their powers of reasoning extend. It seems as evident to me, says Locke, that some animals do, in certain instances, reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from the senses." Locke is not disposed to allow them the power of abstraction. It is however well observed by the writer of the article Instinct in Rees' Cyclopædia, that "there are many facts from which it is evident, that brutes on some occasions exhibit proofs of this faculty." And to this opinion I assent.*

Now, if we compare our own mental constitution with that of brutes,-however we may excel them, as we certainly do, in some noble capacities and principles, exclusively belonging to our moral nature ;yet we possess many faculties and powers precisely analogous to theirs; and the motives and combined operation of these, it is often as difficult to understand, as it is those of the lower animals. So that it might be as hard a matter to prove that many acts of human volition were deliberate acts of the reasoning faculty in its abstract sense, as many actions of the lower animals:-such a variety of motives and im

* In allusion to the reasoning of animals, Milton says,—

"Is not the earth

With various living creatures, and the air
Replenished, and all these at thy command

To come and play before thee? Know'st thou not
Their language and their ways? They also know
And reason not contemptibly. With these

Find pastime."

pulses may govern the decision of a human being, prompting him to act, not according to the standard of reason, but according to the scale of sense or passion, and low desire. For, how rarely does enlightened reason, setting aside the higher influence of moral duty, determine the conduct of man!

In common with the brutes we have our instincts, our imitative powers, our natural senses perfect or imperfect according to their use, our capabilities of improvement by discipline and education, our animal propensities and passions, our feelings benevolent and malevolent, our faculties of remembering and of comparing or judging. Perhaps also they may partake with us in some others. But these are sufficient to show what a compound is man,—of mean and noble -of evil and good-how prone to the impulse of nature from his very constitution, like the brute, and how rarely asserting the prerogative of his superior rank in the creation, by purifying his rational and moral decisions and general conduct from the contamination of sordid motives, so as to reason and act like a being formed after the image of the Deity.

CHAP. VI.

OF THE ASCENDING SCALE OF INSTINCTIVE OR UNCONSCIOUS MOTIONS-COMPRISING INANIMATE, VEGETABLE, AND ANIMAL MOTIONS.

SECT. I.

Of Inanimate and Vegetable Motions.

I AM ready to believe that we shall be better able to judge of the relation, which appears to subsist between Instinct and the higher attributes of the human mind, as well as of that subsisting between man and the brute, after we have ascended the scale of natural operations, even from those of inanimate matter, through the several gradations of Being, up to man himself.

1

We shall find that at every step in this ascent, although many of these operations may not be justly denominated instinctive, yet in as much as they are surely and determinately, though in some cases blindly

Of unconscious motions in Unorganized Matter. 113 effected, they are analogous to those of Instinct, and are only referable to the same ultimate cause.

Hence, this survey may be the means of connecting in the mind more perfectly the chain of argument; as we shall thus have an opportunity of referring Instinct to its proper source-the pervading influence of the Deity in all his works; and also of referring reason to its proper source-the outward or reflected light of nature, alone and unassisted, constituted as the leader of the natural faculties, which, by experience and observation, enables man to use the means, placed abundantly within his reach, for all his outward conveniencies and lawful enjoyments in life.

Of unconscious Motions in Unorganized Matter.

In contemplating the phenomena of the material world, we perceive that all the grand operations of nature are in perfect harmony, and proceed with admirable order. The motion of the earth in its orbit; the vicissitudes of the seasons; the distribution of heat and cold; the growth and decay of vegetables and animals, and their mutual dependencies:-in short, all the phenomena taking place upon our globe that are not under the immediate controul of man, are displayed with consummate wisdom.

H

We may observe, however, that when man interferes, so far as he can interfere, by reason of the portion of free agency with which his Maker has endowed him, then, he may either co-operate with, or oppose, the intelligent designs of Providence; and his happiness or misery,-and in degree also the beauty or deformity of the Lord's creation,-are the result of his own free will. For, to a limited extent, we have power over the face of nature, as well as rightful dominion over the beast of the field. We can plant a forest in the plain, or disencumber the plain of the shady forest. We can cultivate the barren field, and drain the noisome marsh, or leave it to exhale pernicious effluvia, hurtful to man and beast; so that the very soil may be either a blessing or a curse to its possessor. For he may raise the poisonous weed, instead of the wholesome nutritious grain; and by his imprudence may suffer the flocks to be cut off from the fold, and, through want of timely care, thousands of his dependent fellowcreatures to languish in misery, who might otherwise rejoice around him.

Now, if we consider the stupendous phenomena of the material world, celestial and terrestrial, we cannot hesitate to believe, that with regard to the heavenly bodies, either in their internal structure or in the element through which they move, a power has been impressed upon these masses of matter by Omnipotence, which directs them, though uncon sciously, with unerring certainty in their course.