view. None but heretics ventured to maintain that man is subject to the influence of a foreign power (the stars, or the εἱμαρμένη) (10); and on this very account they met with the most decided opposition on the part of the whole Church.

(1) Justin M. speaks in the most decisive way against determinism, Apol. i. c. 43 : Εἱμαρμένην φαμὲν ἀπαράβατον ταύτην εἶναι, τοῖς τὰ καλὰ ἐκλεγομένοις τὰ ἄξια ἐπιτίμια, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντία, τὰ ἄξια ἐπίχειρα. Οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, οἷον δένδρα καὶ τετράποδα, μηδὲν δυνάμενα προαιρέσει πράττειν, ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ἄξιος ἀμοιβῆς ἢ ἐπαίνου, οὐκ ἀφ ̓ ἑαυτοῦ ἑλόμενος τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γενόμενος, οὐδ ̓ εἰ κακὸς ὑπῆρχε, δικαίως κολάσεως ἐτύγχανεν, οὐκ ἀφ ̓ ἑαυτοῦ τοιοῦτος ὤν, ἀλλ ̓ οὐδὲν δυνάμενος εἶναι ἕτερον παρ ̓ ὃ ἐγεγόνει.

(2) Tatian, Or. c. 7: Τὸ δὲ ἑκάτερον τῆς ποιήσεως εἶδος αὐτεξούσιον γέγονε, τἀγαθοῦ φύσιν μὴ ἔχον, ὃ πλὴν [πάλιν] μόνον παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, τῇ δὲ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῆς προαιρέσεως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκτελειούμενον· ὅπως ὁ μὲν φαῦλος δικαίως κολάζηται, δι ̓ αὐτὸν γεγονῶς μοχθηρός· ὁ δὲ δίκαιος χάριν τῶν ἀνδραγαθημάτων ἀξίως ἐπαινῆται κατὰ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τοῦ θεοῦ μὴ παραβὰς τὸ βούλημα. Concerning the critical and exegetical difficulties connected with this passage, see Daniel, Tatian der Apologet. s. 207.

(3) Athen. Leg. 31; comp. De Resurr. 12, 13, 15, 18 ss. (4) Ad Autol. ii. 27: Ελεύθερον γὰρ καὶ αὐτεξούσιον ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ἄνθρωπον, in connection with the doctrine of immortality, of which in the next section.

(5) Octav. c. 36, 37: Nec de fato quisquam aut solatium captet aut excuset eventum. Sit sortis fortuna, mens tamen libera est, et ideo actus hominis, non dignitas judicatur. . . . Ita in nobis non genitura plectitur, sed ingenii natura punitur. The liberty of man gets the victory in the contest with all the adversities of destiny: Vires denique et mentis et corporis sine laboris exercitatione torpescunt; omnes adeo vestri viri fortes, quos in exemplum prædicatis, ærumnis suis inclyti floruerunt. Itaque et nobis Deus nec non potest subvenire, nec despicit, quum sit et omnium rector et amator suorum; sed in adversis unumquemque explorat et examinat; ingenium singulorum periculis pensitat, usque ad extremam mortem

voluntatem hominis sciscitatur, nihil sibi posse perire securus. Itaque ut aurum ignibus, sic nos discriminibus arguimur. Quam pulcrum spectaculum Deo, quum Christianus cum dolore congreditur, quum adversum minas et supplicia et tormenta componitur quum strepitum mortis et horrorem carnificis irridens insultat! quum libertatem suam adversus reges et principes erigit, soli Deo, cujus est, cedit, etc. Moreover, in Minucius, xi. 6, it is intimated (though the opinion is put in the mouth of his opponent) that the Christians believed that God judges man not so much according to his conduct, as according to predestination; but he refutes this, as a false accusation.

(6) Clem. Coh. p. 79 : Ὑμῶν ἐστιν ἡ βασ. τῶν οὐρανῶν) ἐὰν θελήσητε, τῶν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐσχηκότων. He then shows (p. 80) how man himself, in accordance with his own nature, ought to cultivate the talents which God has given him. As the horse is not for the plough (after the custom of the ancients), nor the ox for riding, as none is required to do more than his nature will allow, so man alone can be expected to strive after the divine, because he has received the power of doing it. According to Clement, too, man is accountable for that sin alone which proceeds from free choice, Strom. ii. p. 461; it is also frequently in our power to acquire both discernment and strength, ibid. 462. Clement knows nothing of a gratia irresistibilis, Strom. vii. p. 855: Οὔτε μὴν ἄκων σωθήσεται ὁ σωζόμενος, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄψυχος· ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἑκουσίως καὶ προαιρετικῶς σπεύσει πρὸς σωτηρίαν· διὸ καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς ἔλαβεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ἂν ἐξ αὑτοῦ ὁρμητικὸς πρὸς ὁπότερον ἂν καὶ βούλοιτο τῶν τε αἱρετῶν καὶ τῶν φευκτῶν κ.τ.λ.

