[ment (h). And the law so much discourages unlawful imprisonment of every sort, that if a man, while under duress of imprisonment, seals a bond or the like, he may afterwards avoid the deed, that is, when the imprisonment is illegal, not when it is legal (i). Every legal imprisonment, that is to say commitment to prison, must either be by process from the courts, or by warrant from some person having authority to commit. And when the commitment is under a warrant, the warrant must be in writing, under the hand and seal of him by whom it is given, and must express the cause or causes of the commitment, in order to be examined into, if necessary, upon a habeas corpus. If there be no cause expressed in the warrant, the gaoler is not bound to detain the prisoner (k). A natural and regular consequence of the right of personal liberty is, that every Englishman may claim to abide in his own country so long as he pleases, and not to be driven from it or sent out of it, unless by the sentence of the law. The king indeed, by his royal prerogative, may issue his writ ne exeat regno, to prohibit any of his subjects from going out of the kingdom into foreign parts without licence; for that may be necessary for the public welfare or for the due safeguarding of the Commonwealth (1). But no power on earth, except the authority of Parliament, can send a subject out of the kingdom against his will; for exile was never sanctioned by the common law, except in the case of abjuration of the realm (m). And though, in comparatively modern times, persons, criminals under sentence of "transportation" (n), have been sent into (h) 2 Inst. 589. (i) Ibid. 482. (k) Ibid. 52. (1) Practically, the writ ne exeat regno is now only issued in cases falling under secs. 4 and 6 of the Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Viet. c. 62). Colverson v. Bloomfield (1885), 29 Ch. D. 341. (in) Co. Litt. 133 a. (n) Transportation was abolished by the Penal Servitude Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 3), and " penal servitude" substituted. [places beyond the seas, that has been done either by their own choice, to escape capital punishment, or else it has been under the express authority of some Act. of Parliament (o). And the Great Charter expressly declares, that no freeman shall be banished, unless by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land (p). And by the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679 (31 Car. II. c. 2), it is enacted, that no subject of the realm shall be sent prisoner into places beyond the seas; that the person who shall dare to commit another, contrary to this law, shall be disabled from bearing any office, shall incur the penalty of a præmunire, and shall be incapable of receiving the king's pardon and that the party injured shall have his civil action also against the wrongdoer, his aiders, advisers, and abettors, whereby he shall recover his costs and also damages to the extent of at least five hundred pounds. Moreover, the law, in these particulars, is so benignly and liberally construed for the benefit of the subject, that, though within the realm the king may command the attendance and service of all his liegemen, yet he cannot send any man out of the realm, even upon the public service,-except, of course, sailors and soldiers, the nature of whose employment of itself implies an exception. And the Crown cannot even constitute a man lord lieutenant of Ireland, or make him a foreign ambassador, against his will. For this might, in reality, be no more than an honourable exile (q).] (0) It is said, that exile was first introduced as a punishment by the legislature in the thirty-ninth year of Eliz., when a statute enacted that "such rogues as were dangerous to the inferior people should be banished the realm" (39 Eliz. (1597), c. 4; see Barrington, Observations on the Statutes, 268 n, 269); and that the first statute in which 66 the word transportation" is (p) C. 39 (ed. Stubbs). The right of every Protestant subject to carry arms, i.e., such as are proper for his defence, is a right declared by the Bill of Rights (1689) (r); and it is in fact, when exercised with sobriety and under due restrictions, an incident to the right of self-preservation. But to go armed under circumstances which tend to terrify the people, or with an intention to disturb the public peace, is forbidden by the law (s). Also, the training of persons, without lawful authority, in the use of arms, is forbidden by the Unlawful Drilling Act, 1819 (t). (r) 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2. (8) Edw. 3 (1328), c. 3; Hawk. P.C., bk. 1, ch. lxiii. (t) 60 Geo. 3 & 1 Geo. 4, c. 1. BOOK II. OF RIGHTS OF PROPERTY. AS TO PROPERTY IN GENERAL. THE right of property in an individual may be defined as consisting in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of his belongings, according to the law; and it may otherwise be described as the right or principle by which one man claims and exercises dominion over certain external things, to the exclusion of all other individuals therefrom. [In the beginning of the world, as we are informed by holy writ, the all-bountiful Creator gave to man "dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl "of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon "the earth" (a). The earth, therefore, and all things therein, are the general property of mankind, exclusive of other beings, under the immediate gift of the Creator; and while the earth continued bare of inhabitants, it is reasonable to suppose that all was in common among them, and that every one took from the public stock, to his own use, such things as his immediate necessities. required. However, even in the earliest ages it appears that, by the law of nature, he who first began to use a thing, acquired therein a transient property, the right of possession continuing while the fact continued (b); so that, e.g., whoever was in the occupation of any definite spot of land,-for rest, for shade, or the like,—acquired for the time a sort of ownership, from which it would have been unjust, and contrary to the law of nature, to have driven him by force. But the instant (a) Genesis i. 28. (b) Puffendorf, Law of Nature (ed. Kennet), p. 367. [that he quitted the use or occupation of it, another might seize it without injustice. And when mankind increased, and life grew more complicated and refined, the individual who had constructed for himself a habitation for his own shelter and safety, or who had woven for himself some garment for his own warmth and comfort, was recognised as having some property therein; for even the brute creation maintained a property in their dwellings.] The idea of property seems therefore to have had its original foundation in occupancy, confirmed and strengthened by labour. [The reason why occupancy should convey the right of property has been variously accounted for,-Grotius and Puffendorf insisting that this right of occupancy, as a mode of acquiring property, is founded on a tacit and implied assent of all mankind; and Barbeyrac, Locke, and others, holding that no such implied assent is necessary, for that the very act of occupancy alone, being a degree of bodily labour, is from a principle of natural justice, without any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to gain a title. Property, both in lands and moveables, being thus acquired by the first taker, it remains in him, by the principles of universal law, till such time as he does some other act which shows an intention to abandon it. So, if one is possessed of a jewel, and casts it into the sea, or a public highway, this is such an express dereliction, that a property will be vested in the first fortunate finder that will seize it to his own use. But if he hides it privately in the earth, or other secret place, and it is discovered, the finder acquires no property therein; for the owner hath not by this act declared any intention to abandon it, but rather the contrary. And if he loses or drops it by accident, it cannot be collected from thence that he designed to quit the possession; and therefore in such case the property still remains in the loser, who may claim it again of the finder. The right of ownership drew after it the right of |