Law and Public Choice: A Critical IntroductionUniversity of Chicago Press, 15 lip 2010 - 169 In Law and Public Choice, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey present a remarkably rich and accessible introduction to the driving principles of public choice. In this, the first systematic look at the implications of social choice for legal doctrine, Farber and Frickey carefully review both the empirical and theoretical literature about interest group influence and provide a nonmathematical introduction to formal models of legislative action. Ideal for course use, this volume offers a balanced and perceptive analysis and critique of an approach which, within limits, can illuminate the dynamics of government decision-making. “Law and Public Choice is a most valuable contribution to the burgeoning literature. It should be of great interest to lawyers, political scientists, and all others interested in issues at the intersection of government and law.”—Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School |
Spis treści
| 1 | |
1 INTEREST GROUPS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS | 12 |
2 ARROWS THEOREM AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS | 38 |
3 ECONOMIC REGULATION AND THE CONSTITUTION | 63 |
4 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION | 88 |
5 INTEGRATING PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW | 116 |
BEYOND THE ECONOMIC SPHERE | 145 |
| 155 | |
Inne wydania - Wyświetl wszystko
Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction Daniel A. Farber,Philip P. Frickey Ograniczony podgląd - 1991 |
Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction Daniel A. Farber,Philip P. Frickey Ograniczony podgląd - 2010 |
Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction Daniel A. Farber,Philip P. Frickey Podgląd niedostępny - 1991 |
Kluczowe wyrazy i wyrażenia
abortion administrative adopted affirmative action agenda amendment American Antonin Scalia apply argued argument Arrow's Theorem behavior benefits bill Chadha Chapter Choice and Public clause committee reports concurring Congress congressional consider cycling decision delegation doctrine democracy democratic due process Easterbrook ECON Economic Regulation effect enacting Eskridge example favor federal Frank Easterbrook Frickey HARV ideology important individual influence institutions Integrating Public Choice issues judges judicial review Justice Scalia lative legis legislative deliberation legislative history legislative intent legislative outcomes legislative process legislative veto legislature limited majority ment Mow Sun Wong normative political process Posner preferences problem procedures process of lawmaking public choice theory public interest public law public policy rational reason recent rent-seeking republicanism result role rule self-interest Senate special interest groups stare decisis statute Statutory Interpretation statutory language structure suggests Sunstein supra note Supreme Court tion tive voters voting Weber