ment owes to its own preservation, and to the good of the people committed to its care; but whether it is to be effected by a test-law, or in some other way, must depend upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.

Secondly: The magistrate may enjoin silence upon those whose declared opinions are prejudicial or dangerous to the state. Liberty of conscience, a natural and inviolable right, requires every man to follow its dictates in whatever relates to the worship of his Creator: with interior religion no human power can interfere, without being guilty of cruelty and despotism. "But,"

as Vattel observes, "in religious affairs a citizen has only a right to be free from compulsion, but can by no means claim that of openly doing what he pleases, without regard to the consequences it may produce on society 1." Though he may enjoy the liberty of private judgment to the fullest extent, and espouse whatever doctrines he may think fit; yet the magistrate may restrain him from publishing or publicly avowing them, whenever such prohibition is necessary for the welfare of society. At the same time he can require nothing by force, except silence; he cannot, without injury to conscience, attempt to compel any to bear a part in public worship, or other external ceremonies, of which they disapprove.

! Law of Nations, lib. i. §. 129.

Thirdly: Whatever restrictions and penalties the magistrate may impose on account of religion, they must be such as are strictly in unison with the genius of Christianity. He is not, under the pretence of encouraging religion, to subject the professors of others to unnecessary disabilities; nor ought he to lay upon them needless hardships, or deny them the peaceful enjoyment of their own opinions, and their own modes of worship, so long as they are attended with no harm to the State. Every pin and wheel in the cruel machinery of vindictive persecution is at variance with the mild spirit of the Gospel, which vindicates all the rights of mankind, natural and social, which contribute to the happiness of civilized existence.

8. Hence appears the obligation to grant a full and free toleration. The magisterial authority is always subordinate to the authority of God; and his duty to promote religion is limited to those methods which the Gospel prescribes for the propagation of it; among which compulsion cannot be found. Force cannot alter a man's belief, nor his opinion as to the lawfulness of an action, and is therefore as useless as pernicious. The civil ruler would violate the principles established in the third chapter, if he employed coercion in things appertaining to religion, or in any way infringed the right of private judgment and liberty of conscience. It is indeed beyond human power to prevent men

from freedom of thought; but no human power has a right to attempt it. Religion being a matter between a man's own conscience and his God, every man ought to judge for himself, since he must render an account of himself to God, Rom, xiv. 12. Salvation is a personal concern, which can neither be alienated nor transferred; and every one having this responsibility, it is incumbent upon all to examine and decide for themselves as to what is best calculated to secure it, Luke xii. 57; Rom. xiv. 5; Acts iv. 19, xvii. 11; 1 Cor. x. 15; 1 Thess. v. 21. It is no less the duty of the people than of the prince to profess and obey the religion which they conscientiously believe to be true; and of course they ought to be left in the full enjoyment of this liberty.

It will hardly be pleaded now in opposition, that our Saviour "said unto the servant, Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled," Luke xiv. 23. The original word rendered "compel" is often used in the sense of moral compulsion; and here means, persuade them by the most urgent intreaties to come in'. The idea of forcing men to an entertainment is ridiculous, nor could one servant do it. To employ this, therefore, as an argument for using force in religious matters is perfectly absurd. The apos

1 See Christian Expositor, in loc.

tles themselves disclaimed the employment of any thing like compulsion: "not that we have dominion over your faith," 2 Cor. i. 24; neither did they represent themselves "as being lords over God's heritage," 1 Pet. v. 3. It is well remarked by Mr. Locke, that "the toleration of those who differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it'. Compulsion in matters of conscience is on every ground to be discarded by the magistrate, who has fulfilled his Christian obligations when he has provided the means for supporting religion among all his subjects, leaving the success of them to their ordinary operation under the blessing of divine Providence.

9. The only exceptions which either reason or religion admits to a complete toleration are those which have been above referred to; but of this who shall be the judge? To whom does it belong to determine whether such cases actually exist in a particular country? This is a weighty question; and the answer is, that it falls within the province of its government. The supreme authority in every State must of necessity act with discretionary power; for an autho

1 Letters on Toleration, p. 9. See Hints on Toleration, Essays 1-3.

rity, beyond which there is no appeal, cannot be called to an account for its acts. That "the people are the source of all power" is a maxim for ever in the mouths of political sciolists and public agitators; a maxim which, in the ordinary acceptation of the terms, can hardly be reconciled with the divine sovereignty; but to the humble believer in Jesus it is enough to be assured, that "the powers that be are ordained of God," and that he has enjoined the duty of rendering to them obedience in all things lawful. It belongs to their trust and office to judge of the tendency of particular religious professions, whether they are of a character so dangerous to the State as to justify them in imposing positive restrictions.

This, it is acknowledged, is an office of great peril and awful responsibility. Civil rulers may be deceived; they may entertain apprehensions without just grounds; they may decide erroneously; but it is a danger which attaches to every other exercise of their authority. A supreme legislative power must exist, and always with the possibility of error and abuse. It might be an object of desire to see all permitted to follow the dictates of conscience in whatever regards religion; leaving it to God alone to defend and prosper the sacred cause of truth; but when religious sentiments are propagated, or even cherished, which are opposed to the well-being of the State, it becomes the duty of civil govern