and processes can accomplish, than to prefer elaborate and circuitous courses, merely for the sake of going round about to do what could be done as well in the twinkling of an eye. And yet in what does the Divine wisdom, as apprehensible by us, consist? Is it not in those very proceedings, which, if unbounded power existed, would be folly and not wisdom, that all the treasures of the infinite mind are exhausted? In adapting means to ends, in pursuing the path of light amid surrounding darkness, in harmonizing discordant principles, and bringing order out of confusion?" This, then, is his argument; if unbounded power existed, the adapting of means to ends, &c. would be folly; but the ways of God in adapting means to ends, &c. are not folly; therefore unbounded power does not exist."' The preceding words give us a glimpse of the way in which H. W. with a sagacity that I cannot boast of, satisfied himself of the truth of the saying, "It would be more wise to arrive at once at all that means, &c. can accomplish, than to prefer elaborate and circuitous courses." Suppose, then, that the Almighty were to discard from his economy of the world all the means, contrivances, and processes that H. W. ever contemplated or heard of, and were to arrive at once at all the ends that H. W. conceives them to aim at and accomplish; this, according to H. W. would be a state of things displaying more wisdom than the present system of means, &c. Now let me ask him, does he suppose these ends, or results thus produced, would be of any use or importance, or of none at all; would they exist for any good reason, or for none at all? One of these two must be the case. If they existed for no reason at all, and were of no use or importance at all, this state of things could not display more wisdom than the former, for it could display no wisdom at all. If they did exist for some good reason, and were of any use or importance, they would be manifestly means or contrivances, adapted to an end or ends, and would be exposed to the same objection as the former means, &c.; and therefore, so far from displaying more wisdom than the former system of things, they would display none, but be folly and not wisdom. The assertion, then, that "it would be more wise to arrive at once," &c, and that "if unbounded power existed, the adapting the means to the end, &c. would be folly," are clearly false, since they prove too much, even that Almighty God cannot do any thing for a good reason, or with an end in view, without committing folly.

One merit of H. W.'s dissertation is, that it will equally serve to disprove the wisdom or the goodness of God, by simply substituting the necessary terms, and using the same train of reasoning. Thus for example, putting w for p, wisdom for power, in the formula, page 811, we thus prove that God is not infinitely wise: "Wisdom is in its own nature limited. It can act only on possibilities. Even wisdom itself is but a vague and unintelligible notion, unless displayed to.us as triumphing over difficulties and rising superior to obstacles. A sweeping Om

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niscience which could, by one sovereign act of will, decree that in the nature of things, neither impediment nor resistance, nei-* ther means nor processes should exist, leaves no field for wisdom itself to act on. Omniscience, such as this, at least supplies no materials for man to comprehend or to adore. No; we are constructed otherwise. Our faculties are so framed as to correspond with the truth and reality of things. They are formed for the contemplation of wisdom as it exists, and not as it does not exist."

The mistake of H. W. in supposing that the employing of means and processes is an argument against the Divine Wisdom, arises from supposing that there are plannings, and contrivances, and ends in God's proceedings, resembling our own, and that we could point them out if there were; from fancying that God in any act has only one end in view, without looking beyond it, to which He advances by steps that he takes merely for the sake of that end. Means and ends are notions of our own, drawn from our own wants and weaknesses. If we must employ them at all, we are safest in saying that all his means are ends, and all his ends are means. All his works and ways are the offspring of one thought, and tend to one object; and through them all there is an adorable harmony and unity, of which all his worshippers may be convinced, though it is not to be expected that all, or perhaps that any, should fully understand it. All that is, and all that is going on, while it tends to some great and good result, is itself, if completely contemplated, a result of the same kind as that to which it tends-even such a one as is wonderfully fitted to fill its proper place in the wide scheme of his ways, and to display to those whom he has formed to adore and love him, his awful and lovely perfections.

But the chief argument on which H. W. relies is, that absolute Omnipotence is inconsistent with the Divine goodness. We have here the old question about the existence of evil, with a new solution. The human mind has played more fantastic antics about the untying of this knot than any other, and good reasoners have long given it up as indissoluble. The riddle is however all unriddled, as it seems, and that we need not despair after all, about the squaring of the circle, the philosopher's stone, perpetual motion, &c.; and who knows but that H. W. may make them all out himself? Previous enquirers have generally assumed as indubitable the Omnipotence of God, but have found it hard to reconcile what they see in the world, of evil and suffering, with their notions of the Divine wisdom and goodness. They have never suspected that they were wrong in their notions of Jehovah's Eternal Power and Goodness,' thinking with St. Paul, that these are "the invisible things of God that are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made;" but they have confessed with St. Paul, "the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God," that "his judgments" (by

which his distributions of happiness and suffering seem to be signified) "are unsearchable," and "his ways past finding out."

Bat H. W. has discovered that our notions of the wisdom and goodness of God in his judgments and ways, are clear and right enough, but that we are in error in our conceptions of His power. He cites three texts-Ec. xxxiii. 11; Is. vi. 3, 4; Mat. xxiii. 37-8. He asks this question:-"Is this, then, I would ask any fair and candid person, a language which looks as if the All-gracious Being who employs it had any relief or remedy in reserve for those who wilfully reject the mercies he had freely offered them? Are these like the expressions of one who could bestow salvation in any other way, or upon any other terms?" And then he leaves his prostrate antagonist to groan and extricate himself, as best he may, from beneath the weight of this mountain argument-these expressions do not look as if God could save sinners in any other way, or upon any other terms; therefore God cannot save sinners in any other way, or on any other terms; and consequently there is no such attribute as absolute Divine omnipotence.

