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breaking up of this delusive sense of freedom. In what respect is this different from Lord Kames' hypothesis of a deceitful sense of liberty ? Nay, Edwards gives the reason for this natural constitution. “It was meet, if sin did come into existence, and appear in the world, it should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature, as such, and should appear so to do, that it might not appear to be from God, as the efficient or fountain.”—“ If sin had not arisen from the imperfection of the creature, it would not have been so visible, that it did not arise from God, as the positive cause and real source of it."
Surely this is strange reasoning; who could have conceived it possible for the inind of Edwards to adopt it? Look at it closely, “ before and after.” The creature sins from necessity. He has, it is true, the sense, the consciousness of liberty. But it will not do to look behind this consciousness, behind the will, because it will be found delusive, there being in that direction a gulf of necessity that swallows up all things; a set of springs, that, apart from the will, and prior to it, govern the whole machinery of existence. But at the same time, to shield the Deity from the charge of being the author of sin, a second cause must be constituted, namely, the imperfection which properly belongs to the creature, and a delusive idea of freedom must be constituted along with that prearranged imperfection, or else it will be difficult to make it visible that sin does not arise from God, as the positive cause and real source of it!” This singular expression, the imperfection which properly belongs to the creature, taken in connection with the preceding reasoning, seems to us to accomplish the very evil, which the writer was anxious to avoid. It represents the Deity as acting under the prior necessity of having sin “come into existence, and appear in the world,” and then, conformably to that necessity, constituting a creature of such imperfection, that sin would surely and inevitably come into being in that way. If this be indeed the origin of evil, the supporters of such a theory, may as well make thorough work in their argument, and boldly affirm that the necessity for it was a necessity in the divine existence and eternity, and no more to be arraigned, questioned, prevented, or rebelled against, than the rigid and awful postulate, WHATEVER IS, IS.
The great question as to liberty and necessity is connected a parte ante with the divine character, and a parte post with human conduct, According to the side which men take, it exerts a practical influence, even though they cannot agree in their definitions of the terms. But let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. The only freedom which we do not possess naturally, is the liberty with which Christ inakes his people free, and until men gain that, neither life nor liberty can be considered as a blessing. And although men cannot settle it metaphysically, whether they are imprisoned or not, yet if they be good, it is, at the worst, as good as if they were not; but if they be bad, it is, at the best, as bad as if they were. There were once some birds, Goethe tells us, who lived in a spacious aviary. A bullfinch said to his neighbor the goldfinch, who was gayly fluttering from bush to bush, “ Do you know, friend, that we are shut up in a cage ?” “ What do you talk of a cage,” said the goldfinch; “ see how we fly about! That is a cage, indeed, in which my neighbor canary is sitting.” “But I tell you we are in a cage too. Don't you see there the wire grating ?” “Yes, I see one there, certainly; but look, as far as I can see on every side there is none.” “ You cannot see to all sides.” “No more can you." “ But consider then," continued the bullfinch, “ does not our master bring us water every morning, and put it in our trough, and strow seed on the ground? Would he do that, if he did not know that we are shut up, and cannot fly where we will ?” “ But,” said the goldfinch,“ I tell you I can fly where I will.”
Thus they disputed for a long time, till at length the canary called out from his corner : “ Children, if you cannot settle it whether you are in a cage not, it's just as good as if you were not in one.”
In the third volume of Professor Tappan's work, he gives an exhibition of the doctrine of the will viewed in connection with the Bible, which some will regard as one of the most just and valuable portions of the treatise. The author connects with it an exposition of three theories on the subject of election, of which we must record our decided disapprobation of the first, and our preference for the second. Our remarks have run already to such a length, that we shall not go into the statement of these theories, but only say that we regard the first as lying open to some serious objections on account of its super-scriptural refinements, which the author could have preferred only out of an over anxiety to make it very evident that the doctrine of election hariponizes with the doctrine of the will; a fact, which most happily neither they on the one side nor the other of this controversy are at all disposed to doubt. We prefer the second theory, because, holding closer to the Scriptures, it throws us more humbly and absolutely upon God's all-merciful and sovereign grace. The doctrine of election is one, about which we are less inclined to theorize, than on any other subject. We love the explicitness of the Bible, and are well content with its exhibition there.
