neither was nor could be any demonstration a priori of the existence of God. It may be observed also by the way, that the phrase of demonstratio a priori was now become a more familiar phrase than formerly. The elder writers which I have cited, used to call it demonstratio propter quid, answering to the Greek dir. Both signify a proof drawn from some prior cause, or from something naturally, or in the natural order of conception, antecedent to the thing demonstrated by it b. A posteriori is just the reverse c.

A. D. 1600. VASQUEZ.

Gabriel Vasquez, another eminent Schoolman of that time, declares his sentiments to the same purpose; that there can be no demonstration a priori of the existence of a Deity, but a posteriori only d.

A. D. 1614. SUAREZ.

Suarez, the famous Schoolman and Jesuit, deserves a more particular consideration, because he really had a strong inclination to make out something that should look like an argument a priori, or however should (for ostentation sake, I suppose) be set forth with that name: for, in reality, he expressly and absolutely condemned all reasoning a priori to the existence of a Deity, as others before him had done; and yet by a kind of artificial turn, by interpreting the proof of the unity so as to amount to the same with the proof of a Deity, he conceived he had done the thing, only by changing of names. But let us observe how he managed the whole affair: we shall see afterwards what censures were passed upon it by the ju

b Demonstratio a priori ea est qua probatur effectus per causam, sive proximam sive remotam, aut probatur conclusio per aliquod prius, sive sit causa, sive antecedens tantum. Chauvin. Lexic. p. 170.

• Demonstratio a posteriori dicitur illa, qua vel probatur causa per effectum, vel conclusio per aliquod posterius, sive sit effectus sive consequens. Chauvin. ibid.

d Deum esse, non potest a priori demonstrari: a posteriori tamen et per effectus demonstrari potest. Vasq. q. ii. art. 2. p. 60.

dicious, though it was mostly a difference in words. He states the main question thus: "Whether the existence of "God may in some sort [or in some sense] be demon"strated a priorie:" and he determines in the affirmative. The whole tenor of his reasoning is as here follows. f" We are first to premise, that, absolutely speaking, the "existence of God cannot be proved a priori; as well be"cause God has no cause of his existence whereby it "should be proved a priori, as also because if he had, yet "we have no such exact and perfect knowledge of God "as might enable us to trace him up (if I may so speak) "to his own proper principles. To which purpose Dio

• Utrum aliquo modo possit a priori demonstrari Deum esse. Suarez. Metaphys. tom. ii. disp. 29. sect. 3. p. 28.

f Supponendum est, simpliciter loquendo non posse demonstrari a priori Deum esse; quia neque Deus habet causam sui esse, per quam a priori demonstratur, neque si haberet, ita exacte et perfecte a nobis cognoscitur Deus, ut ex propriis principiis (ut sic dicam) illum assequamur. Quo sensu dixit Dionysius, capite septimo de divinis nominibus, nos non posse Deum ex propria natura cognoscere.

Quanquam vero hoc ita sit, nihilominus postquam a posteriori aliquid de Deo demonstratum sit, possumus ex uno attributo demonstrare a priori aliud: ut si ex immensitate, v. g. concludamus localem immutabilitatem. Suppono enim ad ratiocinandum a priori, modo humano, sufficere distinctionem rationis inter attributa.

Resolutio quæstionis. Ad hunc ergo modum dicendum est: Demonstrato a posteriori Deum esse ens necessarium et a se, ex hoc attributo posse a priori demonstrari, præter illud non posse esse aliud ens necessariam et a se, et consequenter demonstrari Deum esse.

Dices, Ergo ex quidditate Dei coguita, demonstratur Deum esse, quia quidditas Dei est quod sit ens necessarium et a se: hoc autem plane repugnat, quia quæstio Quid est supponit quæstionem An est ; ut recte ad hoc propositum notavit divus Thomas. Part. i. q. 2. art. 2. ad secund.

Respondeo, Formaliter ac proprie loquendo, non demonstrari esse Dei per quidditatem Dei ut sic, quod recte argumentum probat; sed ex quodam attributo (quod re ipsa est essentia Dei, a nobis autem abstractius concipitur ut modus entis non-causati) colligi aliud attributum, et ita concludi illud ens esse Deum. Unde ad concludendum hoc modo, esse Deum, sub ratione Dei, supponitur esse probatum, dari ens quoddam per se necessarium, nimirum ex effectibus ejus, et ex negatione processus in infinitum. Atque ita quod primum de hoc ente probatur est esse; deinde esse ab intrinseco necessarium; hinc esse unicum in tali ratione ac modo essendi ; ideoque esse Deum. Atque in hunc modum prius aliquo modo definitur quæstio An est, quam Quid est. Suarez, ibid. p. 28.

