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ARTICLE II.

EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY.

By the Rev. Enoch Pond, D. D. Bangor Theological Seminary, Maine.

The evidence of testimony is that species of evidence which is derived, not from intuition, or reflection, or originally from the senses, but from the communications of others. A moment's consideration will satisfy every reader as to the vast importance of this species of evidence. Our own personal observation is circumscribed within narrow limits. Few comparatively are the important facts with which we become acquainted in this way. Almost all our knowledge-those branches of it especially on which we set the highest value, are the result of testimony.

It is testimony, not personal observation, which opens to us the lights of history, and makes us acquainted with what has been transacted in other times, and in distant portions of the globe.

Our geographical knowledge is almost all of it acquired in the same way. We have not personally traversed the surface of the earth, to observe its mountains, its rivers, its islands, plains, and seas; and what we know of it, for the most part, we receive from others.

The same must be said of by far the greater part of our philosophical knowledge. How few have actually searched out and demonstrated the truth of those propositions, which are laid down in our books of natural science. We satisfy ourselves as to the competency and accuracy of those who have investigated these subjects, and take their conclusions upon trust.

Indeed, most of the important business of life of professional life, and of common life-proceeds upon the evidence of testimony. That system of religion which the christian minister is called upon to inculcate and enforce, rests very materially on testimony. A large proportion of the labor of the jurist consists in weighing and canvassing testimony, and in framing his decisions according to it. The merchant freights his ships, and sends them across the ocean to lands he never saw, and of which he has no knowledge, but from testimony. In short, all men

act, habitually, more or less on this species of evidence; and they feel as secure in acting on it, as they do on the evidence of their senses.

It has been urged by Hume, and others, that our reliance on testimony is wholly the result of experience. We hear those around us, for the most part, speaking the truth, and we learn, at length, to believe them, and confide in them. But this, obviously, is an inadequate view of the subject. We do not learn to believe testimony, in the manner here described. Were this the case, children and persons of little experience would believe almost nothing. Whereas, in fact, they believe almost everything. They are proverbially credulous, until experience of the falsehood and treachery of the world has taught them to hesitate. We learn from experience, not to believe, but to doubt; not to confide in testimony, but to suspect it.

The foundation of our reliance on testimony is laid deep in our own nature. It is too important to us to be laid anywhere

We as naturally confide in well authenticated testimony, as we do in our memories, or in our external senses. Nor is our confidence in the former source of knowledge more easily shaken, than in the two latter sources. Our senses sometimes deceive us, and so do our memories, and so does the evidence of testimony; but we do not, on this account, throw either of them away, or reckon them of no value. Our experience of the fallibility of these great sources of knowledge-these lights of the soul-should only lead us the more carefully to look after them, to investigate their nature and laws, that we may the better determine when to confide in them, and when not.

My principal object, in this paper, is to state and illustrate some of the laws of testimony; or to specify the conditions, the circumstances, under which the evidence of testimony is conclusive. And,

1. In order that testimony may be admitted, the thing testified to must be possible. This is too obvious almost to require notice. No amount of testimony can justify us in believing an impossibility. We may be required to believe a strange thing, a marvellous thing, a thing to our apprehension supernatural and unaccountable; but it must at least be a possible thing; -a thing involving, in the idea of it, no palpable contradiction or absurdity. Otherwise, no testimony, however unexceptionable in other respects, can justify us in believing it.

This point is pleasantly illustrated by President Edwards.

"If," says he, "some learned philosopher who had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observations he had made in his travels, should say, that he had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth himself, and yet had a sire and dam distinct from himself; that he had an appetite and was hungry before he had a being; that his master, who led and governed him at pleasure, was always led and governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased; that when the animal moved, he always took a step before the first step; that he went with his head first, and yet always went tail foremost, and this though he had neither head nor tail;-it would be no imprudence," says Edwards, "to tell such a traveller, although a man of profound learning, that he had never seen such an animal as he described; that he had no idea of it, and never could have."

2. That testimony may be conclusive, it is necessary that there should be a competent number of witnesses. What this number is, I will not now undertake to decide. Our Saviour, in framing rules for his church, requires that "in the mouth of two or three witnesses, every word may be established." Matt. 18: 16. Moses enjoins the same law on the Israelites, especially in cases of capital offence. "At the mouth of two or three witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death." Deut. 17: 6. Our civil courts think themselves authorized to act, I believe, on something less than this amount of testimony. It is sufficient for my present purpose to say, that testimony, in order to be conclusive, must be ample. The number of witnesses must be such, that those who hear them can have no good reason to object or hesitate on account of their fewness.

