autem corpus animale ipsum quidem non est anima, participatur autem animam, quoadusque Deus vult, sic et anima ipsa quidem non est vita, participatur autem a Deo sibi præstitam vitam.

(2) The opposition which Tertullian raised to the above doctrine was connected with his twofold division of the soul; that of Origen, with his views on pre-existence. (For the latter could easily dispose of the objection that the soul must have an end, because it has had a beginning.) Comp., however, Tert. De Anima, 11, 14, 15. Among other things, Tertullian appeals to the fact that the soul continues active even in dreams. On the connection of sleep and death generally, see De Anima, c. 43 ff. According to Orig. Exhort. ad Mart. 47 (Opp. i. p. 307), De Princip. ii. 11; 4, p. 105, and iii. 1, 13, p. 122, it is both the inherent principle of life in the soul, and its natural relation to God, which secures its immortality. To this is to be added his view about self-determination, and the retribution based thereon. Comp. Thomasius, s. 159; Redepenning, ii. s. 111.

The whole question, however, had more of a philosophical than Christian bearing, as the idea of immortality itself is abstract negative. On the other hand, the believer by faith lays hold of eternal life in Christ as something real and concrete. The Christian doctrine of immortality cannot therefore be considered apart from the person, work, and kingdom of Christ, and rests upon Christian views and promises; see, below, in the Eschatology. Comp. the writing of Schultz, noted above.

§ 59.

Sin, the Fall, and its Consequences.

J. G. Walch (Th. Ch. Lilienthal), De Pelagianismo ante Pelagium, Jen. 1738, 4to. Ejusdem, Historia Doctrinæ de Peccato Originali; both in his Miscellanea Sacra, Amstel. 1744, 4to. J. Horn, Commentatio de sententiis eorum patrum, quorum auctoritas ante Augustinum plurimum valuit, de peccato originali, Gött. 1801, 4to. + Wörter [Landerer and Huber], u. s. § 57. +Kuhn, der vorgebliche Pelagianismus der voraugustinischen Väter (Tüb. Quartalschrift, 1853).

However much the primitive Church was inclined, as we have already seen, to look with a free and clear vision at the bright side of man (his ideal nature), yet it did not endeavour

to conceal the dark side by a false idealism. Though it cannot be said that the consciousness of human depravity was the exclusive and fundamental principle upon which the entire theology of that time was founded, yet every Christian conscience was convinced of the opposition between the ideal and the real, and the effects of sin in destroying the harmony of life; and this, too, in proportion to the strictness of the claims set up for human freedom.

Thus Justin M. complains of the universality of sin, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 95. The whole human race is under the curse; for cursed is every one who does not keep the law. The author of the Clementine Homilies also supposes that the propensity to sin is made stronger by its preponderance in human history, and calls men the slaves of sin (δουλεύοντες émiovμía), Hom. iv. 23, x. 4, Schliemann, s. 183.-Clement of Alexandria directs our attention, in particular, to the internal conflict which sin has introduced into the nature of man; it does not form a part of our nature, nevertheless it is spread through the whole race. We come to sin without ourselves knowing how; comp. Strom. ii. p. 487. Origen also conceives of sin as a universal corruption, since the world is apostate, Contra Cels. iii. 66, p. 491: Zapŵs yàp φαίνεται, ὅτι πάντες μὲν ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν πεφύκαμεν, ἔνιοι δὲ οὐ μόνον πεφύκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰθισμένοι εἰσὶν ἁμαρτάνειν. Comp. iii. 62, p. 488: Αδύνατον γάρ φαμεν εἶναι ἄνθρωπον μετ ̓ ἀρετῆς ἀπ ̓ ἀρχῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἄνω βλέπειν· κακίαν γὰρ ὑφίστασθαι ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον èv åveρáπois (with reference to Rom. vii. 9). Cf. Redep. ii. s. 360. Nevertheless the writers of this period do not express as strong a sense of sin as those of the following. On the contrary, jubilant feelings preponderated in view of the finished work of the Saviour. It would be as one-sided to demand in the first centuries the experience of later times, as it is to misconceive the necessity of the later developments.

