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obscurity; for that a sophism should be mistaken for an argument, can be imputed only to this, that it is not rightly understood.

As from what hath been said, we may learn to distinguish the few cases wherein a violation of the laws of perspicuity may be pertinent to the purpose of the orator, I shall next inquire what kind of violation is in such cases best fitted for answering his design. It is evident it cannot be the first, which, for distinction's sake, was denominated by the general name Obscurity. When a hearer not only doth not understand, but is himself sensible that he doth not understand what is spoken, it can produce no effect on him but weariness, suspicion, and disgust, which must be prejudicial to the intention. Although it is not always necessary that every thing advanced by the speaker should convey information to the hearer, it is necessary that he should believe himself informed by what is said, ere he can be convinced or persuaded by it. For the like reason, it is not the second kind of transgression, or any discoverable ambiguity in what is spoken, that is adapted to the end of speaking. This fault, if discovered, though not of so bad consequence as the former, tends to distract the attention of the hearer, and thereby to weaken the impression which the words would otherwise have made. It remains, that it is only the third and last kind above discussed, when what is said, though in itself unintelligible, a hearer may be led to imagine that he understands. When ambiguities can artfully be made to elude discovery, and to conduce to this deception, they may be used with success. Now, though nothing would seem to be easier than this kind of style, when an author falls into it naturally; that is, when he deceives himself as well as his reader; nothing is more difficult when attempted of design. It is besides requisite, if this manner must be continued for any time, that it be artfully blended with some glimpses of meaning; else, to persons of discernment, the charm will at last be dissolved, and the nothingness of what hath been spoken will be detected; nay, even the attention of the unsuspecting multitude, when not relieved by any thing that is level to their comprehension, will infallibly flag. The invocation in the Dunciad admirably suits the orator who is unhappily reduced to the necessity of taking shelter in the unintelligible.

Of darkness visible so much be lent,

As half to show, half veil the deep intent.

There is but one subject in nature (if what is unintelligible can be called a subject) on which the appetite of nonsense is.

4 That they are often successful this way hath been justly remarked by Aristotle. Των δ' ονομάτων, τω μεν σοφιστη ομωνυμίαι χρησιμοι, παρα ταυτας γαρ κακουργεία PAT. Y.

utterly insatiable. The intelligent reader needs not be informed that I mean what is commonly termed mystical theology; a subject whose supposed sublimity serves with its votaries to apologize for its darkness. That here indeed there may be found readers who can, not only with patience but with avidity, not only through pages but through volumes, lose themselves in wandering over a maze of words unenlightened by a single ray of sense, the translation of the works of Jacob Behmen, and our modern Hutchinsonian performances, are lamentable proofs. But this case is particular.

After all, we are not to imagine that the sophistical and unmeaning, when it may in some sense be said to be proper, or even necessary, are, in respect of the ascendant gained over the mind of the hearer, ever capable of rivalling conclusive arguments perspicuously expressed. The effect of the former is at most only to confound the judgment, and by the confusion it produceth, to silence contradiction; the effect of the latter is fully to convince the understanding. The impression made by the first can no more be compared in distinctness and vivacity to that effected by the second, than the dreams of a person asleep to his perceptions when awake. Hence we may perceive an eminent disadvantage, which the advocate for error, when compelled to recur to words without meaning, must labour under. The weapons he is obliged to use are of such a nature, that there is much greater difficulty in managing them than in managing those that must be employed in the cause of truth, and when managed ever so dexterously, they cannot do equal execution. A still greater disadvantage the patron of the cause of injustice or of vice must grapple with. For though he may find real motives to urge in defence of his plea, as wealth perhaps, or ease, or pleasure, he hath to encounter or elude the moral sentiments which, of all motives whatever, take the strongest hold of the heart. And if he find himself under a necessity of attempting to prove that virtue and right are on his side, he hath his way to grope through a labyrinth of sophistry and nonsense.

So much for the legitimate use of the unintelligible in

oratory.

SECTION II.-Objections answered.

But are there not some subjects, and even some kinds of composition, which from their very nature demand a dash of obscurity? Doth not decency often require this? Doth not delicacy require this? And is not this even essential to the allegoric style, and to the enigmatic? As to the manner which decency sometimes requires, it will be found, on examination, to stand opposed more properly to vivacity than to perspicuity

of style, and will therefore fall to be considered afterwards.

I shall now, therefore, examine, in the first place, in what respect delicacy may be said to demand obscurity. Thus much indeed is evident, that delicacy often requires that certain sentiments be rather insinuated than expressed; in other words, that they be not directly spoken, but that sufficient ground be given to infer them from what is spoken. Such sentiments are, though improperly, considered as obscurely expressed, for this special reason, that it is not by the first operation of the intellect, an apprehension of the meaning of what is said, but by a second operation, a reflection on what is implied or presupposed, that they are discovered; in which double operation of the mind there is a faint resemblance to what happens in the case of real obscurity. But in the case of which I am treating, it is the thought more than the expression that serves for a veil to the sentiment suggested. If, therefore, in such instances there may be said to be obscurity, it is an obscurity which is totally distinct from obscurity of language.

That this matter may be better understood, we must carefully distinguish between the thought expressed and the thought hinted. The latter may be affirmed to be obscure, because it is not expressed, but hinted; whereas the former, with which alone perspicuity of style is concerned, must always be expressed with clearness, otherwise the sentiment will never be considered as either beautiful or delicate 5. I shall illustrate this by examples.

