perhaps once in a thousand instances-attain to the perfection of which his nature is susceptible; it must be pronounced, that Reason is not the faculty to whose influence and operations, the highest degree of moral excellence is wholly to be ascribed.

I apprehend, it will be granted, that brute animals fulfil the ends of their creation; and am not aware that the proposition, in a moral sense, can be denied, that man does not fulfil the ends of his creation. For if he did, we should see purity of conduct instead of vice and wickedness overspreading the world.

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But brute animals are governed by Instinct or the superior guidance of Providence and man, in the usual course of affairs at least, is governed by Reason, that is, his own discretion. I state the proposition generally; which is the only way it can be taken.

Therefore, in fair deduction, Reason does not enable man to fulfil the ends of his creation; and his own discretion, however competent to his outward affairs, sleeps, or is overpowered, so far as his better, that is, his immortal interests are concerned. For, if Reason enabled man to fulfil the ends of his creation; this governing principle of human nature might be expected to produce effects as universal as the instinct of brutes.

The argument avails little which some may oppose, that Reason is not suffered to have the mastery, because other principles, antagonists to good, are superior in strength: and, hence, that the fault is not to be laid to Reason. Suffice it to say, that whatever

is boasted of as a special endowment, constituting the pride and glory of a creature, ought to have dominion; nay more, it would be doing injustice to Providence to suppose that it might not have dominion: and if Reason could accomplish all that is ascribed to it, I believe, it would have the dominion.

CHAP. IX.

OF REASON, AND THE EXTREMES OF OPINION RESPECTING IT-ITS EXTENT OR USES, AND LIMITATION OR INSUFFICIENCY.

SECT. I.

Of Reason, and the extremes of opinion respecting it.

REASON is a term, as I before remarked, comprehensive in its meaning; and when we consider it as including the whole rational and moral powers which distinguish man from the brute, it takes in more than can strictly be allowed.* It may be proper, therefore, to show, not only, positively, what Reason, in its fair legitimate acceptation, can do; but negatively, what it can not do. In this way we shall have a more distinct notion, both of its value and its insufficiency,in other words, of its extent and its limitation.

It is a fact to be lamented, that some assertors of its dignity or usefulness, have given it all power and

"Man is more distinguished by devotion than by reason, as several brute creatures discover something like reason, though they betray not any thing that bears the least affinity to devotion."

Addison.

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supremacy in the human mind; and, on the contrary, some assertors of its insufficiency have spoken of the necessity of putting out its light, in order that a better might be substituted in its place.

Now, it is clear, that both these extremes may lead to error. We cannot consistently imagine that it is possible for Reason to inform us, what is done in Heaven; nor that a divine principle, governing our eternal interests, should supersede our temporal faculties and wants on earth.

If Reason, therefore, cannot do all that its professed advocates would have it do, let us not underrate its powers, and overlook its real uses: if it can do more than the apostles of a wild fanaticism and bigotry will admit, we must not bring down, as from its holy seat in the temple of the heart, into every secular act appointed to reason and sense, a superior principle designed for the highest spiritual offices of an immortal soul.

To favour the one class, we must not exalt too high the faculty of reason, by deprecating the necessity and ridiculing the supposition of superior help to so frail a being as man: nor must we depress it too low, by claiming the immediate guardianship of Heaven, the pointings of the divine finger, in every step we are to take in the daily walks of life. How needful it is that the golden mean should be preserved! Whoever presumes that he may direct his own steps, and that he has no need of Providence for his guide, is in danger of the precipice that lies in the way of high

minded arrogance and short-sighted practical impiety: whoever closes his outward senses when he may perceive, and refuses to exercise the rational powers his Maker has given him, when he may understand, (in expectation that, in this passive state, miracles will be wrought for his deliverance) like one wilfully blindfolded, may also fall into the snare of temptation. For he also presumes on the other side, tempting Providence and resting on divine protection, whilst he is neglecting earthly concerns, as if already translated to Heaven.

Let the errors of the one preserve us from a wayward enthusiasm, in which reason is taken captive in wild delusions; and the errors of the other equally guard us from the dark counsels which lead to the desolating abyss of scepticism. There surely is a mean—a safe and middle path. And, because human nature is liable to the first error, let us not therefore slide into the second; nor, because we are liable to the second, let us too rashly conclude, that man is left wholly to himself, and suppose that an instinctive, unflattering, superior, and supernatural Guide, leading into paths of moderation and sound discretion, is nothing but a chimæra of the brain, the offspring of bewildered fancies, and, never, in this day of reason's boasted ascendancy, vouchsafed to the human mind.