The Self-restraining State: Power and Accountability in New DemocraciesAndreas Schedler, Larry Jay Diamond, Marc F. Plattner Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999 - 395 This text states that democratic governments must be accountable to the electorate; but they must also be subject to restraint and oversight by other public agencies. The state must control itself. This text explores how new democracies can achieve this goal. |
Spis treści
Conceptualizing Accountability | 13 |
Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies | 29 |
Comments on ODonnell | 53 |
A Response to My Commentators | 68 |
A Brief History of Electoral Commissions | 75 |
Institutionalizing Credible Elections in Ghana | 105 |
A Brief History of Judicial Review | 145 |
Judicial Independence and Judicial Reform in Latin America | 151 |
Corruption Democracy and Reform in Benin | 227 |
Combating Corruption in South Korea and Thailand | 245 |
A Brief History of Central Bank Independence | 285 |
The International Financial Institutions | 313 |
Conflicts and Agents of Accountability | 333 |
Bibliography | 351 |
The Contributors | 381 |
About the Book 395 | |
Building Judicial Independence in Common Law Africa | 177 |
A Brief History of Anticorruption Agencies | 217 |
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Kluczowe wyrazy i wyrażenia
actions actors Africa agency of restraint agents anticorruption authoritarian authority Benin Botswana CBR's central bank central bank independence citizens civil society CMVP conditionality conflicts constitutional court constitutionality corruption countries credibility decisions democracy democratic donors economic effective elec elections electoral administration Electoral Commission electoral court established example executive Federal Electoral Federal Electoral Tribunal Ghana groups horizontal accountability human rights ICAC important institutions issue judges judicial independence judicial reform judicial review judiciary Latin America leaders legislative liberal mechanisms mediators ment Mexico monitoring national chapters NGOs norms O'Donnell opposition parties organizations parliament percent political autonomy political parties polyarchies postelectoral president problem regime republican role ruble rule of law Russia sector separation of powers social Soglo South Korea strategy Supreme Court Tanzania Thailand TI's tion tional tive tradition transition transparency Transparency International tribunal Uganda vertical accountability vote voters World Bank Yeltsin