§ 60.

The Doctrine of Sin in General.

Suicer, Thesaurus, sub ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία, ἁμαρτωλός. Krabbe, dio Lehre von der Sünde und dem Tode, Hamburg 1836 (dogmatico-exegetical). *Julius Müller, die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde, Breslau 1844, 2 vols. 6te Aufl. 1877 [transl. in Clark's Foreign Theol. Library].

Though sin was recognized as a fact, yet definitions of its precise nature were to a great extent indefinite and unsettled during this period (1). The heretical sects of the Gnostics in general (and in this particular they were the forerunners of Manichæism), with their dualistic notions, either ascribed the origin of evil to the demiurge, or maintained that it was inherent in matter (2). On the other hand, the Christian theologians, generally speaking, agreed in seeking the source of sin in the human will, and clearing God from all responsibility (3). Such a view easily led to the opinion of Origen, that moral evil is something negative (4).

(1) A definition, allied to that of the Stoics, is given by Clement of Alexandria, Pæd. i. 13, p. 158, 159: Πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν ὀρθὸν, τοῦτο ἁμάρτημά ἐστι. Virtue (ἀρετή), on the contrary, is διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. Hence sin is also disobedience to God, Αὐτίκα γοῦν ὅτε ἥμαρτεν ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος, καὶ παρήκουσε τοῦ θεοῦ. He further considers sin, urging its etymology, as error ... ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι τὸ πλημμελούμενον πᾶν διὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου διαμαρτίαν γινόμενον καὶ εἰκότως καλεῖσθαι ἁμάρτημα. Comp. Strom. ii. p. 462 : Τὸ δὲ ἁμαρ τάνειν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν κρίνειν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν συνίσταται ἢ τοῦ ἀδυνατεῖν ποιεῖν. The different kinds of sin are ἐπιθυμία, φίβος, and ἡδονή. One consequence of sin is the λήθη τῆς ἀληθείας, Coh. p. 88, and, lastly, eternal death, ib. p. 89. Tertullian puts sin in the impatience (inconstancy) of man, De Pat. 5 (p. 143): Nam ut compendio dictum sit, omne peccatum impatientiæ adscribendum. Comp. Cypr. De Bono Pat. p. 218. Orig. De Princip. ii. 9, 2 (Opp. t. i. p. 97,

HAGENB. HIST. DOCT. I.

Ρ

Redep. p. 216), also believes that laziness and aversion to efforts for preserving the good, as well as turning from the path of virtue (privative), are causes of sin; for going astray is nothing but becoming bad; to be bad only means not to be good, etc.; comp. Schnitzer, s. 140.

(2) Now and then even orthodox theologians ascribe the origin of evil to the sensuous nature: thus Justin M. Apol. i. 10 (?); De Resurr. c. 3, see Semisch, s. 400, 401. On the other hand, comp. Clem. Strom. iv. 36, p. 638, 639 : Οὔκουν εὐλόγως οἱ κατατρέχοντες τῆς πλάσεως καὶ κακίζοντες τὸ σῶμα. οὐ συνορῶντες τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὀρθὴν πρὸς τὴν οὐρανοῦ θέαν γενομένην, καὶ τὴν τῶν αἰσθησέων ὀργανοποιίαν πρὸς γνῶσιν συντείνουσαν, τά τε μέλη καὶ μέρη πρὸς τὸ καλὸν, οὐ πρὸς ἡδονὴν εὔθετα. Οθεν ἐπιδεκτικὸν γίνεται τῆς τιμιωτάτης τῷ θεῷ ψυχῆς τὸ οἰκητήριον τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. . . . 'Αλλ' οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει, οὔδε αὖ κακὸν φύσει τὸ σῶμα, οὐδὲ μὴν, ὃ μή ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν, τοῦτο εὐθέως κακόν. Εἰσι γὰρ οὖν καὶ μεσότητές τινες κ.τ.λ. Comp. Origen, Contra Celsum, iv. 66: Τόδε, τὴν ὕλην . . . τοῖς θνητοῖς ἐμπολιτευομένην αἰτίαν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, καθ ̓ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ ἑκάστου ἡγεμονικὸν αἴτιον τῆς ὑποστάσης ἐν αὐτῷ κακίας ἐστίν, ἥτις ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.

