tions, all the feelings of the heart, especially those relating to moral objects. If now you think proper to give the word this broad signification, and will take care uniformly to adhere to it, I will not complain, but will endeavor, as far as I can, to fall into your track, and to use words and phrases as you do. And this may perhaps prevent some difficulties. For now you can say, we are responsible for our affections and desires, because they are voluntary; not consequences of volition, but themselves volitions, or acts of the will, and controlled by the will only as the will puts them forth. We could not however go far in this way, without finding it necessary to distinguish among these various acts of the will, and to arrange them under different heads or classes, as has often been done, making some generic or immanent volitions, such as the habitual affections or dispositions of the heart; and others specific, emanent, or imperative, such as the determinations or decisions of the mind as to particular things to be done. These last are the manifestation or the coming forth of the former in specific actions. So be it. The name we give to a thing does not alter its nature. Whether we call love to God voluntary or involuntary, an affection or volition, it is really the same thing. Calling it voluntary does not make it holy and praiseworthy, and calling it involuntary would not take away its praiseworthiness. Whatever epithet we apply to it in metaphysical discourse, it is the sum of obedience to the moral law.

But after giving this wide sense to the words will and volition, suppose you start from it, either designedly or inadvertently, and deny that such and such affections have any morality in them, because they arise instantly in the mind when moral objects are presented, and do not follow an act of the will. Well, what if they do not follow an act of the will? According to your manner of using words, they are themselves acts of the will. Do you say, that in order to be moral acts, they must not only be acts of the will, but must be voluntary in the other sense, that is, must follow another act of the will, and be controlled by it? To be consistent then, you must say, that love to God and man is not a moral act, because we know it does not arise in the mind as the effect of a previous volition. If you insist that no affection or desire can be morally good or bad, unless it is voluntary, I will only request you to fix the meaning of the word voluntary, and to adhere to it uniformly. You must use the word to denote either that which is itself an SECOND SERIES, VOL. VII. NO. I. 14

act of the will, or that which follows an act of the will. Take one or the other of these senses, as you please, but not both. If you take the first, then you may say, love to God and love to man, and other affections required of us, are morally good, and the contrary affections morally evil, because they are voluntary, that is, acts of the will. And if you regard them as really acts of the will, you cannot surely think it any disadvantage, that the will puts them forth spontaneously, or exercises them very promptly. We should naturally expect it would do this, because the will, or the moral faculty, is exceedingly active, and generally brings out its exercises with but little urgency, and without delay, as soon as the object comes into view. In these affections or emotions you have, then, what you regard as completely moral in their nature, being acts of the will. Now take care not to slip away from this sense to the other, and say, whatever is of a moral nature, must be voluntary, meaning that it must be the effect or consequence of an act of the will. If you take this as the sense of voluntary, then, according to your scheme, the affection of love to God is not morally good, because it is not voluntary, that is, because it is not the consequence of a volition. And here the falsity of such a scheme would be apparent, because we know that love to God is a moral excellence, although it does not arise in the heart as a consequence of an act of the will. The other sense of the word would by no means free you from difficulties. For if voluntary is taken to mean that which is itself a volition, or act of the will, then clearly no external bodily action can be voluntary; because such bodily action certainly is not a volition, or act of the will. Now I only ask you to take your choice of the two senses of the word voluntary, and the two senses of volition and will, and keep uniformly to the sense you choose in the expression of your opinion, and then let the consequences appear.

I shall only add, that if you assert that all virtue and vice lie in the acts of the will, and if by the acts of the will you mean its imperative or executive acts, you then make virtue and vice to lie in that which really has no moral nature, except in a secondary or relative sense, i. e. as derived from the inward disposition or motive. But if when you assert that all virtue and vice, all that is praiseworthy and all that is blameworthy lie in the acts of the will, you mean to include in the acts of the will all the affections, dispositions, desires and emotions, as well as

the volitions; I have only to say, that using the word in such a large sense, ‚—a sense which includes things so widely different in their nature,-must be unfavorable to clearness in treatises on the philosophy of the mind, and that your position, even as now explained, can be true only of those affections, emotions, desires and volitions, which relate to moral objects.

