sin of all men- -a connection which loses itself in the dim beginnings of nature no less than of history. Mere suppositions, however, did not satisfy his mind; but, carrying out his system in all its logical consequences, and applying a false exegesis to certain passages, he laid down the following rigid proposition as his doctrine:-" As all men have sinned in Adam, they are justly subject to the condemnation of God on account of this hereditary sin and the guilt thereof” (2).

(1) Pelag. lib. 1, De Lib. Arb., in Aug. De Pecc. Orig. c. 13: Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles, vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis: capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio procreamur, atque ante actionem propriæ voluntatis id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit; he even admits the preponderance of good in man, when he (according to August. De Nat. et Grat. c. 21) speaks of a naturalis quædam sanctitas, which dwells in man, and keeps watch in the castle of the soul over good and evil, and by which he means conscience. Comp. Julian (quoted by August. in Op. Imp. i. 105): Illud quod esse peccatum ratio demonstrat, inveniri nequit in seminibus. 122: Nemo naturaliter malus est: sed quicunque reus est, moribus, non exordiis accusatur. Other passages

may be found in Münscher, von Cölln, i. s. 375 ff. [L. ii. 66: In omnes autem homines mors pertransiit, quia una forma judicii prevaricatores quosque etiam reliquæ comprehendit ætatis; quæ tamen mors nec in sanctos, nec in innocentes ullos sævire permittitur, sed in eos pervadit quos prævaricationem viderit æmulatos.] Comp. Wiggers, s. 91 ff. Augustine himself protested against the expression peccatum naturæ or peccatum naturale which the Pelagians imputed to him, and always substituted his phrase-peccatum originale. The Pelagians considered bodily death not as a punishment of the first sin, but as a physical necessity, though Pelagius himself conceded, at the Synod of Diospolis, that the death of Adam was a punishment inflicted upon Adam, but only upon him. Aug. De Nat. et Gr. 21 (c. 19); Op. Imp. i. 67, vi. 27, 30. Yet Pelagius did not deny the power of sin; he even asserted an increasing degradation of the human race; but he explained

this from the long habit of sinning and bad example. Epist. ad Demetriadem, c. 8: Longa consuetudo vitiorum, quæ nos infecit a parvo paulatimque per multos corrupit annos, et ita postea obligatos sibi et addictos tenet, ut vim quodammodo videatur habere naturæ. Cf. Schröckh, Kg. xiv. s. 344.

(2) A list of the works in which Augustine combated the Pelagians will be found in Münscher, von Cölln, s. 373. The passages bearing on this question, which can be understood, however, only in their connection, are also given there, s. 377 ff. (Comp. De Pecc. Mer. i. 2, 4, 21; Opus Imp. vi. 30; De Pecc. Mer. i. 10; De Nupt. et Concup. i. 27, ii. 57-59; Op. Imp. i. 47; De Nupt. et Concup. i. 26; De Pecc. Orig. 36; De Con. et Grat. 28. In support of his views he appealed to infant baptism: De Pecc. Mer. i. 39, iii. 7; Contra Jul. vi. 6; De Pecc. Mer. i. 21; Enchirid. 93; to the formulas of exorcism: De Pecc. Orig. 45; and principally to Rom. v. 12.) Wiggers, s. 99 ff. [De Civit. Dei, xiv. 1: A primis hominibus admissum est tam grande peccatum, ut in deterius eo natura mutaretur humana, etiam in posteros obligatione peccati et mortis necessitate transmissa.-De Corrept. et Grat. x. (28) Adam, quia per liberum arbitrium Deum deseruit, justum judicium Dei expertus est; ut cum tota sua stirpe, quæ in illo adhuc posita tota cum illo peccaverat, damnaretur. --De Pecc. Orig. c. 38: Deus nihil fecit nisi quod hominem voluntate peccantem justo judicio cum stirpe damnavit, et ideo ibi quidquid etiam nondum erat natum, merito est in prævaricatrice radice damnatum; in qua stirpe damnata, tenet hominem generatio carnalis. De Nupt. et Concup. 11, c. 5: Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt, de quo propterea singuli peccatum originale traxerunt. De Civit. Dei, viii. 14: Deus enim creavit hominem rectum, naturarum auctor non utique vitiorum; sed sponte depravatus justeque damnatus, depravatos damnatosque generabit, Omnes enim fuimus in illo, quando fuimus ille unus. Nondum erat nobis singillatim creata et distributa forma, in qua singuli viveremus; sed jam natura erat seminalis, ex qua propagaremur; qua scilicet propter peccata vitiata, et vinculo mortis obstricta, justeque damnata, non alterius conditionis homo ex homine nascetur. Ibid. xiv. 15: Adam faciendo voluntatem suam non ejus, a quo

