If it has been resisted in quiet and free countries, it has only been with regard to those ambiguous acts to which the appre hension of great danger might have tempted even such comWith a slight alteration in the saying of a philosopher, we may truly say, that no man ever became an enemy to the law of nations till that law had first been his enemy.

With these opinions, we cannot but wonder, and even somewhat regret, that Mr Stewart should have so far departed from the usual mildness and wariness of his equitable judgments; as, in speaking of these writers, to say, that, notwithstanding all their industry and learning, it would be very difficult to name any class of writers, whose labours have been of less utility to the world.' (Disc. 131.) It would be more just, in our opinion, to have said, that notwithstanding the mediocrity of their general talents, and their frequent offences against the order of science, it would be difficult to name any class of writers, whose labours have been of more utility to the world. To promote the civilization of mankind, by contributing to diffuse a reverence for the principles of justice, is certainly far more useful to the world, and (if that inferior object were worthy of notice) indirectly even more useful to science itself, than to make any addition, however splendid, to the stock of knowledge. A class of writers, remote from power, without sympathy for ambition, and happily disabled by inexperience from making allowance for the real exigencies of State necessity, addressing themselves to the great body of readers, similarly circumstanced and disposed with themselves, and expecting all their credit and popularity from the approbation of that important and daily increasing body, became necessarily the advocates of liberal principles, and the preachers of strict justice between all nations. In this manner, they became, as Mr Stewart states, the forerunners of the beneficent science of political economy,spreading the same spirit which it breathes, and reaching, with a sort of practical coarseness, some of its results,-though their reasonings did not, we conceive, lead by any logical process to the establishment even of its first principles. The connexion is rather historical than philosophical. But at all times they carried on that avowed war against the policy (we think harshly) called Machiavelian, which was solemnly declared by Grotius in almost the concluding sentiment of his work-That doctrine can have no permanent utility, which renders man the enemy of his fellow-men.

* Non potest diu prodesse doctrina quæ hominem hominibus in. 'sociabilem facit.' Grotius de Jure Bel. et Pac. Lib. III. cap. xxv. at ult. Monita ad fidem et ad pacem.'

3

It is with considerable regret, that we find ourselves precluded, by time and space, from throwing the most cursory glance over the writings of Hobbes, who fills so great a station in metaphysical history; a profound and original thinker, distinguished by a fearless consistency in following every principle through its logical consequences; whose diction is perhaps the most perfect example of the union of clearness and brevity on abstruse subjects, and in proposing new opinions,-but whose discourse of human nature is probably the work of man, which, without the circle of mathematical knowledge, has the smallest number of ambiguous or unnecessary words. In the Philosophy of Understanding, he has doubtless anticipated the greater part of those speculations, which are presented as discoveries by his successors. In that which regards the sentient and active part of human nature, he has set out from principles, or rather assumptions, so utterly false, as to contract and debase his Ethics, and to render his Politics a mere system of slavery. Should we be so happy as to meet Mr Stewart, when, in the sequel of this Discourse, he renders that justice to Locke, which there has been of late a disposition to deny to that incomparable person, we may have again an opportunity to consider the writings of Hobbes, undoubtedly the mine from which Mr Locke extracted part of his treasure ;-and if ever a contrast between the intellect and character of two great philosophers can be instructive, it seems to be in that which is so striking between the mode and spirit in which Hobbes and Locke have cultivated the same science, and sometimes expounded the same truths. We are told by Mr Stewart, that the theory so fashionable at present, which resolves the whole of Morality into the principle of Utility, is more nearly akin to Hobbism than some of its partisans are aware of.' (Disc. 138.) It is curious to observe,' says he in another place, how nearly Hobbes and Locke set out from the same assumptions, though they differ so widely in their practical conclusions.' (Disc. 62.) There is one sense in which the first of these observations must be al

Hobbes is to be added to the number of those philosophers who have exerted imagination in their censure of Imagination. In one passage he condemns metaphors in very strongly metaphorical language. But for metaphors they are utterly to be excluded: For seeing they openly profess deceit, to admit them into counsel or reasoning, were absolute folly.'-Leviath, p. 1. c. 8. The truth is, that a writer will seldom be quoted whose mind is so mutilated as to want an imagination which will force the way, like Hobbes, in me. taphorical objections to metaphors; or like Malebranche, in ungrate ful hostility against fancy; or like Rousseau, in eloquent declamation against the arts, without sparing eloquence itself.

lowed to be more absolutely just than it is represented to be. It is that in which Leibnitz regards many ethical systems which hold very different language, as being no more than modifications of a principle differing only in name from that of Utility. The next question,' says he, is, whether the preservation of human society be the principle of the law of nature. This the excellent writer denies, in opposition to Grotius, who founds the obligation of that law in its tendency to maintain society;-to Hobbes, who derives it from mutual fear; and to Cumberland, who derives it from mutual bene-. volence;-both which last systems are equally resolvable into its tendency to preserve society. '

The theory of talent, and the various forms of intellectual character, an equally important and imperfectly cultivated subject, leads Mr Stewart to observe, that the distinction of Locke between wit and judgment, is substantially the same with that of Malebranche between the sound sense which discerns real differences, and the superficial thinker who imagines or supposes resemblances; and, finally, with that of Bacon, who says, that the great and radical division of minds, in relation to philososophy and the sciences, is into the Acute, who can discover the smallest shade of difference-and the Sublime and Discursive, who recognize the slender resemblances of things the most ⚫ unlike. '