Professor Tappan observes (and we think rather unguardedly, because an opponent, and even a casual reader, would take more from the observation than the writer means to convey), that “ the determination of our will by the divine will, interpenetrating it, appears as little consistent with freedom, as a necessary determination by the strongest motive.” The writer must have had soine material analogy in his own mind connected with this phraseology, or he would not have used it; but if not, what then becomes of freedom in the case of the Holy Spirit “ exerting his coincident regenerating influences to secure the coincident act of the human personality,” which Professor Tappan exhibits as a part of that theory which he seems himself to prefer? There is as much freedom in the one case, as in the other.
After all, the manner in which the Divine Being works in us, to will and to do, without infringing in the least on our most perfect and absolute free agency, is a mystery, and for the present must remain so. We shall, in the celestial world, know a great deal more about psychology, than we do here in the cave of Plato; and just now it is impossible, on the subject of election, to be wise above that which is written. Two passages of Scripture, which we confess we greatly admire and love, are so explicit, that they contain the whole doctrine, to our heart's content, and to the silencing of every objection : “Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to do. "_" According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy, and without blame before him in love, having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted in the Beloved.” Professor Tappan, we are glad to know, accepts these passages with all heartiness, in their fullest extent, and therefore we wish that in one or two paragraphs he had been more careful in avoiding the possibility of any misconstruction of his views.
Professor Tappan has chosen a difficult and thorny path of metaphysical investigation ; there are lions in the way that few men are willing to encounter. We believe he has the truth on his side, and a most frank and honest heart in pursuing it, though,-if he adopts the refinements of the second theory above noticed as his own,—with some little mixture of error. The truth is of the highest importance, and there are critical vultures enough to pounce upon the error, if once they find that the truth is attracting notice. It surely will, for these investigations deserve all the attention that their author asks for them. There are some persons whose nature makes it impossible that they should come to such speculations except with the very spirit which Professor Tappan deprecates ; but no matter for that; time is a great and impartial friend, and God is greater; trusting to whom no man need have his temper ruffled or his ardor cooled in the pursuit of truth.
"I ask,” says Professor Tappan," that no one will meet arguments advanced in no spirit of partisanship, with the eager zeal of such a spirit: and that, as I have arrayed myself under the banner of no great leader in the schools of philosophy or theology, so also that I may not be either honored or anathematized by the application of his name. I have sought for truth independently, as I had a right to do: I have published my results, as I had a right to do: and I cheerfully take upon me all the responsibility which fairly attaches to the proceeding."
Ora, et labora! Continue to trust in the “ divine power and quiet majesty of truth,” though still, if need be,“ without patronage and without defence.” In speculations on the will there is danger of growing misanthropic. A man who deserves well of the public is very apt to think the public ungrateful towards him; but alas ! men are still more neglectsul of the truth than of him who proposes it. We often think of that beautiful col. loquy, which Coleridge once wrote, and we believe almost impromptu, and we shall take the liberty to close with it, in the full and sad conviction that there is no degeneracy more common in this world-worshipping age and community, than that of making greatness and goodness means instead of ends,
How seldom, friend ! a good great man inherits
ANCIENT AND MODERN Greece.*
ATHENS AND ATTICA; Journal of a Residence there. By the Rev.
Christopher Wordsworth, M. A., Fellow of Trinity College ;
Head Master of Harrow School, &c. John Murray, London. A Short Visit to the Ionian Islands, Athens, and the Morea. By
Edward Gifford, Esq., of Pemb. Coll., O.con. A. & W. Galignani, Paris.
Until quite recently, the difficulties to one visiting Greece were such as to deter the great mass of foreign travellers from making the attempt. Whoever advanced beyond the generally understood limits of the “grand tour," and found his way to the land where the stolid Moslem kept guard over the sacred remains of ancient art, received credit for some classical enthusiasm, a profound sympathy with antiquity, and much of the earnest and reverential spirit which Pliny, speaking of the saine land, recommends to his friend Maximus: “ Cogita, te missum in provinciam Achaiam, illam veram et meram Greciam, in qua primum humanitas, literæ, etiam fruges, inventæ esse creduntur. **** Reverere gloriam veterem, et hanc ipsam senectutem, quæ in homine venerabilis, in urbibus sacra est. Sit apud te honor antiquitate, sit ingentibus factis, sit fabulis quoque."
* We regret that we are not allowed to give the name of the writer of this review. It is from the pen of a professor in one of the colleges of New England, who has himself visited the scenes which he describes, and whose personal observation, as well as his previous clası sical research, gives to his representations a freshness and an author. ity, which greatly enhance their interest and value.-ED.