them, as one that had declared against the argument a priori; as indeed he really had, though verbally he might seem to differ, as I have before hinted. So universal hitherto had been the agreement of metaphysicians and divines in this article.

A. D. 1644. DIONYSIUS PETAVIUS.

The very learned Petavius is but short upon this question, mentioning it transiently, as it came in his way: but he is too considerable a person to be omitted in this recital. He takes notice, that the existence of a Deity is not to be proved from any thing prior or antecedent, but from effects only, and a posteriori; and from the absurdities which lie against the contrary persuasion '.

A. D. 1652. NATHANAEL CULVERWELL.

I shall now mention a Protestant writer of our own, of some note in his time. He was Fellow of Emanuel College in Cambridge. In his book, entitled, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, he occasionally drops a few words to our purpose: "There can "be no demonstration of him [God] a priore; for he is "the first Cause: and all demonstrations fetched from "such effects as flow from him, they do only show you "that he is; they do not open and display the Divine essence s," &c.

A. D. 1658. BISHOP BARLOW.

A more considerable writer of our own, so far as concerns the present question, was Thomas Barlow, then Fellow of Queen's College, Oxon. and afterwards (A. D.

• Verum hæc iisque similia tum nos commoverent, si probationum id genus ageretur quod ex antecedentibus et prioribus ducitur, ac demonstrationem et scientiam parit: ejusmodi enim locum in Deo non habent.-Nihilominus ex effectis et iis quæ posteriora sunt, atque etiam iis ex incommodis et absurdis quæ in contradicentium altera parte cernuntur, argumenta licet colligere, quibus Deus esse monstretur. Petav. Dogm. Theolog. tom. i. lib. 1. c. 1. p. 2, 3.

1675.) Bishop of Lincoln. He published some Metaphysical Exercises, wherein he discovers great learning, and no less acuteness. The edition of 1658, which I follow, is the second edition. I shall produce his sentiments at large, because he entered deep into the question, viewed it on every side, and withal passed his censure (though rather too severe) upon the learned Suarez.

He writes thus: "Our knowledge of God, arising "from the light of nature, is not a priori, and T. "The reason is, because then God could not be eternal, "if there were any principle prior to God: for eternity, "in the very notion of it, excludes any prior principle. "Consequently, if God be eternal, there cannot be any "prior principle whereby he may be known a priori."Were there any principle by which God might be "known a priori, then, 1. God would not be the first "Original and first Cause, as having by the supposition "another cause prior to him.-2. That supposed antece"dent principle, by which the existence of God should "be proved, must be either external, (of the final or effi"cient kind,) or else internal, of the material or formal "kind. Now it cannot be of the final kind, because "God is the chief end, and there cannot be any higher "final cause, whereby to demonstrate a priori the exist"ence of God. It cannot be of the efficient kind; be"cause if God had any antecedent efficient cause, then "God would be an effect, &c.-Neither can it be said, "that such prior cause is either material or formal: for "the perfect simplicity of the Divine nature admits not of "any such causes, as is self-evident: consequently there " is no room for any cause whereby to demonstrate a pri"ori the existence of a Deity "."

* Hæc nostra de Deo cognitio, a lumine naturali orta, non est a priori et diri. Ratio est, quia sic Deus non esset æternus, modo esset aliquod principium Deo prius: ipsa enim æternitas intrinseca dicit negationem principii; et per consequens, si Deus sit æternus, non potest esse aliquod principium prius, per quod a priori cognoscetur.-Si esset aliquod principium quo Deum a priori cognosceremus; tum, 1. Deus non esset principium primum

Our learned author here enters into the heart of the question, and reasons his way through, like a knowing and judicious man. Only he seems rather too short as to what concerns the two internal causes, called material and formal: but that brevity of his may be competently supplied from what has been said above, under Duns Scotus. I proceed to observe how he animadverts upon Suarez.

"I am aware, that Suarez is of opinion, that we may, "in some sort, demonstrate a priori the existence of a Deity: not by the essence of God as such, but by some "certain attribute which is really the essence of God, "only considered by us, in an abstract way, as a mode "of the uncaused Being. But, to say the truth, I ap

prove not this bold assertion of the learned Jesuit. "Because it is a manifest contradiction to say, that the "existence of God can be proved a priori from any at"tribute whatever, when every attribute, as such, in the very notion of it, denotes something posterior to the essence of which it is the attribute. For if the at"tribute be really distinct, [from the essence,] then it "is really subsequent to it: or if it be only notion

ally distinct, (which is the case in the divine Being,) "then it is likewise notionally subsequent to the essence, whose attribute it is conceived to be. It is not possible so much as to imagine any attribute but what presupposes some essence whose attribute it is. Consequently our knowledge of God's existence is a posle"riori only and of that kind are all the demonstrations

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et causa prima, utpote qua alia causa esset prior.—2. Principium prius ex quo probari possit a priori Deum esse, vel erit externum (finale vel efficiens) vel internum, scil. materiale vel formale. Non primum, quia cum Deus sit finis ultimus, non possit esse causa finalis prior, per quam demonstrari possit dör. Deum esse. Non secundum, quia si Deus habuisset causam efficientem priorem, tum Deus esset effectus, &c.-Nec dici possit, quod illa causa sit materialis, aut formalis, summa Dei simplicitas tales causas non admittit, ut manifestum est: et per consequens non est causa ulla, per quam a priori demonstrari possit esse Deum. Barlow, Exercit. Metaph. iv. p. 28.