But it seems to us, that no two of these distinctions relate precisely to the same subject. Those of Bacon and Malebranche agree in being applied to the reasoning powers, and to their employment in the pursuit of truth. The distinction is expressly so limited by Bacon; and the words of Malebranche, where he speaks of supposing resemblances' as the vice of shallow intellects, clearly imply the same limitation. Malebranche contrasts the healthy state of reason with its chief disease. The division of Lord Bacon is into the two grand classes of merely intellectual power-the acute and the comprehensive understanding; of which last he is himself the most sublime example that human nature has yet exhibited by the wide range of his reason, independent of all consideration of his splendid imagination, which was only the minister and interpreter of what Leibnitz calls his divine genius. The distinction of Locke appears to us to be entirely of another kind. It is not like that of Bacon--the description

The Law of Nature, here, evidently is coextensive with Morality. The passage is in the Letter to Molanus, cited above, and writ ten in 1700.

Divini Ingenii Vir, Franciscus Bacon de Verulamio.

of two sorts of intellect, both confined to objects of science ;nor like that of Malebranche, a mere contrast between cursory and patient observers. It is a discrimination between the two powers of Wit and Judgment. It is so far from being limited to philosophizing, like the two others, that one of the members is totally without the province of Philosophy. Wit can never have any influence on reasoning, but to disturb it. The titles of the chapter and section of Locke, of which the last is The Difference between Wit and Judgment,' manifestly point to a distinction between mental powers essentially different, and employed for different purposes. In all but the terms, it corresponds to the distinction of Hobbes (Hum. Nat. c. 10.) between Fancy and Judgment. But, says Hobbes, both Fancy and Judgment are comprehended under the name of Wit. This word has indeed, in the course of two centuries, passed through more significations than most others in our language. Without going farther back than the reign of James I., wit is used by Sir J. Davies as the most general name for the intellectual faculties, of which reason, judgment, wisdom, &c. are subdivisions. (Immcrt. of Soul, sect. XXV.) In the time of Cowley and Hobbes, it came to denote a superior degree of understanding, and more particularly a quick and brilliant reason. In the famous description of facetiousness by Barrow, the greatest proof of mastery over language ever given by an English writer, Wit seems to have retained the acceptation of intellectual superiority. In Dryden's character of Lord Shaftesbury, it has the same signification; and is very nearly synonymous with the modern words Talent or Ability. But, in the course of forty years from the publication of Hobbes, to that of Locke, it had come to denote that particular talent which consists in lively and ingenious combinations of thought. In Mr Addison's papers on Wit, we find an approach to the modern sense of the term. To Mr Locke's account, which he adopts with warm commendation, he expressly adds, (what was perhaps implied in Mr Locke's language), that it must be such an assemblage of ideas as will give delight and surprise.' From a shade in the meaning of this last word, has gradually arisen that more limited sense of ludicrous surprise, which seems now an essential part of the import of wit, except where some of its more ancient significations are revived by epithets, or preserved in phrases which have descended from former times.

Having mentioned Mr Addison, in this Discourse very beautifully called the English Fenelon, we cannot refrain from expressing our satisfaction at the justice rendered by Mr Stewart to the admirable Essays on the Pleasures of Imagination. Perhaps they may deserve a still more ample consideration, when

he comes to consider the philosophy of the eighteenth century, in which they seem to have opened a new path of speculation. If we are to measure the previous progress by the notes on Boileau's Longinus, the most eminent writer who had treated a similar subject about the same time, we must allow that Mr Addison has made a step in philosophy. We are not indeed aware, that any writer before him had classed together the pleasures of contemplating beauty in nature and the arts, or had distinguished that class of sentiments from the pleasures of sense, as well as those attendant on the exertion of the understanding; or had set the example of classifying them by subdivision, under such heads as Novelty, Beauty and Sublimity. His own claim to originality may indeed be received as a proof of its justice. The modesty of his character, the result of the purity of his taste, as well as of his virtue, is an ample security against undue pretensions. The Characteristics had indeed been. published a very short time before: but the moral colour of that ingenious and often beautiful work, rather rendered it more difficult to distinguish and separate the pleasures of imagination, which were lost in the splendour of a stronger light.

Soon after the time of Mr Addison, the application of philosophy, to what he called the pleasures of imagination, became a favourite pursuit in the several countries of Europe. In this country, it was cultivated by a long succession of ingenious writers, of whom some, and these the greatest men of their age, are in this province the disciples of Mr Addison. On a subject of a very different nature, the two hundred and eightyseventh Number of the Spectator may be recommended to the perusal of those who doubt the vigour and the originality of Mr Addison's understanding. That form of government,' says he, appears to me the most reasonable, which is most conformable to the equality that we find in human nature, pro⚫vided it be consistent with public peace.' It is odd to consider the connexion between despotic government and barbarity; and how the making of one person more than man, ⚫ makes the rest less. Above nine parts of the world in ten are in the lowest state of slavery, and consequently sunk into the most gross and brutal ignorance. European slavery is indeed. a state of liberty, if compared with that which prevails in the other three divisions of the world; and therefore it is no wonder that those who grovel under it, have many tracks of light. Riches and plenty are the natural effects of liberty; and where these abound, learning and all the liberal arts will immediately