Inquirer presses the question: "What is free agency?" In reply, I would describe free agency, not as a supposition or work of imagination, but as a reality, as a thing which truly exists among men. I take it to be a point in which we are all agreed, that man is a free, moral agent; that in his common, every day conduct, he does really exercise a free, moral agency. If we agree in this, then all controversy is thus far excluded. Free, moral agency is a standing fact. And if we would know exactly what it is, and how it operates, we must look upon the moral agent, man, and see what he does, and how he does it. I am not now to say a word to prove that man is a free agent. Why prove that which is admitted by all? What we have to do is to examine the very agency which man exercises, and to find out what it is, and what are its circumstances. And as all men are, in this respect, alike, you may take any one of them as an example. Take Paul then, and begin with his unconverted state. What did he do? Why he studied; he acquired learning; he observed the ceremonial law according to the principles of the Pharisees; and he persecuted the followers of Christ; and he did all this under the influence of pride, selfcomplacency, bigotry, and a misguided conscience; in other words, under the influence of a deceitful and wicked heart. He was governed, or governed himself, from worldly, selfish motives. He had that carnal mind, which is enmity against God. In all this, he was a free, moral agent; free, because he followed his own inclination and choice, and was not influenced by physical force. He was not free from the influence of motives, but was completely governed by them, so far as he was rational and accountable. But he was free from whatever would prevent him from choosing and acting according to his own inclinations. He had inclinations, and he was free to follow them, and did follow them, just as all sinners do. Are we not agreed in this? And Paul was a moral agent, because he exercised affections and performed actions which had a moral nature, and related to a moral law. Such was Paul before his conversion. And at his conversion, and after his conversion, he was equally

a free, moral agent. He repented. He believed. He engaged in preaching the gospel, and in all the labors of a Christian and an apostle. And in all these labors he was influenced by holy affections. The love of Christ constrained him. And this operated so strongly, that he says, a necessity was laid upon him. That necessity was his full conviction of duty, and the strength of his love to Christ and to the souls of men. But that necessity did not interfere with his freedom. Indeed, to act from such necessity, is to act freely. The power of his predominant affection was very great; but the greater the better. For just in proportion as that affection controlled his voluntary agency, that agency was right and commendable. It was free agency, and that in a twofold sense; first, free from physical compulsion, as it always had been; and secondly, free from the dominion of sinful passions and desires, which brings the worst kind of slavery. Thus it was with the Apostle Paul. Exercising his powers and faculties just as he did, he was a free agent; not free in all respects, not free, surely, from the use of reason; not free from the influence of his own affections and desires; not free from the control of right motives; but free from whatever would prevent or in any way disturb his moral, accountable agency, and free from the dominion of sin.

And as it was with Paul, so it is with every man, whether good or bad. Acting just as he does, he is free. He has no want of any power or faculty which is required in moral agency; he has no principle operating in himself, and is exposed to no interference of foreign force, which in the least degree hinders his moral agency. There is, then, no need of conjecture, or hypothesis, or abstract reasoning, or hard and perplexed thinking on this subject. As a matter of inward consciousness, and a matter of fact, it is perfectly plain. And there is no room left for any one to say, unless we have such or such a power, or if we are influenced to act in such or such a way, how can we be free, moral agents? We are free, moral agents at any rate. This is settled. And the proper questions are: Do we really possess such a power? And are we influenced in such a way? Whatever is found to be the true answer to these inquiries, free, moral agency is not disturbed.

In order to ascertain facts, we inquire, how our outward actions and our intellectual operations are influenced by our volitions; and how our volitions are influenced by our inclinations and affections; and how the exercise of any particular affection

or desire is affected by what may be called the general habit or state of the mind; and how the general habit or state of the mind is affected by natural temperament, by hereditary influence, by previous practice, or by any other cause. Determine what are the facts on these points, and you have done. It cannot be a question, whether the facts, whatever they are found to be, are consistent with free agency. We know that we are free. Whether we find that we possess any particular power, or not, it makes no difference. We are free, moral agents. Our outward actions being under the government of our volitions, does not interfere with our freedom. And if it is found true, that our volitions are governed by motives, it hinders not our being free. And if our motives, or our affections and desires, are affected by natural temperament, or by any other cause, still it hinders not our being moral agents. Or if in any or all of these cases, the contrary should be found to be true, we could not say that our moral agency is impaired. Just as we are, with just such faculties and sensibilities as we possess, and with just such a power of choice and action, and under just such influences or causes, we are moral, accountable beings. It is not left for us to determine what powers we must possess, and what must be our manner of acting, in order that we may be free agents. This has been determined for us by our Creator. The proper inquiry for us is, how God has formed us, and what powers and capacities he has given us, never taking upon us to say what they must be, but asking merely, what they are.

Suitable attention to the principle here stated would help us to settle our minds on a variety of controverted subjects. Take for example the question as to the power of choice. We do in fact make a choice every day between different things presented before us. Some individuals choose in one way, and some in another; and the same individual chooses differently at different times. Thus exercising the power of choice, we know that we have it. But how do we exercise it? In what manner, on what grounds or conditions, and under what influences do we put forth our choices? This must be determined by an appeal to our own experience and consciousness. Review any one of the choices we have made. Why did we make it? For what reasons? What induced us to make that particular choice, rather than another? In reference to all important cases, we can readily answer these inquiries; and in this way we learn what may be called the philosophy of choice. If there