(7) Comp. the third book of the work De Princip. in its whole connection. According to Origen, there is no accountability without liberty, De Princip. ii. 5 (Redep. p. 188): "If man were corrupt by nature, and could not possibly do good, God would appear as the judge, not of actions, but of natural capacities" (comp. what Minucius says on this point). Comp. De Princip. i. 5, 3, and Contra Cels. iv. 3 (Opp. i. p. 504): 'Αρετῆς μὲν ἐὰν ἀνέλῃς τὸ ἑκούσιον, ἀνεῖλες αὐτῆς καὶ Thy ovoiav. Nevertheless, this liberty is only relative; every moral action is a mixture of free choice and divine aid. Comp

§ 70, and the passages quoted by Redepenning, Orig. ii. s.

318.

(8) Iren. iv. 4, p. 231, 232 (Gr. 281): Sed frumentum quidem et paleæ, inanimalia et irrationabilia existentia, naturaliter talia facta sunt: homo vero, rationabilis et secundum hoc similis Deo, liber in arbitrio factus et suæ potestatis ipse sibi causa est, ut aliquando quidem frumentum, aliquando autem palea fiat; Irenæus then founds the accountability of man upon this argument. Comp. iv. 15, p. 245 (Gr. 318), iv. 37, p. 281, 282 (Gr. 374, 375): Εἰ φύσει οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν, οὔθ ̓ οὗτοι ἐπαινετοί, ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ, τοιοῦτοι γὰρ κατεσκευάσθησαν· οὔτ ̓ ἐκεῖνοι μεμπτοὶ, οὕτως γεγονότες. 'Αλλ' ἐπειδὴ οἱ πάντες τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσι φύσεως, δυνάμενοί τε κατασχεῖν καὶ πρᾶξαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ δυνάμενοι πάλιν ἀποβαλεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι· δικαίως καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς εὐνομουμένοις, καὶ πολὺ πρότερον παρὰ θεῷ οἱ μὲν ἐπαινοῦνται, καὶ ἀξίας τυγχάνουσι μαρτυρίας τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ καθόλου ἐκλογῆς καὶ ἐπιμονῆς· οἱ δὲ καταιτιῶνται καὶ ἀξίας τυγχάνουσι ζημίας τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἀποβολῆς. Comp. also iv. 39, p. 285 (Gr. 380), v. 27, p. 325 (Gr. 442). But, according to Irenæus, the freedom of man is not only seen in his works, but also in his faith, iv. 37, p. 282 (Gr. 376); comp. also the fragment of the sermon, De Fide, p. 342 (Gr. 467). On Hippolytus and his view of freedom, see Jacobi in Neander, Dg. s. 193.

(9) Tertullian defended the idea of liberty especially in opposition to Marcion: "How could man, who was destined to rule over the whole creation, be a slave in respect to himself, and not have the faculty of reigning over himself?" Advers. Marcion, ii. 8, 6, 9; comp. Neander, Antignost. s. 372, 373.1

(10) "According to the Gnostics, there is a fate which stands in intimate connection with the stars, and is brought about by their instrumentality," etc. Baur, Gnosis, s. 232. But the doctrine of human freedom is of importance in the opinion of

1 Even the opponents of the doctrine of human liberty, as Calvin, are compelled to acknowledge this remarkable consensus Patrum of the first period; and in order to account for it, they are obliged to suppose a general illusion about this doctrine! "It is at any rate a remarkable phenomenon, that the very doctrines which afterwards caused disruptions in the Christian Church, are scarcely ever mentioned in the primitive Church," Daniel, Tatian, s. 200.

the author of the Clementine Homilies, e.g. Hom. xv. 7: Ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐλεύθερον ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἑαυτὸν ἀπονέμειν ᾧ βούλεται, ἢ τῷ παρόντι κακῷ, ĥ TÊ μÉλλOVTI ȧyalą; comp. also c. 8, Hom. ii. 15, iii. 69, viii. 16, xi. 8. Credner, l.c. iii. s. 283, 290, 294. Schliemann, s. 182 ff., 235 ff., 241.

