A tenancy "from year to year," or "by the year," may be created, in the first place, by the express agreement of the parties. And this agreement (provided the rent reserved be at the least two-thirds of the annual value of the land demised) may be either verbal or in writing; but, if the rent is under that amount, then it must be by deed. Secondly, such a tenancy may arise by construction of law; for the law will always imply a tenancy from year to year where there is an occupation at an annual rent, and there is no evidence that the occupier's estate is of a different description (a). And, formerly, if a man was let into possession under a demise not under seal, for a term of more than three years, though such a demise would not pass any legal interest in the premises for the term specified, yet the lessee was considered as holding from year to year, upon such of the terms of the agreement as were consistent with that tenancy (b). At the present day, however, such a demise (if good as an agree ment to demise) confers an equitable interest in the land for the whole term, and not merely a legal interest from year to year (c). It is to be observed, that where a tenancy "by the year" or "from year to year" is once created, it cannot, on either side, be put an end to without half a year's notice to quit from the one party to the other, such notice expiring with the current year of the tenancy (d); though if the tenancy commenced at one of the usual quarterly feast days, the half year must be computed from one of such feast days to another--as from Midsummer to Christmas-whether there be 183 days between them or not (e). It follows, therefore, that a lease "from year to been greatly modified by the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1851.) (a) Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. Merral, (1869) L. R. 4 Exch. 162. (b) Tress v. Savage, (1854) 4 E. & Bl. 36, 42. (c) Walsh v. Lonsdale, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 9. (But such an agreement is not a "lease." Swain v. Ayres, (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 289.) (d) Morgan v. Davies, (1878) 3 C. P. D. 260. (e) Ibid. year will confer an estate for one year certain, determinable by half a year's notice expiring at the end of the first year (f). But if in that, or any succeeding year of the tenancy, more than half a year should elapse without a notice to quit being given by either of the parties, another year certain is thereby constantly added to that which is in progress (g). Also, and upon the same principle, if the lease be "for a year, and so from year to year," it will enure as a demise for two years certain, at the outset. For at the expiration of the first year there is a continuation of the tenancy, which cannot be determined by a notice to quit at an earlier period than the expiration of the second year (h). Moreover, this estate does not come to an end by an assignment of the interest of either of the parties, or by their death; but the tenancy will continue to exist between one of the parties and the assigns or representatives of the other, (or between the assigns or representatives of both parties, as the case may be,) until duly determined by the usual notice to quit (i). As regards leases which fall within the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883 (k), a year's notice, expiring with the current year of the tenancy, is now made necessary in lieu of the old half-year's notice, unless the parties agree in writing to the contrary. And when the tenancy is for a less period than a year, e.g., from month to month, or from week to week, it may, in general, be determined by a month's notice (if it be a monthly letting), and by a week's notice (if it be a weekly letting) (1). It is to be observed, that a tenant from year to year, unlike a tenant for years, is not bound to repair, (f) Doe d. Plumer v. Mainby, (1847) 10 Q. B. 473. (g) Cattley v. Arnold, (1859) 1 J. & H. 660. (h) Legg v. Strudwick, (1709) 2 Salk. 414; Denn v. Cartwright, (1803) 4 East, 31. (i) Cattley v. Arnold, ubi sup. (k) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 61, s. 33. But the benefit of this section cannot be claimed by, or on behalf of, an insolvent tenant. (1) Jones v. Mills, (1861) 10 C. B. (N.S.) 800; Bowen v. Anderson, [1894] 1 Q. B. 164. and consequently will not be answerable for such permissive waste as may arise by his neglect to do so (m). [II. The second species of estates not freehold, are estates at will. This is where lands and tenements are let by one man to another to have and to hold at the will of the lessor; and the tenant by force of this lease obtains possession (n). Such tenant hath no certain indefeasible estate, nothing that can be assigned by him to any other, for that the lessor may determine his will, and put him out whenever he pleases. But every estate at will is at the will of both parties, landlord and tenant; so that either of them may determine the will, and quit his connexion with the