our salvation is made to depend upon the obedience and merits of another." - pp. 146, 147.

We have no wish to comment upon the matter of the foregoing extracts. The doctrines defended have hitherto been regarded either as so contrary to reason, or above reason, that they rested solely upon Scriptural authority, and were to be received as special matters of revelation, upon the instrumentality of faith alone, with a reverential submission of human judgment to the wisdom and power of God. Whatever may be thought of the Scriptural argument in their favor, they are so entirely repugnant to our natural feeling of justice, that when a person attempts to maintain them on the grounds of consciousness, by doing away with this repugnancy, we cannot argue with him. He is a different being from us. That such an attempt has been made, only shows what loose habits of reasoning are induced by the endeavor to support these doctrines even on Biblical grounds; and evinces still more strongly the necessity of keeping the department of Ethics distinct from that of Dogmatic Theology.

The argument of the second extract, however, from its great ingenuity, may appear to deserve a more close examination. The fallacy in it has arisen from the preconceived opinions of the writer on religious subjects, which have induced him, in a treatise purely Ethical, to attribute guilt to vice, but no merit to virtue. It is a poor rule, which will not work both ways. If from the general power of habit, the commission of a single fault blunts the discriminative power of conscience, lessens its impulsive force, and leads to other vicious acts, so that the individual can never be released from its future injurious operation, then we urge, e contra, that one virtuous action, a deed of charity for instance, is not only meritorious in itself, but

from its tendency to strengthen the benevolent impulses of our nature, creates a fund of good desert, equally permanent in its working to the benefit of the agent. It is surely possible, that a result of the latter kind should balance one of the former. Dreadful and debasing as are the tendencies of sin, there is an effective, healing power in virtue. This is heresy, Dr. Wayland will say. He had better call it sophistry, for then only could we join issue with him. It is not asserted, that a dependent being can claim merit with the Creator for any action whatever; but only that he deserves and receives the approbation of conscience, when he has complied with the dictates of this faculty. But after all, from the admitted position, that evil habits deteriorate the moral powers, to infer the irretrievable effects of a single error or crime on the individual's whole future capacity for amendment, is to draw the argument altogether too fine, and to apply a mode of reasoning, which, however proper in mathematics, is ludicrously out of place in morals.

The doctrine is too harsh and repulsive in its first aspect. Men can never be persuaded to repent, unless previously assured of the efficacy of repentance. To deny them this assurance is to blot the moral sun from the heavens, and to leave all mankind to the agony of unavailing regret. Individuals have been driven to madness from the fear of having committed the unpardonable sin. Dr. Wayland would make all sins unpardonable, for the sake of proving, that we can be saved only by the merits of another; and he would teach this doctrine too, not as an incomprehensible revelation from the Deity, but as the obvious dictate of natural reason. We believe neither in such a state, nor in such a remedy. Firmly persuaded of the evils of transgression, we are yet to learn, that it leaves man

in a condition entirely hopeless, except from the expiation of his guilt by the sufferings of a different and an innocent being. We believe, that in his punishment are contained the elements, if he will use them, of his restoration; that remorse pursues sin, but repentance overtakes and vanquishes it.

IX.

POLITICAL ETHICS.*

A PUBLICATION on the subject indicated by this title is now happily timed. Important questions on the fundamental points in morals and politics are frequently discussed at the present day in our community, with a warmth and earnestness, which show rather the deep interest the disputants feel in the argument, than their competency to decide the mooted problems aright. The contest is not only of opposite theories; the results are not merely speculative. Conclusions are carried into practice with ominous precipitancy, and sometimes it is well, if the decision do not wholly take precedence of the argument, and the debate be instituted only to afford a coloring to preconceived opinions. What are the bounds of the rights of individuals? How far are they limited and controlled by the establishment of society? What creates the duty of allegiance to human government, and when does this duty cease? How far are legal enactments binding, and when does resistance to constituted authority become a virtue ? What positive duties are created by the mere fact of an individual's birth on one or the other side of a rivulet or chain of mountains, under this or that government?

*From the Christian Examiner for March, 1839.

Manual of Political Ethics, designed chiefly for the use of Colleges and Students at Law. Part I. Book I. Ethics, General and Political. Book II. The State. By FRANCIS LIEBER. Boston. 1838.

These are grave questions, and it is somewhat late in the day to discuss them now, with any particular reference to conduct. One would suppose, that they were answered long since, practically at least; for the daily actions of every citizen presuppose a tacit determination of them in his own mind. But the times are changed, and we are changed with them. Novel positions of society beget new relations between individuals, and from these spring new rights and their corresponding obligations. New systems of morals and politics must be contrived, it seems, for each new phasis of government and civilization. We have done with discussing the divine right of kings, and, like good republicans, have now for a long time been determining the divine rights of the people. Nay, from recent events, it would appear that we have passed this point also, and are now to consider the rights of the individual, as opposed to the claims of kings, governments, majorities, and all constituted authorities whatsoever. The great problem to be solved at present is, how to preserve the blessings of civil institutions with the smallest possible infringement of each man's natural right; how to keep up society, and yet im. pose no restraint on the free action of any of its members. The spirit of the present age is strongly marked by an impatience of all authority, however long seated and tamely acknowledged by former generations. As the subjectmatter of all discussions in political ethics is thus changed, the old systems have become obsolete, and if any of the conclusions embraced in them are to be retained, they must be supported on wholly different grounds, and thus be assimilated to the other provisions of a renovated code.

The republican tendencies of the age have already been displayed in action; they have dethroned kings, emancipated colonies, and proclaimed deliverance to the captive and the slave. They are now to be seen in speculation.