rections, answering to what we call the general laws of nature, suffices to produce a great variety of effects; just as the single downward tendency of a weight causes a very complex movement in the interior of a clock, and gives origin to all the different appearances on its face. Thirdly, that what are called secondary causes are really no causes at all, but only mark the occasions on which events and changes take place, all of which are brought about by the direct agency of a power, that is wholly foreign to this world. The second and third suppositions are equally consistent with the doctrine of the being of a God, the only difference between them relating to the manner in which his influence is exerted. In both these theories, he is represented not only as the creating, but the sustaining, power of the universe. The last of the three is certainly the most philosophical opinion, for it avoids the difficulty of attributing efficient causation to matter, where it can never be perceived, and of believing from the immediate sequence in time of two events, that there is a necessary connexion between them. But the second hypothesis is the more common one, and is equally favorable to the great doctrine, that the Deity is not only constantly present in all his works, but actuates and sustains them through his unceasing power. The succession of events is never stopped; the great clock of the universe never runs down. To deny the existence of a God is to fall back upon the first hypothesis, according to which creation and change are alike impossible, and the actual nature and appearance of things is an inexplicable dream.

Human experience, arguing from a limited number of effects, can only establish the existence of a Cause proportionate to them. The infinite power and wisdom of the Deity cannot be inferred directly from the finite evidences, which alone are subject to our observation. But this defect

in the argument a posteriori, though much insisted upon, is really of little consequence. The proof is sufficient for the great doctrine of his existence as an independent and primal cause, and with attributes beyond the power of human intellect to comprehend. The argument from the effect cannot stop short of the primitive cause. This point being established, we may safely reason from it in the inverse order of our former course, and thus supply the deficiency by a strict and unexceptionable argument a priori. That is, the conception of the Deity and the reality of his existence, to which we rise from evidence afforded by his works, supply the required data for reasoning of the opposite character, and enable us to demonstrate his infinite goodness, wisdom, and power. Each of these attributes may be easily deduced from the doctrine of his independent nature, and primary, or uncaused existence. We have not room to develope the proof, but refer the curious reader to Clarke's treatise, the portion of which relating to the Attributes is unexceptionable.

We had purposed to illustrate still further the positions, that the argument from design is perfectly analogous to the reasoning employed in all the inductive sciences, and that the conclusion to which it leads us cannot be rejected, without destroying at the same time the basis of all human knowledge. The illustrations which we have given are chiefly drawn from geology, not because they are more numerous and complete in that science than in any other, but because they are more obvious and striking, and require little collateral information in order to be fully understood. In astronomy, and that part of chemistry relating to imponderable agents, in the investigations respecting the history and condition of ancient tribes, and the physical history of the human race, or the science which is now called anthropology, matter enough might be found to elucidate and

210 PALEY: THE ARGUMENT FOR THE BEING OF A GOD.

sustain our conclusion. But we can only allude to these sources, and leave to others the task of drawing from them additional confirmation of the truth, which we have endeavored to establish. Enough has been said to answer our original purpose, and to vindicate the judgment of Paley in selecting his argument, and avoiding all impertinent and extraneous matter. His object was merely to present in the smallest compass an argument, level to the comprehension of all, and perfectly conclusive, in favor of the great truths of natural theology. The metaphysical subtilties, with which the argument had been encumbered, were avoided by him, not more from a natural distaste for such speculations, than from a conviction that they were out of his path, and had nothing to do with the point at issue. He saw clearly the nature of the inquiry, and the place which it held relatively to other exercises of the human mind. He pursued it, not as a theorist, but as a searcher after truth; not as a logician, nor an anatomist, nor a historian, but with the single purpose of imparting to others the full conviction, that was present to his own understanding. And the consequence has been what we noticed in the commencement of our remarks; that, while metaphysicians have exposed his errors and quibbled upon his reasoning, and men of the highest scientific reputation, with all the assistance furnished by recent discoveries, have followed upon his track, his work as a whole has never been refuted or superseded. It remains the chief text-book on the subject of which it treats, and thousands are indebted to it for a confirmation of their faith on matters of the most vital importance to man.

VI.

SUBJECT CONTINUED:

THE UNION OF THEOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS.*

DR. CHALMERS was one of the persons appointed, under the will of the late Earl of Bridgewater, to write a treatise "On the Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of God, as manifested in the Creation." This general subject being divided into eight branches, the portion of it allotted to our author was "The Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Condition of Man." The work which Dr. Chalmers published, in compliance with this call, has been for some years before the public, and we have had occasion to express, incidentally, our opinion of its merits. The vol umes now before us contain a republication of the Bridgewater Treatise, with some additional chapters on the argument for the being of a God, and on a few other subjects, designed so far to fill out the deficiences of the former publication, as to entitle the entire work to be called an exposition of the whole science of Natural Theology. These supplementary portions of the book are all that require present notice, and very few words may suffice for a consideration of their merits and defects.

Dr. Chalmers does not appear qualified in an eminent degree, either by the peculiarities of his style, or his habits of study and thought, to become a scientific writer. With a

* From the North American Review, for April, 1842.

On Natural Theology. By THOMAS CHALMERS, D. D. and LL. D. New York. 1840.

great command of words, considerable power of amplifying a subject, and, at times, of expressing himself with much force and earnestness, he lacks precision of statement and definiteness of views. His style is often incorrect, and almost always verbose and tumid, and, amidst a wilderness of words, the reader is sometimes at a loss how to find any meaning whatever. Such a style may be very effective in the pulpit, where familiar thoughts are to be handled, to be amplified and set forth under every variety of aspect. The constant repetitions will enable the hearer to comprehend the general drift of the argument, and the swell and copiousness of language will fasten it upon his memory. But the inaccuracy and vagueness of such a manner are serious objections in a scientific treatise. One is often puzzled by contradictory statements, and loses sight of the chief object of inquiry, while the author is expatiating at great length on some incidental topic.

But these defects might be pardoned, if they did not proceed from much confusion of thought, and a hasty manner of prosecuting an abstract inquiry. Dr. Chalmers elaborates nothing, but gives out the first draft of his arguments and speculations, pretty much in the order in which they first occurred to him. Consequently, there is no proportion between the parts, but a crude mass of materials is presented, which, if duly worked over, might be found to contain many sound remarks, and some trains of reasoning and reflection, followed out with considerable success. The subject of his Bridgewater Treatise forms but a small fraction of the whole science of Natural Theology. But, desirous of publishing something, that should appear to cover the whole ground, without revising or retrenching to any extent the original work, he annexes to it a few introductory chapters, interpolates one or two more in the body of the book, and then sends it forth as a new and complete treatise.