3. That testimony may be conclusive, the witnesses must have had the means, and the capacity, of forming a correct judgment in reference to the things about which they testify. They must be original witnesses, deriving their knowledge, not from others, but from their own observations. They must be able to speak, not what they have heard, but what they know. And they must be of sufficient age and understanding to form a judgment of the things about which they speak. Thus, on ordinary subjects, the testimony of a child would have less weight than that of a man. Or if the question were one of science, or of art, the testimony of an ignorant person would have little weight, compared with that of one who was familiar

ly acquainted with the particular subject of inquiry. A person, for example, unacquainted with law, would be incompetent to testify on points of law. He might not even understand the terms in which questions were propounded to him. A person unacquainted with chemical analyses and combinations would be incompetent to testify on questions of this nature. The general rule is (and it is a very obvious one) that in order to a valid testimony, witnesses must have had the means, and must be intellectually capable, of coming to a knowledge, or forming a judgment of the particular points on which they testify.

4. It is necessary to a conclusive testimony, that the witnesses should possess, each of them, an unexceptionable moral character. The value of testimony, in every case, depends very materially on the character of him who utters it. Who believes a notorious liar, even if he chances to speak the truth? And with about the same pertinency it may be asked, Who confides in the testimony of an individual, whose character is stained with any vice? For in order to be the perpetrator of vice, in any of its forms, a person must, of necessity, have broken down his conscience. He must have divested himself of moral principle, and perhaps also of the feebler restraints of pride and shame. And now he is in a state to perpetrate anything-to fall into any new vice or crime to which he may be strongly tempted. He would sell his Saviour for less than what Judas. received for him. His word he would barter for a song. The more prominent vices usually hang in clusters. It is rare that we see one of them long standing out upon the character of a man alone. Hence, to be in a situation to bear a strong, unquestionable testimony, a person must possess an unstained, an unimpeachable moral character. And hence, with the utmost propriety it is determined by our laws, that certain defects of moral character utterly disqualify a person to bear testimony in a court of justice.

5. In order to give an unquestionable testimony, not only must a person's general character be good, but he must be understood, at the time, to be disinterested. He must be under the influence of no strong, impelling motives to mis-state the facts of which he speaks, or to falsify his testimony. Men act from motives. They can no more act without them, than they can without faculties or members. And we are always influenced by motives just in proportion to the force with which, at the time, they strike us, or the strength with which they bear

SECOND SERIES, VOL. II. NO. III.

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upon our minds. Now a person may possess, in general, a fair moral character. He may be so far under the influence of high moral principles, as to be effectually restrained in ordinary circumstances, from falsifying his word, or perpetrating any vice. And yet, when placed in new and peculiar circumstances, where strong motives of interest are brought to bear upon him, his course may waver-his moral strength may fail. To favor himself or those whom he loves, he may consent, for once, to conceal or mis-state the truth. It is on this account that our laws have determined, that certain relations or circumstances of interest disqualify a person altogether to give testimony. It is on this account that testimony is always suspected, just in proportion to the degree of interest which the witness is supposed to have in the question at issue.

6. It is necessary, in order to a convincing testimony, that it should be given in plain, direct terms. Studied, evasive, equivocal language is always suspicious. It indicates that the person using it has some sinister object in view. He has some purpose in mind, aside from that of telling the plain, honest truth. Besides, evasive, equivocal language cannot be easily and certainly understood. It may mean this or that; and no one can determine, without an explanation, what it does mean. The rule we are considering is therefore one of obvious propriety and importance. The language of testimony should be plain and explicit; and the more so the better. It should be, not only such as can be understood, but such as cannot well be misunderstood.

7. When several witnesses give testimony to the same facts, it is necessary that their statements should be, on all essential points, concurrent. This does not imply, that they must all tell precisely the same story, or that they must agree in every minute particular. Such an agreement would be rather suspicious, than otherwise. It would furnish ground for the conjecture, that there had been concert between the witnesses, and that a story had been fabricated. But convincing testimony must be so far concurrent, that no part of it shall be self-contradictory. And more than this, it must concur in establishing the main facts or points of a case. There may be slight variations of statement, one witness omitting what another relates; or one dwelling more fully and circumstantially upon some particular points than another. Such variations are to be expected in honest witnesses; and they are an indication of honesty, rather than otherwise. But there must be a substantial agree

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