasmuch as it proposes the only permanently influential motives for obedience to the laws and the practice of virtue, upon which the peace, the welfare, and the happiness of society depend; to the latter it is the one thing needful. It belongs, then, to the sovereign, as invested with power only for the sake of securing the good of the community, to give every encouragement to true religion, which constitutes the greatest good of the subjects both as to this world and the next. By the law of nature, the care of religion attaches to the office of the magistrate, as the guardian of the public civil good. The church state, as well as every other social state, has its foundation in that law; what it directs unto, as Dr. Owen remarks, may receive new enforcements by revelation, but changed, or altered, or abolished, it cannot be'. By the fundamental principles of this law, it devolves upon the magistrate to cherish, to protect, and to propagate religion. In this respect, the Christian revelation has made no difference; the same right which the civil ruler had under the law of nature, he still retains under the gospel dispensation. Christ has not by any positive command prohibited him from interfering in matters of religion; there is nothing in His laws incompatible with such interference; and, therefore, whether we consider the end and design of his See his "Short Ca- 1 Works, vol. 20, p. 75; so p. 90. techism," in vol. 19; Stebbing, Essay, &c. in tracts. right of the magistrate is asserted by the best writers on the Law of Nature and Nations; Grotius, Concord. veræ Polit. cum Relig. c. 1, n. 13. Puffendorf, De Jure Nat. et Gent. lib. 7, cap. 9, § 4; Vattel, Law of Nations, Prelim., and lib. 1 chap. 12. office, or the natural rights belonging to it, the duty devolves upon him, as conservator of the good of the community, to encourage religion. The only difficulty is, in what way he is to promote it. He cannot personally teach and inculcate the doctrines of the gospel; for that is the office of the Christian ministry; he cannot engraft them in the heart, for that is the office of the Holy Spirit; religion, in short, as an inward principle, is quite beyond his control. In no other way, then, can he promote it than by the influence of his example, and by providing whatever is requisite for instruction in its truths, and for the performance of its services. All provisions of human laws refer to outward actions: and those respecting religion must consequently relate to that which is external, as the erection of churches, the payment of ministers, and the like. If the civil ruler be bound to patronize religion, he must of necessity make choice of some such outward mode, the only one within his power. The argument, then, stands thus: It is the duty of the sovereign to promote the good of society: religion, the best gift of God to man, is the chief good of society: the sovereign, therefore, is bound to use all the means he possesses of promoting it; but no other than external means are within his power: consequently, he is bound to employ them for the advancement of religion. This inference it is attempted to evade in different ways. Some, compelled by the force of truth, admit the premises, and own that it is the duty of the sovereign and of all subordinate authorities to employ their power and influence for the support and diffusion of religion. "He may bring his authority to aid the Divine laws, by commanding his subjects to perform certain religious observances, and by conferring especial marks of favour on those who are the most zealous and active in their compliance; and he may employ a portion of the public funds intrusted to his administration in erecting and furnishing places of worship, in printing and circulating the Bible, and what he may judge the best books of human composure; in training to due qualification persons who shall teach Divine truths and human duties; in securing to them the means of subsistence while they devote their whole lives to those pious and benevolent labours; in conferring upon them special honours and advantages"." But, conceding all this, it is contended that by establishing religion, the sovereign defeats his object; instead of promoting it, he inflicts upon it an unspeakable injury; instead of strengthening its influence, he does much to produce an entire 1 Dr. Pye Smith, Append. to Sermon, p. 27. So in his "Letters." Most of the older Nonconformists held the same opinion; as for instance, Calamy, Defence of Moderate Nonconformity, vol. ii. p. 28; et seq. where he makes equally liberal concessions. disruption of all that binds man either to his Creator or to one another. It is surprising how any should fail to perceive that such reasoning cannot invalidate the principle of an Establishment. Civil rulers may espouse erroneous plans, they may adopt injudicious methods in reference to religion; but this circumstance does not overthrow their right to adopt some means or other. A measure, for instance, may be introduced into Parliament, which may be shown to be likely to inflict unspeakable injury on society; yet it would be absurd to convert it into an argument against the right of Parliament to pass it. The objection, then, can at the most only make against the expediency of a national religion; and every argument on this ground, so far from denying, admits the magistrate's right to establish it; which is granting all that is contended for in this Chapter. The utility of Establishments is another matter; but capable of proof, as I conceive, little short of demonstration. Human means are the appointed instruments for advancing religion in the world; and it would be absurd to suppose their efficacy is lost when employed by governThe religious instruction of the people, the circulation of the Scriptures, the erection of Churches, the education of youth for the ministry, the maintenance of qualified ministers, the providing such things as are requisite for ments. 12 |