a false one, are we to argue against the duty of bringing them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord? It is unquestionably a sacred obligation upon individuals to choose a religion; yet, because they may make an erroneous choice, are we to deny them this privilege? The objection, in short, involves the absurdity of arguing against a thing from its abuse; and if we deny the right of civil rulers to interfere in religion, because it may be abused, it must in the end drive us to consequences which will allow no rest to the soles of our feet till we repose in the bosom of an infallible church. The magistrate's duty, like that of private persons, is to search, to examine, and to support the truth, as it is in Jesus: and in proportion to the overwhelming importance of the subject, should be his anxious care to have a conscience rightly directed, and a judgment well informed.

The duty of civil rulers to establish a national religion, is accompanied with directions to establish it only by such means as are sanctioned by the sacred writings, and by a due regard to the public weal; and within the boundary of these prescriptions, even error in the performance of the duty cannot, it is presumed, be productive of very serious evils. It is less dangerous than in the exercise of other civil functions, since error here is attended with the powerful counteraction which the principle of

toleration calls into operation. In giving exclusive privileges to one religion, he must grant to others the liberty of serving God in their own way, and of adopting that creed, and that mode of worship, which they may deem agreeable to the word of God, and best adapted to secure the salvation of their souls'. Besides, though the possibility of error on the part of the magistrate is freely admitted, in affairs of religion we have especial reason to expect the controlling agency of divine providence. All his dispensations are accommodated to the imperfect condition of his creatures; and he invests some of them with high authority and power, which they sometimes wield for wrong and oppression, but His almighty arm brings good out of evil, and overrules the errors of princes, and the wickedness of subjects, for the accomplishment of His wise and gracious designs.

The objection, moreover, proves a great deal too much; for if it be valid against one method of promoting religion, it must be equally valid against every other; since no means can be employed for the support of truth, which may not be made use of for the support of error. If the magistrate ought not to annex civil sanctions to religion, because he may, by an error of judgment, establish a false one, the Dissenters ought

1 See Chap. v. § 8.

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not to employ human means to advantage “ the cause," and "the interest" which they believe to be right, because they may be deceived, that cause may be unsound, that interest unscriptural. In fact, the like argument may be made use of against any thing which, either through the weakness of men's judgment, or the corruption of their hearts, may be applied to a bad as well as a good purpose.

An objection, therefore, which legitimately goes to an extent which neither common sense nor reason admits, cannot possess any validity. Every exercise of civil power affecting the peace and welfare of society is liable to error; for government having no superior, can be under no infallible control: and it may adopt a creed, as well as means of supporting it, which are unscriptural. But these, it is evident, are not essential to an establishment, and that which concludes against them, will not therefore conclude against all employment of means. cause some establishments are wrong, it will not follow that there ought to be no establish

ment.

Be

9. It is urged that if the magistrate is bound to exercise the power of Christ in support of religion, the care of souls will devolve upon him, and he will be empowered to assume the spiritual functions, whereas, Christ hath appointed an order of ministers to perform them. But the inference is not just. In matters of reli

gion he acts only in his civil capacity; and consequently all the support he can give, and all the privileges he can confer are only of a civil and secular nature. The sacred functions are committed to spiritual persons, and civil governors cannot exercise them, cannot confer them, cannot qualify any for the ministration of the word and sacraments. The laws of God do not warrant them in the assumption of any such powers; but, on the other hand, restrain them to the exercise of their secular supremacy; and they cannot lawfully enact any thing contrary to what these laws enjoin.

10. There is no precept in the Gospel enjoining ecclesiastical Establishments; the want of which, our opponents insist is equivalent to a prohibition. To this it has been answered, that it is unreasonable to expect a positive precept in the case, inasmuch as it must be liable to various modifications, according to political circumstances in different nations; that its observance was impossible till kings and civil rulers had embraced the Christian faith; that there was no occasion for an express command, the right of the magistrate to take care of religion being enforced by the example of the Jew. ish system, and generally acknowledged; that Church Establishments could not be specially enjoined without too precise a specification of their form and constitution to admit of their being accommodated to the peculiar circum

stances of every age and country; that some things are conformable to the will of God which are not the subject of any direct command, as the cultivation of friendship, the prohibition of slavery, the baptism of infants, the observance of the sabbath; that a specific direction would have lessened the confidence of those who depended upon invisible aid; that it might, on the one hand, have encouraged a spirit of insubordination and resistance to civil governments even from a desire of carrying the direction into effect, and, on the other, would have furnished heathen rulers with a plausible ground for persecution.

This objection, however, and all others of the same kind, must appear contemptible to every one conversant with the luminous reasoning of Bp. Butler. "As we are no sort judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by what means it were to be expected that God would naturally instruct us; so, upon supposition of his affording us light and instruction by revelation additional to what he has afforded us by reason and experience, we are in no sort judges by what methods and in what proportion it were to be expected that this supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us1." Without presuming to be wise above what is written, it is our part gratefully to receive the light of revelation, and with venerating sub

1 Analogy, p. ii. ch. 3.