denote a mind hardened against the impressions of guilt. So that, the Conscience, in itself, may be a faithful monitor, though the soul be impure: and the impurity, as is often the case in Scripture phraseology, is transferred from the mind generally to the witness of the mind. Of this we have a remarkable instance where "the light of God" is said "to become darkness"—which in itself, or morally, is impossible : but, the mind may become darkened in which other. wise the light of heaven would shine. In this sense, with reference only to the treatment it receives from man, the Spirit of God may be despised and put to shame, quenched, resisted;—the truth of God, changed to a lie, and the word of God corrupted, as it regards the state of the heart and soul :-but, in itself, this Spirit, Truth, Word, (which is one and the same thing) is invincible, incapable of any thing but glory, immutable, and incorruptible.

I shall conclude these illustrations with a passage from Dr. Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments; which, while it supports the limited acceptation of the word Conscience, passes by, as a point not quite settled among men, the name of that Power, which Conscience always supposes, and which is acknowledged to be the internal Sovereign of the mind.

"The word Conscience does not immediately denote any faculty or moral sense by which we approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes indeed the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to

its directions. When Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, Gratitude, Resentment, with so many other passions, which are all supposed to be the subjects of this principle, have made themselves considerable enough to get titles to know them by, is it not surprising that the Sovereign of them all should hitherto have been so little heeded, that, a few philosophers excepted, nobody has yet thought it worth while to bestow a name upon it?"

The fact is, that by some it has been called Conscience, by others Moral Sense, by others the Light of the World, the Divine Principle of Truth, and the Spirit of God in the Soul.

CHAP. VIII.

OF THE TRUE SOURCE OF MORAL SENTIMENTS; AND OF THE VARIOUS OPINIONS RESPECTING A MORAL PRINCIPLE.

SECT. I.

Of Moral Feeling, the source of Truth.

It has been laid down in this Essay as a position of some importance, that there is a power or faculty, viz. the Conscience or Moral Principle, (by whatever name it may be distinguished) and that it is the root and ground-work of virtue. It has been also admitted, that moral sentiments do not appear as early as some other principles in children; and are liable to be perverted by custom, and changed by education.

From these admitted facts, however, some have contended that there is no, moral sense, nor other guide and rule of conduct, than the imperfect instruction of Reason, by, what is called, the light of nature, on the one hand, and the clear discovery made by

Scripture on the other: Hence, according to this view, Reason is the only guide to those who have no access to Scripture. But it was also held by Locke, that man received his knowledge of right and wrong by observation, or from without; at least that he had no certain criterion in his own breast distinct from Reason, to inform him of these distinctions; and a still stronger point was even urged, that scarce a virtue could be named, (excepting those which are necessary bonds to society) but, in some parts of the world, entire communities were agreed in setting it aside, and dispensing with its obligation, as it were, by universal consent; and, conversely, scarce a vice, which in some place or other, did not rise into the dignity of a virtue: for, one position seems to be a natural consequence of the other. So unprovided, it was to be inferred, was man with any moral instructor in his own breast; and so mutable were all moral distinctions; therefore, so little depending upon any original feelings of the mind; and so much depending either upon the outward proof that virtue was in itself profitable, and vice the contrary, (which is a deduction of Reason); or on the persuasion, derived from Scripture, that it was the Will of God, and consequently a rule of conduct. It is obvious, that FEELING, or an internal source of moral emotion, is entirely excluded from such a system.

Some reasons have been already assigned in opposition to this argument; and it has been urged that when the genuine features of moral conduct, in other

words, the various actions arising from Gratitude, Integrity, Justice, Fortitude, Benevolence, and their opposites (which we suppose must enter into the vocabulary of all languages) are fairly brought before the uncorrupted and unprejudiced view of the mindthey are discerned as clearly to be virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy or blameable, and right or wrong, by an internal sense or moral tribunal; as sounds are discovered by the unobstructed ear to be harmonious or discordant, or as objects of sight are seen to be beautiful or otherwise by a sound eye-without mote or film-when looking through a clear medium with a steady light.

For, as many things are necessary, in the natural state, to perfect outward vision, and in fact to clear perception, by any one of the outward Senses; so many things are necessary, in the moral state, to a correct moral judgment.

But, as we do not consult Reason to know whether an object is beautiful, or a flower is fragrant, or a fruit is sweet; so neither do we use it in feeling the first emotions excited by the moral qualities of human actions. By the constitution of our minds we are compelled to feel certain emotions in perceiving these actions; for which we can give no other explanation than this, that it is a law imposed upon our nature. That we may pervert this original law, is very true; and that we may reason and rebel against these feelings so as to reduce, change, corrupt, stifle, and almost annihilate, until we scarcely know what they