κεσθαι, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ψυχὴ ἔτι οὖσα ἐν σώματι γιγνώσκειν τὶν θείν.

§ 36.

The Unity of God.

Since Christianity adopted the doctrine of one God as taught in the Old Testament, it became necessary to defend it, not only against the polytheism of the heathen, but also against the dualism, resting on heathenism, and the theory of emanation of the Gnostics (1). Some proved the necessity of one God (2), though not in the most skilful manner, from the relations of space (3), or even from analogies in the rational and also in the animal creation (4). The more profound thinkers, however, were well aware that it is not sufficient to demonstrate the mere numerical unity of the Divine Being, and tried to give expression to this feeling by transporting the transcendental unity into a sphere above the mathematical Monas (5).

(1) Both the hypothesis of an ❝pxwv, Snμiovpyós, Jaldabaoth, etc., who is subordinate to the supreme God (0εòs ȧKαтOVÓμαστος, βυθός), and that of the unfolding of the one God into manifold simple æons, or pairs of æons, is contrary to monotheism. On the more fully developed systems of Basilides and Valentinus, comp. Irenæus, Clem. Alex., and the works quoted § 23 on the Gnostic systems. Against the Gnostic dualism especially, Irenæus (ii. 1); Origen, De Princip. ii. 1; Tert. Adv. Marcion. i. (As to the mode in which the orthodox Church tried to unite the belief in the Trinity with monotheism, see below.)

(2) Justin M. simply acknowledges this necessity, by considering the unity of God as an innate idea, which was afterwards lost. In his opinion, monotheism is the first true criterion of religious principles, Coh. ad Græc. c. 36: Avvatòv μανθάνειν ὑμᾶς ἕνα καὶ μένον εἶναι θεὸν, ὃ πρῶτόν ἐστι τῆς ἀληθοῦς θεοσεβείας γνώρισμα.

(3) To this class belongs the proof adduced by Athenagoras, Legat. pro Christianis, c. 8: "If there had been two or several gods from the beginning, they would either be in one and the same place, or each would occupy a separate space. They cannot be in one and the same place, for if they be gods they are not identical (consequently they exclude each other). Only the created is equal to its pattern, but not the uncreated, for it does not proceed from anything, neither is it formed after any model. As the hand, the eye, and the foot are different members of one body, as they conjointly compose that body, so God is but one God. Socrates is a compound being, since he is created, and subject to change; but God, who is uncreated, and is incapable of suffering and of division, cannot consist of parts. But if each god were supposed to occupy a separate space, what place could we assign to the other god, or the other gods, seeing that God is above the world, and around all things which He has made? For as the world is round, and God surrounds all beings, where would then be room for any of the other gods? For such a god cannot be in the world, because it belongs to another; no more can he be around the world, for the Creator of the world, even God, surrounds it. But if he can be neither in the world, nor around it (for the first God occupies the whole. space around it), where is he? Perhaps above the world, and above God? in another world? or around another world? But if he is in another world, and around another world, he does not exist for us, and does not govern our world, and his power, therefore, is not very great, for then he is confined. within certain boundaries (after all, a concession!). But as he exists neither in another world (for the former God fills. the universe), nor around another world (for the above God holds all the universe), it follows that he does not exist at all, since there is nothing in which he can exist." Similarly the author of the Clementines. Comp. Baur, Dg. s. 401.

(4) Minuc. Fel. c. 18: Quando unquam regni societas aut cum fide cœpit, aut sine cruore desiit? Omitto Persas de equorum hinnitu augurantes principatum, et Thebanorum præmortuam fabulam transeo; ob pastorum et casæ regnum de geminis memoria notissima est; generi et soceri bella toto orbe diffusa sunt, et tam magni imperii duos fortuna non

cepit. Vide cetera: rex unus apibus, dux unus in gregibus, in armentis rector unus. Tu in cœlo summam potestatem dividi credas, et scindi veri illius ac divini imperii totam potestatem? quum palam sit, parentem omnium Deum nec principium habere nec terminum, etc. Comp. Cyprian, De Idolorum Vanitate, p. 14.

:

(5) Clem. Paed. i. 8, p. 140 : Ἓν δὲ ὁ θεὸς, καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν μονάδη. Along with the idea of the unity of God, Origen speaks of the more metaphysical idea of His simplicity, De Princip. i. 1, 6 (Opp. t. i. p. 51; Redepenning, p. 100): Non ergo aut corpus aliquid, aut in corpore esse putandus est Deus (against this, compare Athenagoras), sed intellectualis natura simplex, nihil omnino adjunctionis admittens uti ne majus aliquid et inferius in se habere credatur, sed ut sit ex omni parte μovás et ut ita dicam évás, et mens et fons, ex quo initium totius intellectualis naturæ vel mentis est. Strauss in his Glaubenslehre (i. s. 404 ff.) gives a compressed sketch of the attempts of the Fathers to prove the unity of God. [Origen, Contra Cels. i. 23, in the a posteriori method; from the analogy of armies and states. Lactantius, Div. Inst. i. 3: Quod si in uno exercitu tot fuerint imperatores, quot legiones, quot cohortes, quot cunei, quot alæ, etc. Cyprian, De Idol. Van. 5: Nec hoc tantum de homine mireris, quum in hoc omnis natura consentiat. Rex unus est apibus, et dux unus in gregibus, et in armentis rector unus: multo magis mundi unus est rector, etc. They also derived an a priori argument from the infinitude and absolute perfection of the divine essence.]

§ 37.

Whether God can be named and known.

Baur, Dg. s. 392 ff.

