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the former is not. It is an established idiom in the English tongue that any of the auxiliaries might, could, would, should, did, and had, with the nominative subjoined, should express sometimes a supposition, sometimes a wish: which of the two it expresses in any instance is easily discovered from the context. Thus the expression, "Would he but ask it of me," denotes either, "If he would, or I wish that he would but ask it of me." Would God, then is properly, I wish that God would, or, O that God would. The other expression it is impossible to reconcile to analogy any way2. For a like reason the phrase ever so, as when we say, though he were ever so good," is preferable to never so. In both these decisions I subscribe to the judgment of Dr. Johnson. Of the two phrases in no wise in three words, and nowise in one, the last only is conformable to the present genius of the tongue. The noun wise, signifying manner, is quite obsolete. It remains now only in composition, in which, along with an adjective or other subtantive, it forms an adverb or conjunction. Such are sidewise, lengthwise, coastwise, contrariwise, likewise, otherwise. These always preserve the compound form, and never admit a preposition; consequently nowise, which is an adverb of the same order, ought analogically to be written in one word, and not to be preceded by in. In every ancient style all these words were uncompounded, and had the preposition. They said in like wise, and in other wise3. And even at present if custom were uniform, as it is divided, in admitting in before nowise, it ought to be followed, though anomalous. In these matters it is foolish to attempt to struggle against the stream. All that I here plead for is, that when custom varies, analogy should decide the question. In the determination of this particular instance I differ from Dr. Priestley. Sometimes whether is followed by no, sometimes by not. For instance some would say, "Whether he will or no," others, " Whether he will or not." Of these it is the latter only that is analogical. There is an ellipsis of the verb in the last clause, which when you supply, you find it ne

2 What has given rise to it is evidently the French Plút à Dieu, of the same import. But it has not been adverted to (so servile commonly are imitators), that the verb plaire is impersonal, and regularly construed with the preposition à; neither of which is the case with the English will and would.

3 In proof of this I shall produce a passage taken from the Prologue of the English translation of the Legenda Aurea, which seems to have been made towards the end of the fifteenth century. "I haue submysed my selfe to translate into Englysshe the legende of sayntes whyche is called legenda aurea in latyn; That is to saye, the golden legende. For in lyke wyse as golde is moost noble aboue all other metallys; in lyke wise is thys legende holden moost noble aboue all other werkes." About the time that our present version of the Scriptures was made, the old usage was wearing out. The phrase in like wise occurs but once (Matt. xxi. 24), whereas the compound term likewise occurs frequently.-We find in several places, on this wise, in any wise, and in no wise. The two first phrases are now obsolete, and the third seems to be in the state which Dr. Johnson calls obsolescent.

cessary to use the abverb not, "Whether he will or will not." I shall only add, that by both the preceding canons we ought always to say rend in the present of the indicative and of the infinitive, and never rent, as is sometimes done. The latter term hath been pre-occupied by the preterite and the participle passive, besides that it is only in this application that it can be said to be used analogically. For this reason, the active participle ought always to be rending and not renting.

Canon the third.

The third canon is, When the terms or expressions are in other respects equal, that ought to be preferred which is most agreeable to the ear.

This rule hath perhaps a greater chance of being observed than any other, it having been the general bent for some time to avoid harsh sounds and unmusical periods. Of this we have many examples. Delicateness hath very properly given way to delicacy; and for a like reason authenticity will probably soon displace authenticalness, and vindictive dispossess vindicative altogether. Nay, a regard to sound hath, in some instances, had an influence on the public choice, to the prejudice of both the former canons, which, one would think, ought to be regarded as of more importance. Thus the term ingenuity hath obtained a preference to ingeniousness, though the former cannot be deduced analogically from ingenious, and had besides been pre-occupied, and consequently would be equivocal, being a regular derivative from the term ingenuous, if the newer acceptation had not before now supplanted the other altogether.

Canon the fourth.

The fourth canon is, In cases wherein none of the foregoing rules gives either side a ground of preference, a regard to simplicity (in which I include etymology when manifest) ought to determine our choice.

Under the name simplicity, I must be understood to comprehend also brevity; for that expression is always the simplest which, with equal purity and perspicuity, is the briefest. We have, for instance, several active verbs which are used either with or without a preposition indiscriminately. Thus we say either accept or accept of, admit or admit of, approve or approve of; in like manner address or address to, attain or attain to. In such instances it will hold, I suppose, pretty generally, that the simple form is preferable. This appears particularly in the passive voice, in which every one must see

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the difference. "His excuse was admitted of by his master."—" The magistrates were addressed to by the townsmen," are evidently much worse than, "His present was accepted by his friend." —“ His excuse was admitted by his master.' "The magistrates were addressed by the townsmen." We have but too many of this awkward, disjointed sort of compounds, and therefore ought not to multiply them without necessity. Now if once the prepositions should obtain in the active voice, the rules of syntax will absolutely require it in the passive. Sometimes indeed the verb hath two regimens, and then the preposition is necessary to one of them, as, "I address myself to my judges."—"They addressed their vows to Apollo." But of such cases I am not here speaking.

"His present was accepted of by his friend."

Both etymology and analogy, as well as euphony and simplicity, determine us in preferring subtract to substract, and consequently subtraction to substraction*.

Canon the fifth.

The fifth and only other canon that occurs to me on the subject of divided use is, In the few cases wherein neither perspicuity nor analogy, neither sound nor simplicity assists us in fixing our choice, it is safest to prefer that manner which is most conformable to ancient usage.

