present wickedness, provided they are immediately resisted, and never fostered or indulged." Here it is important to keep in mind what was said in the last number of the Repository, that there are two classes of desires ;-those which are of an inferior kind, belonging particularly to our animal nature, and those which are of a moral or spiritual nature.

Take as an instance of the first kind, a desire for strong drink. This is generally the effect of the frequent use of such drink, though it sometimes comes from a vitiated constitution In regard to such a desire or appetite as this, it is very clear that, in itself, separate from circumstances, it has not a moral nature, and that it may exist without involving any guilt. But if a man, with the requisite information as to consequences, does any thing to form the appetite, or to indulge and continue it, he becomes culpable ;-culpable for doing that which he knows to be hurtful to the body and the soul; just as he would be for using any other poison, or for voluntarily forming an appetite for it. The guilt does not lie in the bodily appetite, or the bodily act of indulging it, but in the intention or choice of the mind to indulge it, when the consequence is known.

The other class of affections and desires are, in their own nature, moral or spiritual. They have a direct and necessary relation to moral law, and cannot exist without being praiseworthy or blameworthy. Such is love to God, and enmity against him. If such an object as God is presented before the mind of a rational being, loving will be a holy and praiseworthy act, an act of obedience, and hating will be sinful, an act of disobedience. You will say, he must have requisite knowledge, before he can be accountable. I admit that he must have some knowledge or discernment of the object. But as soon as the object is before his mind, and he discerns it, he has sufficient knowledge to render him accountable for the acts he puts forth towards it. Is it said, he cannot be accountable for the first act of love or hatred, but only for continuing it, and for fostering and indulging it? I reply; if the goodness or badness of the affection or mental act lies in its nature, it must belong to the first act as well as to the second. If the first act of love to God is not in itself right and praiseworthy, how can the second be? And if the first act of enmity is not in itself wrong, how can the second be? The moral law requires love and forbids enmity. And when we put forth the first act of love, do we not as really obey the law, as when we repeat the act? If obedi

ence does not begin with the first act of love; it must be because love is not morally good in its own nature, but only on account of the circumstance of its being repeated. But I ask again, how can it be praiseworthy to repeat an act, unless the act is right? So on the other hand, when we put forth the first act of enmity, do we not disobey the law as really as when we put forth the second act? If not, it must be because the law does not forbid the first act of enmity, but only the repetition of it. And then the question comes up, why the law forbids the repetition of an act, while it allows the act in the first instance. Must it not be,because the act has nothing wrong in its own nature?

As the result of our inquiries, do we not find, that one class of affections and desires are, in themselves, of a moral nature, and that he who exercises them is always praiseworthy or blameworthy? If a man loves God and man, whether it is the first act of love, or the second, and whatever the circumstances, he has holiness. But in regard to the other class of affections above mentioned, is it not evident, that they are not of a moral nature in themselves, and that it is merely the consideration of consequences, which gives a moral aspect to our conduct respecting them?

Inquirer refers to the case of our Saviour's temptations, and says: "If he had no desires or emotions like our own on such occasions," (i. e. when he was tempted,) " then how was he tempted in all points, as we are? If he had such emotions, and these emotions are, as Dr. Woods says, sins of the deepest die, then how was he tempted, and yet remained without sin ?"

It is very difficult for me to reply as I should wish, to such a statement as this, because it is difficult to speak of the feelings and character of Christ with becoming reverence. I will, however, venture to offer a few suggestions.

The Scripture does indeed say, that Jesus was in all points tempted as we are. But where does it say, that he had the same emotions and desires with us? Saying this would, in my apprehension, be utterly incompatible with the spotless purity and holiness of Christ.

66

The word temptation is sometimes used to denote that irregular desire of the depraved heart, which leads to actual transgression; as in James 1: 14: Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed.” Jesus was never tempted in this way. This is not the kind of temptation to which he was subjected. All other men are by nature sin

ners; born in such a state, that they must be born again to prepare them for the kingdom of heaven. From the first, their moral affections are corrupt; their moral nature is depraved. They have no holiness. And the actings of their minds, so far as they are of a moral nature, are all sinful. And as to those emotions and desires which do not directly relate to moral objects, and which are not, in themselves, either morally good or evil, I cannot but think they are all affected, all tainted by the moral disorder of the heart. Even the natural affections, the corporeal and social emotions, desires and instincts, which are faultless and pure when the heart is pure, even these become irregular and faulty, by dwelling in a depraved heart. The evil pervades the whole man. There is no soundness in him. He is corrupt to the very centre of his being. And " to them that are defiled, nothing is pure." How can any thing in a heart that is "desperately wicked," be what it would be in a heart perfectly undefiled? In this respect, Jesus was exceedingly unlike all other men. He had human nature; but his human nature was uncorrupt. From the first he was holy, harmless, undefiled. He never existed in any other state. He never needed to be born again. And he never had a single thought, emotion or desire, which varied, in the least, from the rule of righteousness. He was indeed tempted. But how? Not by any irregular inclination, any lust, any solicitation to sin within his own mind. He said to his disciples: "Ye are they that have followed me in my temptations." What were his temptations? Let the story of his life answer. "He suffered, being tempted." All his sufferings were temptations, or trials. The original word, rendered tempt, signifies to try, to put to the proof, in order to ascertain the disposition or character of any one. All the sufferings of Christ tried him, as the furnace tries the gold. They showed what he was. The opposition and enmity of the Jews, the ingratitude and obduracy of those for whose benefit he came into the world, and all the evils he endured from time to time, especially in the closing scene of his life, were temptations or trials, and made it manifest that he was without sin. If men are corrupt, trials will be likely to show it. If they are holy, trials will make that manifest. Any one who carefully attends to the word of God, will be satisfied, that the temptations spoken of, generally refer to the afflictions or sufferings of life. In this sense Christ was tempted or tried as we are. He endured all that variety of suf