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nysius (in his seventh chapter of the divine names) ob"serves, that we cannot know God according to his proper "nature.

"But though that be so as I have here said, yet not"withstanding, after we have once demonstrated a poste"riori something concerning God, we may go on to de"monstrate a priori one attribute from another: as for "instance, when we infer unchangeableness of place from "the omnipresence before proved. I suppose all the while, "that a notional distinction of the Divine attributes (after "an human way of conception) is foundation sufficient "for reasoning a priori.

"Now, for the resolution of the question, I proceed "thus having demonstrated a posteriori, that God is a "necessary and self-existent Being, we may be able to

prove a priori from this attribute, [of necessary exist

ence,] that there cannot be another necessary and self"existent being besides that one; from whence it fol"lows, that that Being is God.

"You will object, that this is proving the existence of "God from the essence of God before known, (for it is "supposed that the essence of God is, that he is a neces"sary and self-existent Being,) which is plainly repug"nant; since the question what he is presupposes the "other question whether he exists; as St. Thomas [Aqui"nas] has justly observed on this head. Part i. qu. 2.

❝art. 2.

"I answer, that strictly and properly speaking, we in"fer not the existence of God from his essence, consider"ed as such, (which the objection justly excepts to,) but "from one certain attribute (which though really identi"fied with the essence, is yet conceived abstractedly by "us as a mode of the Being uncaused) we deduce another "attribute; and so we at length prove that that Being is "God. Wherefore in order to prove in this way that "there is a God, precisely considered as God, we suppose "it proved beforehand, that there is a certain Being necessary in himself; proved namely from his effects, and

"from the absurdity of an infinite progression. So the "first thing we prove of this Being is, that he exists; the "next, that he is necessarily existing; then, that he is the "only one existing in such a way; and so of consequence "he is God. And thus, after some sort, we do first de"termine whether he exists, and next the other question, "what he is."

Thus far the acute and learned Suarez; of whom I have many things to observe, before I go on to other writers; 1. That he appears to have been ambitious to make out something that should be called an argument a priori, and was probably able to do as much in it as any one before or after him can justly be presumed to be. 2. That the method which he took for it, proving first something a posteriori, and then proceeding to argue a priori for the rest, is very like to that which others have taken since. 3. That he differs however from those later advocates for the argument a priori in the main thing of all, and determines expressly against their notion, that necessity can be conceived antecedent to existence. He looked upon that as flat absurdity and self-contradiction, utterly repugnant to the nature of a first Cause; and so he made no use of antecedent necessity, or internal cause, or formal reason, ground, or foundation, in proving his point: he was too knowing a logician and metaphysician, to offer any thing of that kind. 4. All that he admits is, that after the existence and one or more attributes have been proved a posteriori, we may then proceed to argue a priori for the rest: not from antecedent necessity, not from any thing conceived as prior, in order of nature, to the existence itself; but from the existence and one attribule or more considered as before proved, and as prior in conception to all the rest. 5. One thing Suarez was very singular in, and upon that the whole stress of his cause lies, so far as concerns the making out an argument a priori for the existence of God: he would have it supposed that God is not proved to be God, till the unity is prov

ed; and so he suspends, as it were, the proof of a Deity upon the proof of the unity. This was an ingenious thought, but too weak to bear. For in that way there could be no room for the question whether God be one, since the very name would imply it: besides, it is universally allowed, that the proof of the existence of a Deity is both clearer and stronger than any proof of the unity, and is sufficiently determined and settled in the first place, before the consideration of the unity comes in at all. When we have proved, for instance, that there is an intelligent, eternal, self-existent Being, (one or more,) which is most easily proved from our own existence; we have then competently proved that there is a God, though we have not yet proved or considered every attribute that belongs to him. Such has been the way of divines and metaphysicians, first to prove the existence of a Deity, under that confuse general conception; and next to proceed to the proof of the unity and other attributes in due place and order and it is not reasonable to suggest, that if a man should fail in the proof of the unity, or of some other Divine attribute, (for the reason is the same in all,) that he has therefore failed in his proof of a Deity. That would be going against rule, and risking the whole for a part; and, in short, resting the proof of a Deity (the plainest thing in the world) upon very obscure conditions, very unequal terms. But we shall have more of this matter in the sequel, as we take in other later writers, who have directly or indirectly passed their censures upon Suarez for his excesses on this head. 6. Upon the whole, one may observe, that this pretended proof of a Deity, as drawn a priori, is rather a fetch, or a subtilty of that great man, than any thing solid; a nominal proof, rather than a real one; or an affected manner of miscalling things by wrong names.

A. D. 1610. CHRISTOPH, GILLIUS.

Contemporary with Suarez lived Christopher Gillius, a