it in the strict sense would exclude a voluntary as much as a legal and permanent provision.

So much for the objections. On the other hand, it clearly follows from the principles already established, that it is incumbent upon the governors and legislators in Christian countries to provide the requisite funds for religious instruction and religious services. If it be the duty of the magistrate to maintain religion by every lawful and practicable method, then is he bound to furnish, as far as he can lawfully and prudently, the pecuniary means necessary for that purpose. As they cannot be adequately supplied from his own private resources, he is bound to provide such as are within the reach of his official power; by encouraging, for instance, voluntary contributions; by securing through legal enactments the endowments and revenues which the wealthy are willing to grant; by an equal taxation of all classes, or by whatever system may be judged most expedient, enforced by equitable and compulsory laws. Granting the premises, the conclusion is inevitable; for a command to do a thing includes the means necessary for its performance.

In various matters connected with religion the Scriptures, as observed in the preceding pages, leave room for the exercise of a sound discretion; and pecuniary arrangements are assuredly of that sort. They come fairly within the province of human reason, the legitimate exercise of

which is not superseded by Revelation. No matter of ecclesiastical institution requires to be so nicely adjusted to the habits, localities, and internal state of each nation; an adjustment which demands the application of good sense and political prudence. Pecuniary arrangements, then, cannot be everywhere one and the same; for a system highly beneficial in one age or country, may be quite the reverse in another. Some, however, must be adopted, since supplies are indispensable to external Christianity; and as it is the magistrate's duty to support religion, it falls within his province to choose and legalize that which is best fitted for the end proposed.

In European states a considerable property has been devoted to the maintenance of religious offices by the spontaneous piety of the earlier ages. In such cases the magistrate is not called upon to levy fresh contributions, not at least to any great extent, but to secure the old. If it be binding upon him to supply, as far as possible, the pecuniary sources when wanting, he must be under the most sacred obligation, when they are already provided, to preserve them entire and undiminished. To seize upon them, or to divert them to the use of the state, or to any other than that for which they were intended by the donors, is a flagrant breach of trust, an act of the grossest injustice, a daring and public spoliation; nay more, it is a robbery of things consecrated to the service of God, which con

stitutes a kind of sacrilege, of which those in office who call themselves Christians should

tremble to be guilty. "Either the name of Godhead," says Hooker, "is but a feigned thing, or, if in heaven there be a God, the sacrilegious intention of Church robbers, which lurketh under this plausible name of reformation, is in his sight a thousand times more hateful than the plain professed malice of those very miscreants who threw their vomit in the open face of our blessed Saviour1."

6. But against compulsory payments for the support of religious offices it is urged, that it is unjust to compel Dissenters to contribute towards the expense of ministrations by which they do not profit; and a violation of the rights of conscience to tax them for the support of a Church of which they do not approve. To these two points all the loud descants about the onerous burden, the intolerable grievance, the loathed oppression of ecclesiastical taxation may be reduced; but when stript of the gaudy colours so variegated and so richly spread by nonconformist pencilling, they will be found light and unsubstantial.

The first ground of objection, the injustice, is based upon the assumption, that those who separate from an Established Church are in no way profited by it, which is undoubtedly contrary to

Eccles. Polity, I. 7. § 21.

fact. Religion, it will not be denied, is a great blessing; and so far as the public maintenance of it tends to the peace, the good order, and the welfare of society, Dissenters have a share of the advantage. Allowing even the benefits of an establishment to be of a kind merely temporal, they are nevertheless a public good, in which every member of the community more or less. participates. As it is not the design of this work to press arguments of utility, it may be sufficient to refer to Dr. Dealtry, who, in his Charge in 1834, has most ably shown that the benefits of an establishment are not confined exclusively to the members of its own com

munion.

But, say our opponents: " Admit that Dissenters should be compelled to share in its support because they share in its advantages, we affirm that the operation of dissent is at least equally beneficial to society at large; that the members of the Establishment participate in the good effects resulting from its influence; and that they should, on this principle, be compelled also to contribute to the maintenance of dissenting teachers'." Some injudicious advocates may have reasoned that, as all participate in the benefits resulting from an Establishment, all should be compelled to contribute to its support; but this is a misapprehension of the

1 Conder, on Nonconformity, vol. ii. p. 552.

argument, the real scope of which is, not that Dissenters should be compelled to contribute to an Establishment because they derive profit from it, but that they have no right to complain of injustice on the ground of deriving no profit from it; inasmuch as the allegation is unfounded in fact. Admitting that they participate in the benefits, to whatever extent, the ground of the alleged injustice is subverted, and the objection vanishes into air. If the operation of dissent were proved to be in some degree beneficial to society at large, Churchmen could not reasonably object to contribute to its maintenance on the ground of reaping no profit from it, though they would object on other grounds; for, without denying it some good effects, they would believe them far out-balanced by the necessarily attendant evils.

Supposing Dissenters do not in any way profit from an Established Church, it by no means follows, that the supreme magistrate is to be debarred on that account from applying a part of the national revenue to what he conceives the most useful and important of national objects. The public expenditure flows, and must flow, in various channels from which the bulk of the people derive no immediate advantage, and which are not unfrequently absolutely prejudicial to some individuals; yet the government is not chargeable with injustice. From the army, the navy, the customs, the excise;