For

No subject requires to be treated more delicately than praise, especially when it is given to a person present. Flattery is so nauseous to a liberal spirit, that even when praise is merited, it is disagreeable, at least to unconcerned hearers, if it appear in a garb which adulation commonly assumes. this reason, an encomium or compliment never succeeds so well as when it is indirect. It then appears to escape the speaker unawares, at a time that he seems to have no intention to commend. Of this kind the following story will serve as an example: "A gentleman, who had an employment bestowed on him, without so much as being known to his benefactor, waited upon the great man who was so generous, and was beginning to say he was infinitely obliged-Not at all, says the patron, turning from him to another: Had I known a more deserving man in England, he should not have had it."

5 This will serve to explain what Bouhours, a celebrated French critic, and a great advocate for perpsicuity, hath advanced on this subject, "Souvenez-vous, que rien n'est plus opposé à la véritable delicatesse que d'exprimer trop les choses, et que le grand art consiste à ne pas tout dire sur certains sujets; à glisser dessus plûtot que d'y appuyer; en un mot, à en laisser penser aux autres plus que l'on n'en dit." Maniere de bien penser, &c.

Tatler, No. 17.

Here the apparent intention of the minister was only to excuse the person on whom the favour had been conferred the trouble of making an acknowledgment, by assuring him that it had not been given from personal attachment or partiality. But whilst he appears intending only to say this, he says what implies the greatest praise, and, as it were, accidentally betrays the high opinion he entertained of the other's merit. If he had said directly, "You are the most deserving man that I know in England," the answer, though implying no more than what he did say, would have been not only indelicate but intolerable. On so slight a turn in the expression it frequently depends, whether the same sentiment shall appear delicate or gross, complimental or affronting.

Sometimes praise is very successfully and very delicately conveyed under an appearance of chagrin. This constitutes the merit of that celebrated thought of Boileau: “To imagine in such a warlike age, which abounds in Achilleses, that we can write verses as easily as they take towns 7!" The poet seems only venting his complaints against the unreasonable expectations of some persons, and at the same time discovers, as by chance, the highest admiration of his monarch and the heroes who served him, by suggesting the incredible rapidity of the success with which their arms were crowned.

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Sometimes also commendation will be couched with great delicacy under an air of reproach. An example of this I shall give from the paper lately quoted: "My Lord," said the duke of B-m, after his libertine way to the earl of O――y, you will certainly be damn'd." "How, my Lord?" said the earl with some warmth. "Nay," replied the duke, "there's no help for it, for it is positively said, Cursed is he of whom all men speak well." A still stronger example in this way we have from the Drapier, who, speaking to Lord Molesworth of the seditious expressions of which he had himself been accused, says, "I have witnesses ready to depose, that your Lordship hath said and writ fifty times worse, and what is still an aggravation, with infinitely more wit and learning, and stronger arguments: So that as politics run, I do not know a person of more exceptionable principles than yourself: And if ever I shall be discovered, I think you will be bound in honour to pay my fine and support me in prison, or else I may chance to inform against you by way of reprisal 9."

I shall produce one other instance from the same hand, of an indirect, but successful manner of praising, by seeming to invert the course of the obligation, and to represent the person

7 Et dans ce tems guerrier et fecond en Achilles
Croit que l'on fait les vers, comme l'on prend les villes.
Tatler, No. 17.
9 Drapier's Letters, 5.

obliging as the person obliged. Swift, in a letter to the archbishop of Dublin, speaking of Mr. Harley, then lord high treasurer, afterwards earl of Oxford, by whose means the Irish clergy had obtained from the queen the grant of the first fruits and tenths, says, "I told him that, for my part, I thought he was obliged to the clergy of Ireland, for giving him an occasion of gratifying the pleasure he took in doing good to the church1.'

66

It may be observed, that delicacy requires indirectness of manner no less in censure than in praise. If the one, when open and direct, is liable to be branded with the name of flattery, the other is no less exposed to the opprobrious appellation of abuse, both alike, though in different ways, offensive to persons of taste and breeding. I shall give from the work last quoted a specimen (I cannot say of great delicacy) in stigmatizing, but at least of such an indirect manner as is sufficient to screen the author from the imputation of downright rudeness. I hear you are like to be the sole opposer of the bank; and you will certainly miscarry, because it would prove a most perfidious thing. Bankrupts are always for setting up banks; how then can you think a bank will fail of a majority in both houses." It must be owned that the veil here is extremely thin, too thin to be altogether decent, and serves only to save from the imputation of scurrility a very severe reproach. It is the manner which constitutes one principal distinction between the libeller and the satirist. I shall give one instance more of this kind from another work of the same author. "To smooth the way for the return of popery in queen Mary's time, the grantees were confirmed by the pope in the possession of the abbeylands. But the bishop tells us that this confirmation was fraudulent and invalid. I shall believe it to be so, although I happen to read it in his lordship's history3." Thus he insinuates, or signifies by implication, that his lordship's history is full of lies. Now, from all the specimens I have exhibited, it will, suppose, sufficiently appear to any person of common understanding, that the obscurity required by delicacy, either in blaming or commending, is totally distinct in kind from obscurity of expression, with which none of the examples above quoted is in the smallest degree chargeable.

I

The illustrations I have given on this topic will contribute in some measure to explain the obsurity that is requisite in allegories, apologues, parables, and enigmas. In all these sorts composition there are two senses plainly intended, the literal and the figurative: the language is solely the sign of the literal sense, and the literal sense is the sign of the figurative. Per

1 Swift's Letters, 10.

2 Ibid. 40.

Preface to the Bishop of Sarum's Introduction to the third volume of his History of the Reformation.

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