§ 58.

(b) Immortality.

* Olshausen, antiquissimorum ecclesiæ græcæ patrum de immortalitate sententiæ recensentur, Osterprogramm 1827, reviewed by Ullmann in Studien und Kritiken, i. 2, s. 425. H. Schultz, die Voraussetzungen der Christlichen Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit, Göttingen 1861.

The theologians of the primitive age did not so completely agree concerning the immortality of the soul. They were far from denying the doctrine itself, or doubting its possibility. But some of them, e.g. Justin, Tatian, and Theophilus (1), on various grounds supposed that the soul, though mortal in itself, or at least indifferent in relation to mortality or immortality, either acquires immortality as a promised reward, by its union with the spirit and the right use of its liberty, or, in the opposite case, perishes with the body. They were led to this view, partly because they laid so much stress on freedom, and because they thought that likeness to God was to be obtained only by this freedom; and partly, too, because they supposed (according to the trichotomistic division of human nature) that the soul receives the germ of immortal life only by union with the Spirit, as the higher and free life of reason. And, lastly, other philosophical hypotheses concerning the nature of the soul doubtless had an influence. On the contrary, Tertullian and Origen, whose views differed on other subjects, agreed in this one point, that they, in accordance with their peculiar notions concerning the nature of the soul, looked upon its immortality as essential to it (2).

(1) On the question whether the view advocated by the

aged man in Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. § 4, is the opinion of the author himself or not?-as well as on the meaning of the passage : ̓Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀποθνήσκειν φημὶ πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς ἐγώ, comp. his commentators, Olshausen, l.e.; Rössler, Bibl. i. 8. 141; Mohler, Patrologie, i. s. 242; Daniel, Tatian, s. 224; Semisch, ii. 368. Tatian speaks more distinctly, Contra Græc. c. 13: Οὐκ ἐστιν ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ καθ ̓ ἑαυτήν, θνητὴ δέ. ̓Αλλὰ δύναται ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μὴ ἀποθνήσκειν. Θνήσ κει μὲν γὰρ καὶ λύεται μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μὴ γινώσκουσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 'Ανίσταται δὲ εἰς ὕστερον ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τοῦ κόσμου σὺν τῷ σώματι, θάνατον διὰ τιμωρίας ἐν ἀθανασίᾳ λαμβάνουσα. Πάλιν δὲ οὐ θνήσκει, κἂν πρὸς καιρὸν λυθῇ, τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ θεοῦ πεποιημένη. Καθ' ἑαυτὴν γὰρ σκότος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν αὐτῇ φωτεινόν . . . (Joh. i.) . . . Ψυχὴ γὰρ οὐκ αὐτὴ τὸ πνεῦμα ἔσωσεν, ἐσώθη δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ. . . Συζυγίαν δὲ κεκτημένη τὴν τοῦ θείου πνεύματος, οὐκ ἐστιν ἀβοήθητος, ἀνέρχεται δὲ πρὸς ἅπερ αὐτὴν ὁδηγεῖ χωρία τὸ πνεῦμα. According to Tatian also, the soul is not a simple nature (πολυμερής ἐστι καὶ οὐ μονομερής), c. 15. Theophilus (ad Aut. ii. 27) starts the question: was Adam created with a mortal or immortal nature? and replies: neither the one nor the other, but he was fitted for both (δεκτικὸν ἀμφοτέρων), in order that he might receive immortality as a reward, and become God (γένηται θεός), if he aspired after it by obeying the divine commandments; but that he might become the author of his own ruin, if he did the works of the devil, and disobeyed God. Irenæus also speaks only of an immortality which is given to man, see Adv. Hær. ii. 64: Sine initio et sine fine, vere et semper idem et eodem modo se habens solus est Deus. . . . Et de animalibus, de animabus, et de spiritibus et omnino de omnibus his quæ facta sunt, cogitans quis minime peccabit, quando omnia, quæ facta sunt, initium quidem facturæ suæ habeant, perseverant autem, quoadusque ea Deus et esse et perseverare voluerit. Non enim ex nobis, neque ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundem gratiam Dei datur. Sicut 1 Καθ' ἑαυτήν is wanting in the most recent manuscripts ; vide Daniel, s. 228, on this passage.

2 Whether an absolute annihilation is here intended, or only a loss of consciousness, see Baur, Dg. s. 575, who adopts the latter view. On the cognate view of the Thnetopsychites (Arabici), compare below, on Eschatology, § 76, note 8.