The idea of a revealed religion implies that so much of the nature of God should be made manifest to man as is necessary to the knowledge of salvation; the Church, therefore, has always cultivated the Xiyos Teрì Оeoû (theology). On the

other hand, the inadequacy of human conceptions has always been acknowledged (in opposition to the pride of speculation), and the unfathomable divine essence admitted to be past finding out; some even entertained doubts as to the propriety of giving God any name. Much of what the Church designated by the term mystery is founded partly on a sense of this insufficiency of our conceptions and the inaptitude of our language, and partly on the necessity of still employing certain representations and expressions to communicate our religious ideas.

When the martyr Attalus, in the persecution of the Gallican Christians under Marcus Aurelius, was asked during his trial what was the name of God, he replied: Ο θεὸς ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχει ὡς ἄνθρωπος, Euseb. v. 1 (ed. Heinichen, t. ii. p. 29, comp. the note). Such was also the opinion of Justin M. Apolog. ii. 6 ; whatever name may be given to God, he who has given a name to a thing must always be anterior to it. He therefore draws a distinction, with Philo (De Confus. Ling. p. 357), between appellatives (προσρήσεις) and names (ὀνόματα). The predicates πατήρ, θεός, κύριος, δεσπότης, are only appellatives. Therefore he also calls God ἄῤῥητος πατήρ; other passages are given by Semisch, ii. s. 252 ff. When Justin further says (Dial. c. Tryph. c. 3) that God is not only above all names, but above all essence (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), it is to be remembered that he is there speaking as a heathen from the Platonic standpoint. But elsewhere he speaks of an οὐσία of God, e.g. Dial. c. Tryph. c. 128, and even ascribes to Him (in a certain sense) a μορφή. Apol. i. 9 ; comp. Semisch, ii. s. 252. Theoph. ad Autol. i. 3 : "Ακουε, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, τὸ μὲν εἶδος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἄῤῥητον καὶ ἀνέκφραστον, καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον ὀφθαλμοῖς σαρκίνοις ὁραθῆναι· δόξῃ γάρ ἐστιν ἀχώρητος, μεγέθει ἀκατάληπτος, ὕψει ἀπερινόητος, ἰσχύϊ ἀσύγκριτος, σοφίᾳ ἀσυμβίβαστος, ἀγαθοσύνῃ ἀμίμητος, καλοποιΐᾳ ἀνεκδιήγητος· εἰ γὰρ φῶς αὐτὸν εἴπω, ποίημα αὐτοῦ λέγω· εἰ λόγον εἴπω, ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω (comp. the note to this passage by Maran)· νοῦν ἐὰν εἴπω, φρόνησιν αὐτοῦ λέγω πνεῦμα ἐὰν εἴπω, ἀναπνοὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω· σοφίαν ἐὰν εἴπω, γέννημα αὐτοῦ λέγω· ἰσχὺν ἐὰν είπω, κράτος αὐτοῦ λέγω· πρόνοιαν ἐὰν εἴπω,

ἀγαθοσύνην αὐτοῦ λέγω· βασιλείαν ἐὰν εἴπω, δόξαν αὐτοῦ λέγω κύριον ἐὰν εἴπω, κριτὴν αὐτὸν λέγω· κριτὴν ἐὰν εἴπω, δίκαιον αὐτὸν λέγω· πατέρα ἐὰν εἴπω, τὰ πάντα αὐτὸν λέγω· πῦρ ἐὰν εἴπω, τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω κ.τ.λ. Comp. i. 5 : Εἰ γὰρ τῷ ἡλίῳ ἐλαχίστῳ ὄντι στοιχείῳ οὐ δύναται ἄνθρωπος ἀτενίσαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν θέρμην καὶ δύναμιν, πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξῃ ἀνεκφράστῳ οὔσῃ ἄνθρωπος OvηTòs où Súvaтaι åνтwπñσαi; [comp. Scherer, Le Dithéisme de Just. Rév. de. Theol. 1856]. According to Iren. ii. 25, 4, God is indeterminabilis, nor can any one fully comprehend His nature by thinking He is invisibilis propter eminentiam, ignotus autem nequaquam propter providentiam (ibid. ii. 6). God cannot be known without God: we know Him only through the revelation which is made to us of Him (iv. 6). The medium through which we know Him is His revealed love to men. Comp. Duncker, s. 11. Möller, 1.c. s. 475. Minuc. Fel. c. 18: Hic (Deus) nec videri potest, visu clarior est, nec comprehendi, tactu purior est, nec æstimari, sensibus, major est, infinitus, immensus et soli sibi tantus quantus est notus; nobis vero ad intellectum pectus angustum est, et ideo sic eum digne æstimamus, dum inæstimabilem dicimus. Eloquar, quemadmodum sentio: magnitudinem Dei, qui se putat nosse, minuit; qui non vult minuere, non novit. Nec nomen Deo quæras: DEUS nomen est! Illic vocabulis opus est, quum per singulos propriis appellationum insignibus multitudo dirimenda est. Deo, qui solus est, Dei vocabulum totum est. Quem si patrem dixero, terrenum opineris; si regem, carnalem suspiceris; si dominum, intelliges utique mortalem. Aufer additamenta nominum, et perspicies ejus claritatem. Clement of Alexandria shows very distinctly, Strom. v. 11, p. 689, that we can attain to a clear perception of God only by laying aside, di ávaλúσews, all finite ideas of the divine nature, till at last nothing but the abstract idea of unity remains. But lest we should content ourselves with the mere negation, we must throw ourselves

1 From these expressions we must not infer that the name of God was indifferent to Christians; on the contrary, the names given to God in the Scriptures were held to be most sacred: hence Origen contends against the position of Celsus, that one might call the highest being, Jupiter, or Zeus, or Sabaoth, or any Egyptian or Indian name: Contra Cels. vi., Opp. i. p. 320.