plenitude, and with more than the boldnefs of the papal depofing power in its meridian fervour of the twelfth century, puts into one sweeping claufe of ban and anathema, and proclaims ufurpers by circles of longitude and latitude, over the whole globe, it behoves them to confider how they admit into their territories these apoftolic miffionaries, who are to tell their subjects they are not lawful kings. That is their concern. It is ours, as a domestic interest of some moment, seriously to confider the folidity of the only principle upon which these gentlemen acknowledge a king of Great Britain to be entitled to their allegiance.

This doctrine, as applied to the prince now on the British throne, either is nonsense, and therefore neither true nor falfe, or it affirms a most unfounded, dangerous, illegal, and unconstitutional pofition. According to this fpiritual doctor of politics, if his majefty does not owe his crown to the choice of his people, he is no lawful king. Now nothing can be more untrue than that the crown of this kingdom is fo held by his majefty. Therefore if you follow their rule, the king of Great Britain, who most certainly does not owe his high office to any form of popular election, is in no refpect better than the rest of the gang of ufurpers, who reign, or rather rob, all over the face of this our miserable world, without any fort of right or title to the allegiance of their people. The policy of this general doctrine, fo qualified, is evident enough.

The propagators of this political gofpel are in hopes their abftract principle (their principle that a popular choice is neceffary to the legal exiftence of the fovereign magiftracy) would be overlooked whilst the king of Great Britain was not affected by it. In the mean time the ears of their congregations would be gradually habituated to it, as if it were a first principle admitted without difpute. For the prefent it would only operate as a theory, pickled in the preferving juices of pulpit eloquence, and laid by for future ufe. Condo et compono que mox depromere poffim. By this policy, whilft our government is foothed with a refervation in its favour, to which it has no claim, the fecurity, which it has in common with all governments, fo far as opinion is fecurity, is taken

away.

Thus thefe politicians proceed, whilft little notice is taken of their doctrines; but when they come to be examined upon the plain meaning of their words and the direct tendency of their doctrines, then equivocations and flippery conftructions come into play. When they fay the king owes his crown to the choice of his people, and is therefore the only lawful fovereign in the world, they will perhaps tell us they mean to fay no more than that fome of the king's predeceffors have been called to the throne by fome fort of choice; and therefore he owes his crown to the choice of his people. Thus, by a miferable fubterfuge, they hope to render their propofition fafe, by rendering it nugatory.

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nugatory. They are welcome to the afylum they feek for their offence, fince they take refuge in their folly. For, if you admit this interpretation, how does their idea of election differ from our idea of inheritance? And how does the fettlement of the crown in the Brunswick line derived from James the firft, come to legalize our monarchy, rather than that of any of the neighbouring countries? At fome time or other, to be fure, all the beginners of dynafties. were chofen by thofe who called them to govern. There is ground enough for the opinion that all the kingdoms of Europe were, at a remote period, elective, with more or fewer limitations in the objects of choice; but whatever kings might have been here or elsewhere, a thousand years ago, or in whatever manner the ruling dynafties of England or France may have begun, the King of Great Britain is at this day king by a fixed rule of fucceffion, according to the laws of his country; and whilft the legal conditions of the compact of fovereignty are performed by him (as they are performed) he holds his crown in contempt of the choice of the Revolution Society, who have not a fingle vote for a king amongst them, either individually or collectively; though I make no doubt they would foon erect themselves into an electoral college, if things were ripe to give effect to their claim. His majesty's heirs and fucceffors, each in his time and order, will come to the crown with C 2

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the fame contempt of their choice with which his majesty has fucceeded to that he wears.

Whatever may be the fuccefs of evasion in explaining away the grofs error of fact, which fupposes that his majefty (though he holds it in concurrence with the wishes) owes his crown to the choice of his people, yet nothing can evade their full explicit declaration, concerning the principle of a right in the people to choose, which right is directly maintained, and tenaciously adhered to. All the oblique infinuations concerning election bottom in this propofition, and are referable to it. Left the foundation of the king's exclufive legal title fhould pass for a mere rant of adulatory freedom, the political Divine proceeds dogmatically to affert *, that by the principles of the Revolution the people of England have acquired three fundamental rights, all which, with him, compofe one system, and lie together in one short fentence; namely, that we have acquired a right

1. "To choose our own governors." 2. "To cafhier them for misconduct." 3. "To frame a government for ourselves." This new, and hitherto unheard-of bill of rights, though made in the name of the whole people, belongs to thofe gentlemen and their faction only. The body of the people of England have no share in it. They utterly difcaim it. They

*P. 34, Difcourfe on the Love of our Country, by Dr. Price.

will refift the practical affertion of it with their lives and fortunes. They are bound to do so by the laws of their country, made at the time of that very Revolution, which is appealed to in favour of the fictitious rights claimed by the fociety which abuses its name.

These gentlemen of the Old Jewry, in all their reasonings on the Revolution of 1688, have a revolution which happened in England about forty years before, and the late French revolution, fo much before their eyes, and in their hearts, that they are conftantly confounding all the three together. It is neceffary that we fhould separate what they confound. We must recall their erring fancies to the acts of the Revolution which we revere, for the discovery of its true principles. If the principles of the Revolution of 1688 are any where to be found, it is in the ftatute called the Declaration of Right. In that most wife, fober, and confiderate declaration, drawn up by great lawyers and great statesmen, and not by warm and inexperienced enthusiasts, not one word is faid, nor one fuggeftion made, of a general right to choose our own governors; to cashier them for "misconduct; and to form a government for ourfelves."

This Declaration of Right (the act of the 1ft of William and Mary, feff. 2. ch. 2.) is the cornerstone of our conftitution, as reinforced, explained, improved, and in its fundamental principles for ever fettled. It is called "An act for declaring "the rights and liberties of the subject, and for

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