taught wisdom by repeated failures, and from acknowledging that it has overtasked its powers and mistaken its prerogatives. The arguments relating to these sublime doctrines are summed up on either side, and found to be equally irrefutable, and therefore equally false. Then it is vain to argue either for or against them; the supporter and the assailant alike are silenced.

Such a result of metaphysical inquiry as this, reminds one of Madame de Staël's remark on former skeptical systems; that "they changed the light of knowledge into a devouring flame; and Philosophy, like an enraged magician, fired the palace on which she had lavished all the prodigies of her skill." It should be observed, however, that Kant himself, alarmed by the sweeping skepticism of these conclusions, in his "Critique of Practical Reason," subsequently published, labors to do away with his own work, and to find in our moral nature what the speculative reason cannot afford, a foundation for the belief in things unseen and eternal. The attempt forms a virtual acknowledgment of the necessity of those doctrines, which he had previously refused to legitimate; they are introduced into the field of ethics as postulates, without which moral phenomena remain inexplicable.

Our outline of this celebrated system is necessarily very imperfect, but it may serve to correct some unfounded notions of its character and tendency. The authority of Kant as a teacher of opinions, even in his native country, has passed away; and the result has come far short of justifying his boast, that he had given a new and sure basis to mental science, and fixed the principles and method of its progress. Speculation has broken the trammels, with which he would have limited its aberrations, and has pursued a course more erratic than ever. Opinions have varied as widely in the mass, and fluctuated as rapidly in the in

dividual, as if he had never determined "the only possible method" of avoiding hesitancy and confusion, and placing metaphysics on the same stable foundation with the other abstract sciences. But the indirect influences of his writings may be distinctly traced in the works of nearly all the speculatists, who have succeeded him, not only in Germany, but in France and England. While his innovations in the nomenclature have changed the whole garb of philosophy, and rendered the study of systems more abstruse, fatiguing, and repulsive, it must be confessed, that they have also removed some causes of ambiguity and mistake, and have pointed out the path for effecting a more systematic and beneficial reform. His example has also given a fresher impulse to the spirit of inquiry, increased the eagerness for the formation of new systems, and carried boldness of theorizing on all topics far beyond its ancient limits. His great demerit consists, in having effectually, though perhaps not intentionally, served the cause of infidelity, while professing to repair and extend the defences of belief. Had the real character of his doctrines been evident at a glance, their influence, whether for good or evil, could not have reached so far. But his disciples groped about in the intricacies of a system, which they could not fully master, and embraced opinions, of the nature and tendency of which they had but a blind conception. Thus, they were fairly enlisted on the side of skepticism, before they had thought of quitting the banners of faith. Once engaged in the work, they felt only the desire of surpassing their instructer in dogmatism of manner, rashness in forming novel hypotheses, and general license of speculation on the most sacred subjects. As his theory extended over the whole territory of knowledge, almost every science has in turn been infected with the wild and crude imaginings of his followers. It is this general effervescence of thought

and reasoning, which has brought a reproach on the very name of philosophy, and, through the mournful perversion of terms which it has occasioned, has given too good cause for regarding a system of philosophical radicalism as a mere cover for an attack on all the principles of government and social order, and for considering a philosophical religion as atheism itself. Under such circumstances, we can hardly wonder, that many reflecting persons have conceived a distrust of the consequences of such free inquiry, and do not suppress either alarm or contempt at the bare mention of German metaphysics.

6*

III.

FICHTE'S EXPOSITION OF KANT:

PHILOSOPHY APPLIED TO THEOLOGY.*

We propose, in this essay, to give some account of the system of theology, which, in Germany, has been derived from the principles of what is there called the "Critical Philosophy," but which is better known among us by the name of Transcendentalism. We mean the system which is founded directly and entirely on the basis of that philosophy, paying no regard at present to the modifications it has undergone in the hands of subsequent inquirers, or to the partial influence, which the same speculative theory has had upon other systems, which were chiefly drawn from different sources. The prodigious impulse, that the writings of Kant gave to the speculative genius of his countrymen, is visible enough in every walk of literature and science, but nowhere are its effects so widely and strongly marked as in the province of the theologian. It was natural that it should be so. Philosophy and theology are sister sciences, so closely allied, that it is often difficult to determine the boundaries between them. Every person must hold some opinions relative to each, and these opinions form two mutually dependent creeds, that are in a greater or less degree peculiar to himself, and of which the action and reaction are so nearly equal, that it is often difficult to determine which is the parent of the other. Every theory respecting the origin and first principles of human knowl

* From the Christian Examiner for May, 1841.

edge must bear a close relation to that subject, on which of all others knowledge is the most important, the doctrine of God, duty, and immortality. The religion of the Greeks and Romans, so far as it existed in a definite and consistent form, that is, as it was conceived by enlightened and thinking men among them, was wholly drawn from their philosophical tenets, or more properly speaking, it was identical with those tenets. And so it has been in modern times. Skepticism in philosophy and in religion, if not the same thing, at least, always go together. The metaphysics of Calvinism are as much a component part of its creed, as the "five points" themselves. This intimate connexion between two great branches of human inquiry supplies an additional means of estimating the truth and value of the results obtained in investigating either. Unsound conclusions in the one must be drawn from false premises in the other.

Kant perceived at once, that his system of metaphysics led to many important results respecting the great truths of religion, and he occupied himself at an early period in tracing out and establishing those points in a separate treatise. His work, entitled "Religion within the Limits of mere Reason," appeared in 1793, twelve years after the publication of the "Critique of Pure Reason." But he had been anticipated by a zealous young disciple, whose ardor in philosophical pursuits, at first exerted only in carrying out and defending the principles of his master, was destined soon to receive a different direction, and to establish a rival system, the reputation of which triumphed for a time over that of its predecessor. Fichte's first work, " A Critique of all Revelation," was published anonymously in 1792, and, being avowedly established on the basis of the Critical Philosophy, the principles of which it merely developed and applied to another subject, it was at first universally