"brought by metaphysicians and schoolmen "." The learned author here argues the point against Suarez with great strength and acuteness: only he seems to fix an opinion upon Suarez which never was his: for Suarez himself plainly disowned any such arguing a priori for the existence, in that crude and gross sense which Barlow appears to take it in, while he is disputing against it. All that Suarez really meant, as I have before hinted, was, that the unity might be proved a priori, after having proved the existence a posteriori: and such proof of the unity he improperly called, or erroneously conceived to be, proving the existence of God a priori, inasmuch as God should not be deemed to be God, till proved to be one. Our author afterwards very well confutes that peculiar fancy, which Suarez and some few others had countenanced in that article: I say, our author well confutes that notion by observing, that the existence of a Deity is sufficiently proved, as soon as an infinite, eternal, uncreated, independent (he should have added intelligent) Being is proved; and that the question of the unity comes not properly in till afterwards *. Valentia had effectually

"Novi quod Suarez putat, nos posse aliquo modo a priori demonstrari Deum esse: non per quidditatem Dei, ut sic, sed ex quodam attributo quod reipsa est essentia Dei, a nobis autem abstractius consideratur ut modus entis nou causati, &c. Sed ut quod res est dicam, non probo hoc docti Jesuita audax pronuntiatum. Quia manifeste implicat Deum esse demonstrari posse a priori per attributum quodcunque, cum attributum omne, qua tale, intrinseca dicit aliquid essentia illa posterius cujus est attributum.—Nam si sit attributum re distinctum, tum re vera est posterius; si sit attributum solum ratione distinctum (quod in divinis accedit) tum est etiam ratione essentia posterius, cujus attributum concipitur: cum attributum nec fingi posset quin præsupponitur essentia aliqua cujus est attributum. Et per consequens Deum esse non nisi a posteriori cognoscimus: tales enim sunt demonstrationes omnes a metaphysicis et scholasticis adducta ad ostendendum Deum esse; ut videre est apud Fran. Suarez. Metaph. p. ii. disp. 29. sect. 2. num. 1, 2, 3, 4. 5. Aquin. contra Gent. lib. i. c. 13. p. 11. et Ferrariens. ibid. Nazarium in I. P. qu. 2. art. 3. et apud Aquin. I. P. qu. 2. art. 3. et commentatores. Barlow, ibid. p. 129, 130. conf. p. 165, 186.

* Hoc dato, quod non ostendunt Deum esse unum, tamen et adhuc erunt argumenta prædicta satis valida, et in demonstrationem thesis antedictæ va litura: quia in præsenti hoc solum demonstrandum suscepimus, nempe esse aliquod ens quod Deum dicimus, infinitum, æternum, increatum, et inde

obviated that pretence of Suarez, some time before, in what he had said against Cajetan, who had been beforehand with Suarez in that piece of subtilty y.

One thing further I would observe of Barlow, before I dismiss him, that he was very scrupulous as to admitting that any of the Divine attributes might be demonstrated a priori. For though he allowed the way of arguing from one attribute before proved, to another not proved, and makes use of it himself more than once; yet considering that the attributes are in reality (however notionally distinguished) identified with the essence, he apprehended such reasoning could not justly be accounted reasoning a prioriz, since the Divine essence could not be conceived prior to itself. There is certainly weight in the sugges

pendens. Sed an hoc ens unum sit aut multiplex, alterius est loci et quæsiti opus demonstrare. Barlow, Exercit. iv. p. 161.

In proposito igitur, cum Dei nomen audimus, communiter solemus concipere imperfecte et confuse, vel primam causam, vel primum movens, vel alia quæ rationes Thomæ concludunt. Quamobrem rationes ejusmodi, quæ scilicet probant esse aliquod primum movens, efficiens, &c. etsi non probant quid, et quale illud sit, scilicet immateriale, infinitum, unum numero, &c. satis tamen probant Deum esse. Illa enim alia probare, pertinet ad quæstionem de natura et quidditate divina, et probantur etiam non admodum difficulter, constituta jam veritate divinæ entitatis, juxta quæstionem an est. Atque hinc fit quod D. Thomas non nisi post expeditam hanc quæstionem an est, disputat de unitate, simplicitate, æternitate, et aliis ejusmodi perfectionibus divinis, ut videbimus in sequentibus quæstionibus. Quocirca cum Cajetanus hic negat, probari per se his rationibus D. Thomæ, Deum esse, eo quod non probatur illis Dei unitas et infinitas; et concedit tantum, id probari per accidens, (ut scilicet ejusmodi rationes concludunt esse quædam prædicata quæ ei rei veritate soli Deo conveniunt,) non satis distinxisse videtur inter quæstionem an est, et quid est. Greg. de Valent. tom. i. p. 64. 2 Fateor Suarezium et scholasticos usitate affirmare æternitatem (ut et alia nonnulla attributa Dei) demonstrari posse a priori, et admittere medium ratione prius; ita ut illud medium licet in re ipsa non sit æternitate prius, tamen quoad modum nostrum concipiendi, imperfectum possit esse prius. Sed, ut quod sentio libere proferam, minutias has scholasticas non probo, et tutius esse judico, et Deo dignius, si de Deo et perfectionibus suis loquamur prout sunt, non prout ab intellectu nostro fingantur. Et sic rectius dices æternitatem a priori demonstrari non posse, quia in re ipsa ita est prout affirmatur, quam æternitatem posse a priori demonstrari, cum in re ipsa non ita fit, nec esse possit medium ullum in re prius, ut supra demonstravimus. Barlow, Exercit. v. p. 187.