factus est, universum genus humanum, propagine vitiata, culpa et pænæ fecit obnoxium. Ibid. xxii. 24: In originali malo duo sunt, peccatum atque supplicium.]—On Augustine's interpretation of Rom. v. 12 (in quo omnes peccaverunt, Vulg.), see Op. Imp. ii. 47 ss., 66, contra duas Epp. Pel. iv. 7 (c. 4); Julian, on the other hand, gives the following explanation: in quo omnes peccaverunt nihil aliud indicat, quam: quia omnes peccaverunt. Augustine's exposition was confirmed by the Synod of Carthage (A.D. 418). Comp. Münscher, von Cölln, s. 381, 382. But it would be a great mistake, a merely atomistic procedure, to ascribe the whole theory of Augustine to this exegetical error. Deeper causes gave rise to that theory, viz.: (1) His own experience, moulded by the remarkable events in the history of his external and internal life; (2) Perhaps some vestiges of his former Manichæan notions, of which he might himself be unconscious, e.g. that of defilement in the act of generation (comp. De Nupt. et Concup. i. 27: Concupiscence, he says, is not attributed to the regenerate as sin; but in its own nature it is not without sin, it is the daughter and the mother of sin: hence every one conceived and born in the way of nature, is under sin until he is born again through Him-quem sine ista concupiscentia virgo concepit 1); (3) His realistic mode of thinking, which led him to confound the abstract with the concrete, and to consider the individual as a transient and vanishing part of the whole (massa perditionis). In connection with this mode of thinking, other causes might be: (4) His notions of the Church as a living organism, and of the effects of infant baptism; (5) The opposition which he was compelled to make to Pelagianism and its possible consequences, threatening to destroy all deeper views of the Christian system. Thus, according to Augustine, not only was physical death a punishment inflicted upon Adam and all his posterity, but he looked upon original sin itself as being in some sense a punishment of the first transgression, though it was also a real sin (God punishes sin by sin), and can therefore be imputed to every

1 "However little Augustine was satisfied by Manichæism, it is probable that the attraction, which at one period of his life he felt towards this system, proceeded from his consciousness of the power of evil in man's nature, a consciousness by which he was throughout his life deeply penetrated," Baur, Dg. i. 2, s. 29.

individual. But it is on this very point, first, strongly emphasized by him, viz. the imputation of original sin, that his views differed from all former opinions, however strict they were, on the fall of man. He endeavoured to clear himself from the charge of Manichæism (in opposition to Julian) by designating sin not as a substance, but as a vitium, a languor; he even charged his opponent with Manichæism. So, too, Augustine could very well distinguish between the sin, which is common to all men, and personal crime, from which the pious are preserved. Enchir. 64: Neque enim quia peccatum est omne crimen, ideo crimen est etiam omne peccatum. Itaque sanctorum hominum vitam, quam diu in hac mortali (al. morte) vivitur, inveniri posse dicimus sine crimine; peccatum autem, si dixerimus quia non habemus, nosmet ipsos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est" (1 John i. 8).-Respecting his views of the insignificant remnant (lineamenta extrema) of the divine image left in man, and of the virtues of the heathen, see Wiggers, s. 119, Anm.

§ 112.

Second Point of Controversy.

Liberty and Grace.

Pelagius admitted that man, in his moral activity, stands in need of divine aid, and could therefore speak of the grace of God assisting the weakness of man by a variety of provisions (1). He supposed, however, this grace of God to be something external, and added to the efforts put forth by the free will of man; it can even be merited by man's good will (2). Augustine, on the other hand, looked upon grace as the creative principle of life, which generates as an abiding good that freedom of the will which is entirely lost in the natural man. In the power of the natural man to choose between good and evil, to which great importance was attached by Pelagius, as well as by the earlier Church, he saw only a liberty to do evil, since the regenerate man alone can actually will the good (3).

(1) On this point Pelagius expresses himself clearly, as follows (in August. De Grat. c. 5): Primo loco posse statuimus, secundo velle, tertio esse. Posse in natura, velle in arbitrio, esse in effectu locamus. Primum illud, i.e. posse ad Deum proprie pertinet, qui illud creaturæ suæ contulit; duo vero reliqua, h. e. velle et esse, ad hominem referenda sunt, quia de arbitrii fonte descendunt. Ergo in voluntate et opere laus hominis est, immo et hominis et Dei, qui ipsius voluntatis et operis possibilitatem dedit, quique ipsam possibilitatem gratiæ suæ adjuvat semper auxilio. Quod vero potest homo velle bonum atque perficere, solius Dei est. Hence man also owes to God, that he can will, as is said in what follows: quod possumus omne bonum facere, dicere, cogitare, illius est, qui hoc posse donavit, qui hoc posse adjuvat. Comp. c. 18: Habemus autem possibilitatem a Deo insitam, velut quandam, ut ita dicam, radicem fructiferam atque fecundam, etc. freedom of the will is common to Jews, Gentiles, and Christians; grace, according to Pelagius himself, is something exclusively Christian. Pelagius also rejected the proposition of Cœlestius: "gratiam Dei non ad singulos actus dari." [Münscher, von Cölln, i. s. 386.]

The

(2) Pelagius considered as means of grace, especially doctrine, as the manifestation of the divine will, promises, and trials (to which belong the wiles of Satan); but Julian strongly denied that the will of man is first created by grace (fabricetur, condatur); he sees in them nothing but an adjutorium of the undisturbed free will. Comp. Aug. De Grat. Chr. c. 8, Op. Imp. i. 94, 95. [Münscher, 1.c. s. 387, 388.] Julius Müller justly remarks (in his work on Sin, 1st ed., s. 475) that Pelagius has not the idea of development: "he has not the conception of a life unfolding itself; he only recognizes the mechanical concatenation of single acts." Distinction of real and formal freedom. Comp., too, Neander, Dg. 385, on the different stages of the divine revelation of grace [corresponding in the view of Pelagius to its progressive deterioration].

(3) Augustine, on the contrary, maintains: Non lege atque doctrina insonante forinsecus, sed interna et occulta, mfrabili ac ineffabili potestate operari Deum in cordibus hominum non solum veras revelationes, sed bonas etiam voluntates (De Grat. Chr. 24). He recognizes in the grace of God an inspiratio