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We see, then, that Reason is sometimes used for the light of the intellect, or for the perfection of human intellect, howsoever enlightened, comprehending the rational as well as moral powers of the mind, cultivated to the highest pitch of excellence : and in this sense, perhaps it may be said, that Reason and Revelation cannot justly be placed in opposition. But when the word is employed, as it commonly is, in modern speculations, for the Discursive faculty alone, or to designate what is meant by the strength and power of human wisdom, unaided by divine counsel, or unassisted by revelation,-which seems to be its proper place, then it becomes essentially necessary to distinguish them.

For, it is clear, from some of the preceding quotations, that, if the term be rightly used, to Reason belong the highest court and office in the human mind. I cannot therefore but freely confess my own opinion, that to include in the word Reason, while it is liable to such an ambiguity of meaning, all that excellence of the human character, which arises from the cultivation of our highest endowments, is far from being conducive to the interests, much less the diffusion, of a pure and vital Christianity.

As I shall have to consider this subject more fully hereafter, it will be necessary to enter a little more into the nature and office of the Reasoning faculty, than I should otherwise have done. No one, I apprehend, can doubt, that, when the word Reason is employed in modern discourse, as applicable to

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matters of religion, it is never meant to include Revelation mediate or immediate-however it may be supposed, according to Locke, to be invested with legitimate right to take cognizance of revelation.

Now, it may be observed, that Reason, in the enlarged acceptation to which I have alluded, embraced three powers or principles very necessary to be distinguished.

First. It included that power of the mind, which enables it to investigate and find out Truth speculatively, as in science and the common business of life, by observation and experience, and to distinguish it from falsehood, by means of propositions, comparisons, and deductions; hence properly called the Discursive faculty or power of Reasoning.

Secondly. It comprehended the elements of Reason itself the rudiments, seeds, or principles from which all natural reasoning must spring; denominated by Judge Hale "rational instincts,"-by Boyle "the innate Light of Reason, or primitive ideas and rules of true and false,"-by Cudworth "innate cognoscitive power," by Stewart," the fundamental laws of human belief, or primary elements of human reason," by Reid and Beattie," the principles of common sense," as being common to all mankind;-by others, "self-evident truths, axioms, common sentiments, and intuitive principles."

Thirdly. The power or source of moral sentiment from which man receives primarily the emotions which give rise to the knowledge of right and wrong, good

and evil; and by which he is enabled to feel the obligation of duty to God and to his fellow creature; in which power may be included the first principles or seeds of moral truth, the sparks of a divine intelligence in the soul, the light that enlighteneth every man-from the necessity of the case, changing the metaphor to express the meaning more fully; also variously denominated "the law written in the heart,"*" connatural moral instincts"+" the first rudiments of natural justice, charity and benignity."+

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CHAP. II.

OF THE NATURE OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES, AND THE PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF REASONING AND MORAL FEELING.

SECT. I.

Of the nature of the Mental Faculties.

As it is my intention to make some general observations on the developement of the various powers of the human mind from their original rudiments or seeds, I shall take this opportunity of premising a few particulars, by way of illustration, on the elements both of our rational and moral principles. For, if it be proved, or deemed highly probable, that in order to constitute the power of Reasoning, some original seeds, or, as they have been called, "inchoatae intelligentiae," must be presupposed, as already implanted in the mind by the Author of our being; we cannot wonder that the same thing should be true, but in a more eminent degree, of the moral principle and its seeds, or instincts.

And, by adopting this method, I flatter myself, that we shall be better prepared to examine and appreciate the tendency of a very celebrated writer's opinion on this subject,-a man whose name cannot be mentioned but with respect and admiration, both for his virtues and his genius, I mean, the enlightened Locke. In laying this foundation, I conceive it to be particularly important to produce such a coincidence of unbiassed authorities before my reader, as, while it qualifies him to determine what degree of deference may be due to these authorities, may enable him also to judge how far the notion is consistent with sound analogy, which assumes, that the human mind, in its infant or undeveloped state, may with propriety be compared to "a white sheet of paper'' or "to an empty cabinet." I propose therefore to adduce some testimonies on this point; and first relatively to the ground-work of reason; which, as before remarked, I use in the signification with which I set out in the beginning of this Essay. I shall afterwards proceed to consider the elements or seeds of moral sentiments.

Now, as we can have no true conception of the nature, constitution, or essence of the mind, but from its powers or faculties and the phenomena of their enlargement,-in like manner, as we can know nothing of the rudiments or original state of the body, but from the position and developement of its limbs and organs,-I am well aware that in attempting to describe the elements or principles of human thought,

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