That error consists in entirely confounding the distinct provinces of moral and demonstrative reasoning. It is certainly improbable, we will not say with Fichte, impossible, that the truth of a revelation should be demonstrated, — that men should be convinced of its divine origin by the same intuitive perception or rigid mathematical deduction, that compels them to receive the axioms and primary theorems of arithmetic and geometry. Such an announcement of God to man would defeat its own end, which is the moral and religious improvement of those to whom it is addressed. Men would be compelled to believe, and the magnitude of the reward and punishment thus brought with absolute certainty before their eyes, would destroy at the same time the possibility of sin and the merit of obedience. Free agency would be practically done away, since compliance with a law proclaimed in this manner would be as involuntary, and as little a ground of merit, as the caution a person exercises in not putting his hand into the fire, or in turning out of his path to avoid a precipice. Now, Fichte's whole argument is directed against the demonstrative evidence of a revelation, and has neither force nor relevancy, when applied to the moral proofs. This appears at once from a consideration of his reasoning concerning miracles, - the keystone of his whole system, where no reference whatever is made to the magnitude and importance of what is assumed to be a special display of divine agency, but the criticism cuts short such assumption in every conceivable case. Should the heavens be rolled together like a scroll, and the earth give up its dead, and the common conception of a final judgment be realized in its full extent, we could not even here demonstrate the suspension of nature's ordinary laws, or infer with logical certainty the immediate operation of the Infinite cause. But every one knows, that moral proof, though different in

kind, may still be accumulated and heightened, till it produce as full conviction as mathematical evidence. We no more hesitate to act on the presumption, that fire will burn and water drown, than on the belief that two and two make four. Indeed, facts of the former class, which rest only on moral evidence, on induction and testimony, form the basis of nearly all the rules by which we regulate our ordinary conduct. The argument of the Transcendentalist, therefore, proves nothing, because it proves too much. He attempts to prevent our recognising the authority of revelation as a rule of life, by arguments which would lead us to reject the simplest maxim of prudence in the management of our ordinary concerns.

A story is told of one of the ancient Greek philosophers, that being wrecked with some companions on what was supposed to be a barren and uninhabited coast, he happened to find some geometrical diagrams drawn on the sand, and immediately called out, "Courage, my friends, I perceive the traces of men. It was certainly conceivable, that these figures should have been produced by fortuitous causes, by the action of the winds and waves upon the stones on the beach. Still, the inference, that civilized men had been there, was so just and obvious, that it would have argued insanity in the observers, had they doubted the fact for a moment. The case is precisely parallel to that of miracles alleged in support of a revelation. It is conceivable, that a moral teacher should heal the sick and raise the dead, though he had not received a special mission from the Deity. It is possible, that men who heard and saw these events should still refuse to credit the divine origin of the doctrine taught, as we know the Jews did with Jesus of Nazareth. But it was reserved for the ingenuity of modern philosophers to argue, that it was impossible to believe under such circumstances.

The conceivable objects of a revelation are, to increase what imperfect knowledge of the divine nature and our own destiny we may obtain through the light of reason and conscience, to confirm by an additional sanction the authority of the moral law within us, and to impose new duties, lying beyond the sphere of conscience, and therefore neither commanded nor rejected by that faculty;-such as acts of special acknowledgment of the Creator's infinite power and goodness. Should it be the will of God to make such a revelation, there is an antecedent presumption, that it will be accompanied with such evidence of its origin, that mankind will still be left free whether to accept or reject it. Thus only will it accord with other portions of the scheme of Divine Providence in the government of men; with the physical laws of the universe, for instance, in conformity to which our conduct must be regulated for the preservation of life and health, and which are not made known to us by intuition or demonstration, but must be slowly and carefully investigated. And then only, we may add, will it agree with the natural law of ethics; for however simple and authoritative may be the dictates of this principle to a well-disciplined and inquiring mind, all histo

ry and experience abound with instances to prove the perils of an unenlightened conscience. The idea of a revelation forced upon mankind by demonstrative evidence is at war with the only proper conception of the object of the divine government; for the instances just adduced justify us in asserting, that this object must be, not merely to raise men to a state of moral perfection, which would require only a simple act of omnipotence, but to supply them with the means of raising themselves. Not mere attainment, but progress, is the law of our finite condition.

IV.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COUSIN.*

THE writings of Cousin form the popular philosophy of the day. Their success in this country is attested by the appearance of the three translations, of which the titles are given above, one of which has already passed to a second edition, and has been introduced as a text-book in some of our principal colleges. There must be some grounds for this popularity, apart from the bias manifested by many people to adopt as their favorite system of philosophy, the one which happens to be the last published. Such a bias operated to swell the favor with which the writings of the late Dr. Brown were at first received, and, in its reaction, to depress his reputation with quite as much injustice as it had at first been elevated. We do not anticipate for Cousin such a rapid fall in public estimation, because his great

*From the North American Review, for July, 1841.

Introduction to the History of Philosophy. By VICTOR COUSIN, Translated from the French. By HENNING GOTFRIED Linberg.

Boston. 1832,

Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature. Vols. I. and II. Containing Philosophical Miscellanies, translated from the French of COUSIN, JOUFFROY, and B. CONSTANT. With Introductory and Criti cal Notices. By GEORGE RIPLEY. Boston. 1838.

Elements of Psychology; included in a Critical Examination of Locke's Essay on [the] Human Understanding, with Additional Pieces. By VICTOR COUSIN. Translated from the French, with an Introduction and Notes. By the Rev. C. S. HENRY, D. D. Second Edition, prepared for the Use of Colleges. New York. 1838.

learning and the merits of his style, to carry the comparison no farther, give him a decided advantage over the Scotch professor; and his lectures, moreover, are not a posthumous publication. His manner, after all, is not much to the taste of sober and accurate thinkers; but it has qualities which are sure to please the majority of readers. Evidently formed in the lecture room, it is sometimes eloquent, but more frequently declamatory. Profound subjects are treated without any affectation of profundity of manner, the capital vice of the German metaphysicians; and the general lucidness of the views set forth is due partly to the clearness of the writer's mind, and partly to the superficial character of his inquiries. He never fatigues the reader with a long train of argument, either because he dislikes the subtilties of logic, or is incapable of that severe exertion of mind which is necessary in order to bridge over the vast interval, that often separates ultimate truths from primitive perceptions. His conclusions lie but a step from the premises, when they have any premises at all, and they are repeated with a frequency, that marks the habits of a lecturer to a mixed audience, while it spares any severe effort of memory to those, who have the good fortune of being able to study the matter in print. We find nothing like terseness of manner, or simplicity of statement; and the rhetoric, though highly wrought, in our judgment at least, often appears cold and artificial, instead of being penetrated with real warmth of feeling. But there is great copiousness, and not unfrequently much dignity, of expression; and the swell of diction often gives prominence and effect to the enunciation of simple and familiar truths. The fairness and candor, which, with one great exception, he displays in estimating the services of other metaphysicians, are quite as manifest