This is founded on a very plain maxim, that in language, as in several other things, change itself, unless when it is clearly advantageous, is ineligible. This affords another reason for preferring that usage which distinguishes ye as the nominative plural of thou, when more than one are addressed, from you the accusative. For it may be remarked, that this distinction is very regularly observed in our translation of the Bible, as well as in all our best ancient authors. Milton too is particularly attentive to it. The words causey and causeway are at present used promiscuously, though I do not know whether there be any difference but in the spelling. The old way is causey, which, as there appears no good reason for altering it,

4 Subtract is regularly deduced from the supine subtractum of the Latin verb subtruho, in the same way as act from actum, the supine of ago, and translate from translatum, the supine of transfero. But it would be quite unexampled to derive the English verb from the French soustraire. Besides, there is not another instance in the language of a word beginning with the Latin preposition sub, where the sub is followed by an s, unless when the original word compounded with the preposition begins with an s. Thus we say subscribe from sub and scribo, subsist from sub and sisto, substitute from sub and statuo. But we cannot say substract from sub and. straho, there being no such word. There can be no doubt, therefore, that a mistaken etymology, arising from an affinity to the French term, not in the verb, but in the verbal noun, has given rise to this harsh anomaly.

ought to be held the best. The alteration, I suppose, hath sprung from some mistaken notion about the etymology; but if the notion had been just, the reason would not have been sufficient. It tends, besides, either to introduce a vitiated pronunciation, or to add to the anomalies in orthography (by far too numerous already), with which the language is encumbered. Much the same may be said of jail and gaol, jailer and gaoler. That jail and jailer have been first used is probable, from the vulgar translation of the Bible 5. The quotations on the other side from Shakspeare are not much to be minded, as it is well known that his editors have taken a good deal of freedom with his orthography. The argument, from its derivation from the French geole, is very puerile. For the same reason we ought to write jarter, and not garter, and plead the spelling of the French primitive jartiere. Nor would it violate the laws of pronunciation in English, more to sound the [ja] as though it were written [ga], than to sound the [ga] as though it were written [ja].

SECTION II.—Every thing favoured by good use not on that account worthy to be retained.

I come now to the second question for ascertaining both the extent of the authority claimed by custom, and the rightful prerogatives of criticism. As no term, idiom, or application, that is totally unsupported by use, can be admitted to be good; is every term, idiom, and application, that is countenanced by use, to be esteemed good, and therefore worthy to be retained? I answer, that though nothing in language can be good from which use withholds her approbation, there may be many things to which she gives it that are not in all respects good, or such as are worthy to be retained and imitated. In some instances custom may very properly be checked by criticism, which hath a sort of negative, and though not the censorian power of instant degradation, the privilege of remonstrating, and by means of this, when used discreetly, of bringing what is bad into disrepute, and so cancelling it gradually; but which hath no positive right to establish any thing. Her power too is like that of eloquence; she operates on us purely by persuasion, depending for success on the solidity, or at least the speciousness of her arguments; whereas custom hath an unaccountable and irresistible influence over us, an influence which is prior to persuasion, and independent of it, nay, sometimes even in contradiction to it. Of different modes of expression, that which comes to be favoured by general practice may be

5 Acts xvi. 23.

denominated best, because established; but it cannot always be said with truth, that it is established because best. And, therefore, though I agree in the general principles maintained by Priestley on this subject, I do not concur in this sentiment as holding universally, that "the best forms of speech will, in time, establish themselves by their own superior excellence." Time and chance have an influence on all things human, and on nothing more remarkably than on language; insomuch that we often see that, of various forms, those will recommend themselves, and come into general use, which, if abstractedly considered, are neither the simplest nor the most agreeable to the ear, nor the most conformable to analogy. And though we cannot say properly of any expression which has the sanction of good use, that it is barbarous, we must admit that, in other respects, it may be faulty.

It is therefore, I acknowledge, not without meaning, that Swift, in the proposal above quoted, affirms that, "there are many gross improprieties, which, though authorized by practice, ought to be discarded." Now, in order to discard them, nothing more is necessary than to disuse them. And to bring us to disuse them, both the example and the arguments of the critic will have their weight. A very little attention will satisfy every reasonable person of the difference there is between the bare omission, or rather the not employing of what is used, and the introduction of what is unusual. The former, provided what you substitute in its stead be proper, and have the authority of custom, can never come under the observation, or at least the reprehension of a reader; whereas the latter shocks our ears immediately. Here, therefore, lies one principal province of criticism, to point out the characters of those words and idioms which deserve to be disfranchised and consigned to perpetual oblivion. It is by carefully filing off all roughnesses and inequalities that languages, like metals, must be polished. This, indeed, is an effect of taste. And hence it happens, that the first rudiments of taste no sooner appear in any people, than the language begins, as it were of itself, to emerge out of that state of rudeness in which it will ever be found in uncivilized nations. As they improve in arts and sciences their speech refines; it not only becomes richer and more comprehensive, but acquires greater precision, perspicuity, and harmony. This effect taste insensibly produces among the people long before the language becomes the object of their attention. But when criticism hath called forth their attention to this object, there is a probability that the effect will be accelerated. It is, however, no less certain, on the other hand, that in

Preface to the Rudiments of English Grammar.

7 For ascertaining the English tongue; see the Letter to the Lord High Treasurer.

M