(3) Clem. Strom. vii. 2, p. 835: Κακίας δ' αὖ πάντως ἀναίτιος (ὁ θεός). Orig. Contra Cels. vi. 55, p. 675 : Ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν, ὅτι κακὰ μὲν ἢ τὴν κακίαν καὶ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς πράξεις ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐποίησε. Comp. iii. 69, p. 492. Nevertheless, he holds that evil is under God's providence; comp. De Princip. iii. 2, 7 (Opp. i. p. 142).

(4) Orig. De Princip. ii. 9, 2 (Opp. i. p. 97), and in Joh. t. ii. c. 7 (Opp. iv. p. 65, 66): Πᾶσα ἡ κακία οὐδέν ἐστιν (with reference to the word οὐδέν in John i. 3), ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐκ ὂν τυγχάνει. He terms evil ἀνυπόστατον, and the fall μείωσις (diminutio). J. Müller, 1st ed. 132; comp. Redepenning, ii.

s. 328.

$ 61.

Interpretation of the Narrative of the Fall.

The documents contained in the five books of Moses were to the early Church the historical foundation, not only of the

doctrine of the creation of the world and of man, but also of the doctrine of the origin of sin, which appears as a fact in the history of Adam. Some writers, however, rejected the literal interpretation of this narrative. Thus Origen (after the example of Philo) (1) regarded it as a type, historically clothed, of what takes place in free moral agents everywhere, and at all times (2). It is difficult to ascertain how far Irenæus adhered to the letter of the narrative (3). Tertullian unhesitatingly pronounced in favour of its strict historical interpretation (4). Both the Gnostics and the author of the Clementine Homilies rejected this view on dogmatic grounds (5).

(1) Philo sees in the narrative τρόποι τῆς ψυχῆς, see Dähne, s. 341, and his essay in the Theologische Studien und Krit. 1833, 4.

(2) Clement considers the narrative of the fall partly as fact and partly as allegory, Strom. v. 11, p. 689, 690. (Serpent = image of voluptuousness.1) On the other hand, Origen regards it as purely allegorical, De Princip. iv. 16 (Opp. t. i. p. 174); Contra Cels. iv. 40, p. 534. Adam is called man, because: Ἐν τοῖς δοκοῦσι περὶ τοῦ ̓Αδὰμ εἶναι φυσιολογεῖ Μωϋσῆς τὰ περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως οὐχ οὕτως περὶ ἑνός τινος, ὡς περὶ ὅλου τοῦ γένους ταῦτα φάσκοντος τοῦ θείου λόγου. Concerning the further application of allegorical interpretation to the particulars of the narrative (the clothing our first parents in skins as a symbol of the clothing of the soul?), comp. Meth. in Phot. Bibl. Cod. 234 and 293. On the other side, see Orig. Fragm. in Gen. t. ii. p. 29, where both the literal interpretation is excluded, and this allegorical exposition is called in question.

(3) According to the fragment of Anastasius Sinaïta in Massuet, p. 344, Irenæus must be understood as having explained the temptation by the serpent (in opposition to the Ophites), πνευματικῶς, not ἱστορικῶς, but it is not evident to

1 That the serpent was the devil, or the devil was in the serpent (which is not expressly declared in Genesis), was generally assumed, in accordance with Wisd. ii. 24 and Rev. xii. 9 ( öçıs ò àpxaños); probably also with reference to John viii. 44.