other, at his own pleasure (o). Yet this must be understood. with some restriction. For if the tenant at will sows his land, and the landlord, before the corn is ripe or before it is reaped, puts him out, yet the tenant shall have the emblements, with free ingress, egress, and regress to cut and carry away the profits (p). But it is otherwise where the tenant himself determines the will; for in that case the landlord shall have the profits of the land (q). A tenant at will is liable for voluntary, but not for permissive waste (r). A tenancy at will may be determined, not only by express notice of the intention to determine it, but also by any act on the part of the landlord which is inconsistent with the estate continuing (s), as, for example, by his entering upon the land and cutting timber, or carrying away stone (t), or taking a distress for rent and impounding it on the premises (u); or by any similar inconsistent act on the part of the tenant, as, for example, by his [committing waste or assigning his estate (r). And if either the lessor or the lessee die or be outlawed, the estate is at an end (y). The law is, however, careful that no sudden determination of the will by one party shall tend to the manifest and unforeseen prejudice of the other. This appears from the rule, that, in the event of the tenancy being determined by the act of the lessor, or his death, the lessee is entitled to emblements; and the lessee, after the determination of the lessor's will, has also the right of reasonable ingress and egress to fetch away his goods and utensils (z). If the rent be made payable quarterly or half-yearly, and the lessee determines the will, it is said that the lessor will in such a case be entitled to be paid the rent to the end of the current quarter or half-year (a). In fact, the courts lean against construing demises, where no certain term is mentioned, as tenancies at will (b); and rather hold them to be tenancies from year to year, so long as both parties please.] A lessor at will can distrain for rent, if the rent is a fixed amount (c). [Among the examples of estates at will, there must, technically, be classed one that deserves a more special notice than any other. This is, the estate held by copy of court roll; or, as we usually call it, a copyhold estate. The extent and nature of this estate is, as we previously explained, in treating of copyhold tenure, entirely determined by the custom of the manor of which it is held. A copyholder may, in many manors, be tenant in fee simple, in fee-tail, for life, by the curtesy, in dower or free bench, for years, at sufferance, or on condition. Yet none of those interests amount to freehold; for the (x) Ibid. 57 a. (y) Oland's Case, (1602) 5 Rep. 116 b; Co. Litt. 57 b, 62 b. (2) Litt. ss. 68, 69. (a) Kighly v. Bulkly, (1666) 1 Sid. 339; Leighton v. The d, (1731) 2 Salk. 413. (But the doctrine is dis tinctly inconsistent with the passage (c) Anderson v. Midland Ry. Co. (1861) 30 L. J. Q. B. 94. [freehold of the whole manor abides always in the lord only (d).] Therefore it is that, while many of the rules. affecting freehold limitations (e.g. the Rule in Shelley's Case (e)) apply to copyhold estates, some others do not. Thus, the Statute De Donis is held not to affect copyhold interests; and, unless there is in the particular manor a custom to entail, a grant of a copyhold to "A. and the heirs of his body," will give A. an estate in fee simple conditional, which, on the birth of issue, will become a fee simple absolute (f). And so, while the estate of the copyholder is technically an estate at will, it is an estate at will according to the custom of the manor. And although, for many years after copyholders were recognized as tenants, they could not obtain protection of their estates. against their lords in the king's courts (for they were, technically, their lords' villeins), that disability has long since disappeared; and now, for many centuries, copyholds have received from the courts as full a protection as any other estates. Still, however, there remain two curious marks of the original character of the copyholder's position. One of these is, the fact that no copyholder, however great his estate, may do any act in respect of his tenement in the nature of waste, upon pain of forfeiture of his interest (g); the other that, upon similar penalty, he may not (unless by his lord's licence) grant a lease for a longer period than one year, or aliene by any freehold assurance (h). [III. An estate at sufferance is where one comes into possession of land under lawful title, but keeps it afterwards without any title at all (i). As if a man takes a lease for a year, and (after the year is expired) continues to hold the premises, without any fresh leave from the (1866) L. R. 2 Eq. 765. (d) Litt. s. 81. (e) Baker v. Parson, (1872) 42 L. J. Ch. 228. (f) Co. Litt. 60 b. (g) Duke of Portland v. Hill, (h) Jackman v. Hoddesdon, (1594) Cro. Eliz. 351. (i) Anderson v. Midland Ry. Co., (1861) 30 L. J. Q. B. 94. |