ferings which his people endure, so that, by his own experience, he learned how to sympathize with them. And he passed through all these trials without sin.

He was also subjected to temptation in another way. The devil tempted him, that is, solicited him to commit sin. But he found" nothing in him." John 14: 30. He found no sinful propensity, no depraved disposition, no bias to evil, which could give effect to temptation. The solicitation to sin was from without, not from within,-from the wicked one, not from any thing in the heart of Jesus.

Thus it appears, that Jesus experienced temptations of two kinds; first, in the way of solicitation to sin, presented before his mind from without, and secondly, temptation in the way of suffering. But neither the one nor the other had any effect, except to exercise his virtue, to show that he had no sin, to manifest his unbending rectitude and perfect purity. We see then, that his being tempted as we are, did not by any means imply, that he was like us in moral feeling, or that temptation had the same effect upon him as it has upon us, or that he had "rising desires or emotions like our own on such occasions," as Inquirer speaks. His temptations proved the contrary. They proved that, by his perfect holiness, he was effectually shielded against those "desires and emotions" which temptations are apt to excite in our corrupt hearts. We are always in danger of being led into sin by temptations. But it was not so with Jesus. For us, the only way of safety is to flee from temptations. But Jesus had no occasion to flee. He was perfectly safe in the midst of temptations, however multiplied and severe. He was like pure gold, gold unmixed with any alloy, upon which the furnace has no effect, but to make its purity manifest.

Such has been my impression as to the character of Christ, his spotless purity, and the strength of holy principle in his heart. Will Inquirer say that this impression has been incorrect, and that I have thought more highly of the character of Jesus than the apostle did, when he declared him to be "holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners?" How was Jesus separate from sinners, except in what constitutes moral character, that is, in the desires and affections of his heart, and in his outward actions? Until I am otherwise informed, I must consider it altogether unjust and dishonorable to the blessed Saviour, to infer from the fact that he was tempted as we are, that

At one

temptation excited in him any "emotions and desires," like those which it generally excites in such minds as ours. time the tempter endeavored to excite pride or ambition in his heart, and thus to draw him into sin. But no pride or ambition was found there. At another time, the tempter addressed his motive to the appetite of hunger. But Jesus was governed by a higher principle. The desire of food, however strong, had no influence upon him in opposition to duty. His natural appetites and passions were entirely subject to the will of God. His mind and heart were filled with spiritual thoughts and spiritual affections and joys; and he had not a single rebellious desire or feeling, he had not a single movement within him, which his conscience or his God would disapprove, or which he could ever wish to have been otherwise. He had no inclination or tendency to comply with temptation. He had no selfish disposition, no corrupt desire, no depravity of heart, for temptation to work upon. And he had no such weakness, no such want of firmness, as Adam had, to expose him to the influence of temptation. As to ourselves, in our fallen state, we have to resist not only solicitations to sin from without, but solicitations from within, that is, sinful inclinations. And we know too well, that it is these sinful inclinations, these corrupt desires of our hearts, that give force to temptation. Our warfare is within; it is with the sin that dwells in us. And if we obtain a conquest, it is chiefly the conquest of indwelling sin. But Jesus had no indwelling sin to conquer, no unholy desire to resist, no pride, no selfishness, no wickedness of heart to subdue. So unlike was he to us in regard to the state of his mind, and every thing which constitutes character; though he was like us in regard to what are commonly and more properly called temptations.

I had said, that our affections and desires are really our actions, (i. e. our mental actions,) and that our mind is as much the producing cause of them, as of our volitions. This Inquirer thinks inconsistent with the position which I maintain, namely, that the presence of appropriate objects spontaneously awakens these desires. But how is it inconsistent? To say, that the presence of appropriate objects spontaneously awakens our affections and desires, is the same as to say, that we ourselves, as intelligent, moral agents, spontaneously put forth affections and desires in view of those objects; or, that we spontaneously act in the way of loving and desiring, or the contrary, when the