"Is

We have here again an excellent formula for disproving the existence of either the infinite power, or the infinite goodness of God. Look at Eph. i. 11; Rev. i. 18; Rev. iii. 7; Rev. iv. 11; Jer. xviii. 6, xv. 2; Matt. xxviii. 18. As thus I reason. this, then, I ask any fair and candid person, language which looks as if the Almighty Being who employs it, had any wish to bestow more happiness than He does, or that he had any dislike to the death of sinners? Do these look like the expressions of one who was willing to bestow salvation on any other persons, or in any other way? Is it honouring God to say that he uses a language to work upon our feelings, which language is, in reality, a misrepresentation of the truth; a misrepresentation, nevertheless, so ill contrived, that after all it does not deceive us? Or is it exalting his great name, to magnify the mere moral attributes of his goodness above those natural attributes, in which consist at once both his essence and his glory? No. If it be indeed reverence to God, to dismiss him altogether from our minds, then all such considerations are set at rest for ever. But if it be our duty not only to think of him, but to bear him in all our thoughts, then in all around us we see this truth inscribed, that there is a limit in love, or a limit in power. In which shall we place it? In love? Then we place it not in God, but in his lowest attribute. In power? Then, indeed, we place the limit in God himself; for the right hand of God is the right hand of Power, (Matt. xxvi. 64,) and, therefore, God is Power."

To this reasoning, which is just as bad, quite as convincing, and rather more ingenious than that of H. W., I think I hear him replying-"Who told you that the love of God is his lowest attribute, or that his essence and glory consists in his power?" I confess that nobody told me, but that I am merely

talking a little nonsense of my own. And who told H. W., I wonder, that the power of God is his lowest attribute, and that his essence and glory consist in his love? Or who ever dreamed of magnifying one attribute of Deity above another, except himself?

H. W. would not have taken all this pains for our sakes, if he had not had an object in view. What was it? We see what it was in page 810. "If," says he, "it be our prime duty to love God with all our heart, and if we cannot love merely because we are commanded, but must have a clear perception of the amiableness of an object before it is in our power to love it-can it be uninteresting to ascertain whether any character plainly opposite to all our notions of goodness and benevolence, can be warrantably attributed to God? The truth is, that the only rational conclusion we can arrive at in the matter is, that in the nature of things no such attribute can exist; and until the cloud which its supposed existence throws on every procedure of the Divine Providence is dissipated, we must either not think at all, or think amiss on that subject, in comparison of which all other subjects are unimportant, namely, the character of God." To his question I answer-It is altogether unimportant, and the idlest trifling, to ascertain, &c.; for this simple reason, that nobody ever attributed, or is in danger of attributing, such a character to God. Not mankind in general; for to their common sense there is no repugnancy whatever between infinite power and infinite goodness, not even from the view of the evil there is in the world, which they plainly knew to be in part the voluntary work of man himself, and easily apprehend to be, in part, the means of producing more good than could arise without it. Not philosophers; for although they, pushing their abstractions not only beyond the range of common objects, and common occurrences, but also frequently beyond the range of common sense, find it hard to reconcile their notions of God, in some things, with their notions of goodness, yet they never dream of attributing to God any character plainly opposite to all their notions of goodness and benevolence. Moreover, I deny utterly that the common notions of Divine Omnipotence impose any necessity on us of either not thinking at all, or thinking amiss, of the character of God, and I demand proof from H. W. of the assertion.

I have shown that H. W.'s pains, on this occasion, were perfectly needless. I will now show that he has totally failed in his efforts, were they never so necessary. The Infidel thus reasons: If God were infinite in goodness, as well as infinite in power, no evil would be: but evil is: therefore God is not infinite in goodness. H. W. as far as I can understand him, if he means any thing consistent, any thing that is not the poorest quibbling and trifling, allows the premises, but begs leave to make a slight change in the conclusion, and thus collects, therefore God is not infinite in power. Thus if any one asks why does your good God allow so much misery? The reply is ready-Because he

How

cannot help it! Was ever any thing more happy? completely is the cloud now rolled from all the proceedings of Providence! But, unfortunately, another puzzle remains. The present existence of evil is disposed of completely, but how are we to account for its origin at first? Who existed before either evil or any thing else existed? God. Who created all things, and set on foot the whole course of things? God. Then why did he not take his plans better? Thus it seems necessary to sacrifice another attribute, and give up infinite wisdom, as well as infinite power, or else to betake ourselves to the expedient of the ancient Gnostics, and assert the existence of two Gods, a bad one and a good one, that have spoiled each others work. God forbid that I should attribute to H. W. such blasphemies. He would not more greatly abhor those consequences, than I should abhor charging him with them, or with any other opinion contrary to the Christian faith. I am so deeply convinced

of the piety and orthodoxy of that gentleman, that, on this occasion, in spite of the impression of his talents that I have received from the papers he has before contributed to the EXAMINER, I am prepared to defend that piety and orthodoxy, at the expense of his perspicuity and prudence.

Rather than believe that the paper I am replying to fairly expresses his serious opinion, I will attribute it to haste, to an excessive love of paradox, to indisposition, or persuade myself that it was sent to press through some mistake or accident. As it has appeared, however, in print, I have thought it my duty to answer it, which I have done, as far as in me has lain, with all fairness, and without the least thought of giving, the slightest offence to its elegant and excellent author. And I am convinced that, although it was necessary thus to reply to it, two or three important distinctions, which he has continually confounded, such as between power possessed, and power exercised, and between impossibilities with respect to the agent, and impossibilities with respect to the object, might, with a little charity in interpreting, supply a key to the whole of this strange production, that would explain away nearly all that at first sight may appear hard sayings to the readers of the CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

T.P. K.