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from a harbour, a breakwater, a canal, a bridge, and a thousand other things, this or that person may reap no direct profit; but it would be absurdity itself to assert that they cannot be justly called upon to contribute to the expense. The objection, then, leads to consequences which common sense rejects; it also asserts a principle that no one is to be taxed for any thing not beneficial to himself individually, and that of this he is himself to be the judge; a principle which, if admitted, would render the administration of the State impracticable; since any one might refuse to pay his quota of the taxes on the plea that they were expended on that from which he derived no profit; a plea which, on the ground of the objection, it would not be easy to invalidate.

Civil government, as the ordinance of God, must enjoy the right to whatever is necessary to its effective and beneficial administration; and, as without revenues its affairs cannot be carried on, it must be right to levy them by an equal but compulsory taxation. Hence, the duty of subjects to render tribute to whom tribute is due;" and the reciprocal duty of the ruler is to expend the public money in the way most conducive to the public interest. What pecuniary arrangements may be so it belongs to his office to judge; and, as they are of a civil or temporal nature, they may be enjoined by

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him, and when so enjoined they become really valid laws, to which each member of the State is conscientiously obliged to submit. They can be exonerated from this obligation only by such conduct as will exonerate them from the duty of all obedience.

The other plea of a violation of the rights of conscience is fraught with consequences equally dangerous. If Dissenters are to be exempted from contributing to an Establishment because they in some respects disapprove of it, every one by the same rule must be exempted from contributing to any measure of government of which he disapproves; a rule obviously incompatible with the very existence of government. Nor does it appear how the payment of a church-rate, for instance, can be a persecution and violation of conscience, though we may not altogether like the Church or its services. The duty of submission to "the powers that be," is enjoined in the scriptures; and a payment of an impost to them is surely justifiable on that ground, though we may deem some of their proceedings unwise, impolitic, or unjust. St. Paul enjoins the converts to pay taxes to the Roman government, part of which were expended in maintaining a superstitious and idolatrous worship. The payment, moreover, is not optional but compulsory; and it is difficult to conceive how any one can really feel scruple

of conscience in doing that which they are compelled to do by the laws and constitution under which they live.

It is attempted by some to parry the force of these remarks by making a distinction in the right of taxation between things secular and things sacred; in the former, say they, the civil power may compel the submission of the people, though the conscience may disapprove of them, but not in the latter. This, however, rests upon an assumption which is a mere begging of the question; for the whole dispute hinges upon the right of governments so to interfere in matters of religion as to lend the power of the State to its support, which implies the right to levy the requisite funds from the people. The affirmative, it is presumed, has been substantiated; and besides, it has just been shewn that an ecclesiastical tax, as such, is neither unjust nor a violation of conscience. It may be impolitic, it may be unwise to impose it, but it does no injury to conscience; and, in the payment of it, no other scruple can rationally be entertained than the reluctance which every man feels to contribute to that which he dislikes.

Neither part, therefore, of the objection is of any validity against the conclusion above deduced, namely, that it is incumbent upon governors and legislators in Christian States to provide the requisite funds for religious instruction, and religious services. If it be the right

and duty of the magistrate to support a national religion, it must be equally his right and duty to assign a portion of the national revenue for that object. Such is the principle: as to what relates to its amount, to the mode of collection and manner of distribution-these are matters of fiscal regulation; and, like other matters of that sort, are to be settled and enforced by municipal law. In many countries, particularly in our own, this principle is seldom called into operation, except in the article of church-rates; which, from the smallness of the amount, cannot be felt as a burthensome impost. The endowments and possessions of the Anglican church, together with the tithes to which she is entitled, are voluntary grants from the former owners, and cannot justly be regarded as a tax imposed by the government.

CHAPTER V.

THE CIVIL PENALTIES WHICH THE MAGISTRATE MAY IMPOSE IN ESTABLISHING A RELIGION.

1. THE Sovereign, as we have seen, may grant certain privileges for the sake of supporting religion; but how far he is justified in enforcing it by civil penalties, is a question of much intricacy but the principles already laid down will help us to the solution.

2. The magistrate has a right to repress by the arm of secular power all overt and active attempts to overthrow the established religion. Under this designation it is not meant to include fair argument and serious discussion, the right to which necessarily springs from the right of private judgment of free inquiry; nor the use of legal and constitutional means to effect its abolition; for this is a civil right which belongs to every man as a citizen. But every other kind of active opposition, being unjustifiable, may be put down; for the magistrate having

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