For swearing each witness, six cents:

A subpoena for each witness, six cents:

For a trial fee, or attendance, to each justice, one dollar :

For a warrant of commitment, on conviction, twenty-five cents:

For drawing up a record of conviction, and causing the same to be filed in the clerk's office, seventy-five cents:

But all such charges, in any one case, shall not exceed five dollars: For taking security from any person to prosecute a certiorari upon any conviction made by such court, twenty-five cents:

For a return to any such writ of certiorari, two dollars, to be paid by the county :(9)

The fees of justices, in criminal cases, unless otherwise provided for by law, are county charges, to be audited by the board of supervisors, and paid as other contingent charges of the county.(r)

Any one of the persons composing a court of special sessions may present, to the board of supervisors of the county, a statement of the fees of the court, and the names of his associates; and the order for such fees shall be drawn payable to such person, and when paid, such person shall account to his associates for their proportion of such fees respectively.(s)

Justices are prohibited, by statute, from taking or receiving any other or greater fee or reward, for any service, than is allowed by law, or from taking any fee or compensation for any service not actually rendered. A violation of these provisions amounts to a misdemeanor.(t)

(q) 2 R. S. 749, § 2.

(r) Id. 753, § 12.

(8) Id. 750, § 3.

(t) Id. 659, §§ 5, 6, 7. Id. 753, § 17.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace, in Criminal Cases.

1st. WITH respect to the local limits thereof, in reference to the residence of the justice.] A justice of the peace must reside in the town for which he was chosen. (a) And if he removes from the town, he forfeits his office, and can no longer exercise jurisdiction in either civil or criminal matters. (6) He is not confined, however, in the exercise of his criminal jurisdiction, to such town; but unless he has actually removed from it, he may hear complaints in criminal cases, issue process thereon, and indeed perform all other duties devolving upon him as a conservator of the peace, any where in the county in which he was elected. For though, in reference to civil cases, justices are regarded as, in some particulars, town officers, by our statutes, yet, as to criminal cases, they always have been, and still are, strictly county officers, except so far as the mere point of residence is concerned. And there is no law which limits a justice to act in his own town, except in the trial of civil causes.(c)

A justice of the peace, however, cannot act as such in criminal, any more than in civil cases, out of the county in which he was chosen. And though there are some common law authorities which seem to regard as valid certain proceedings had before him out of his county, when his jurisdiction is voluntarily submitted to,(d) yet even these concede that a justice so situated has no compulsory power whatever; and as he may, so he ought, in all cases, rigidly to refuse to act except while in his own county.(e)

There seems to be another distinction on this subject worthy of attention. If after the election of any person as a justice, he shall become an innholder or tavern-keeper, he can exercise no jurisdiction in civil cases.(ƒ) But this provision does not extend to the powers of a justice as a conservator of the peace; and though he become a tavern-keeper after his

(a) 1 R. S. 93, § 14.
(b) 9 Wend. 319, 322.
(c) Id. 319.

(d) See 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 8, sec. 29.

2 Toml. Law Dict. 325. 2 Hale's P. C. 51. (e) See 9 Wend. 319, 322.

(f) 2 R. S. 159, § 6.

election, he may nevertheless exercise as full jurisdiction in reference to criminal matters, as though such fact had not occurred. The legislature have power to enlarge or contract the territorial jurisdiction of justices of the peace, by the erection or division of counties.(1)

2d. With respect to the nature of the offence, and to the place where committed.] So far as the nature of the offence is concerned, the jurisdiction of a justice, for the purpose of receiving complaints and issuing warrants to apprehend offenders, is without limit.(g) And this is the doctrine of the common law. (h) And if the offender is brought before the justice he has a right, both at common law (i) and by statute,(k) to examine, and in a proper case to commit him. And this, whether the offence be committed in his own county or in some other, or even in another state, or a foreign country.(1) So, under the authority of the 33d section of the act of congress, passed 24th September, 1789, any offender against the United States may be arrested by any justice of the peace or other magistrate of any state in the union, where he may be found. (m) But warrants issued by a justice of the peace cannot be executed by him out of his own county, unless endorsed in the mode prescribed by statute, of which we shall speak more at large hereafter.(n)

3d. Priority of jurisdiction.] All the justices of each county are equal in authority; but as it would be contrary to the public interest, as well as indecent, that there should be a contest between different justices, it is settled that the jurisdiction in each case attaches in the first justice or set of justices, duly authorized, who have possession and cognizance of the fact; to the exclusion of the separate jurisdiction of all others. So that the acts of any other, except in conjunction with the first, are not only void, but such a breach of the peace as subjects them to indictment. (0) But there are some exceptions to the above rule. Thus, the statute provides that where a person is arrested on a warrant for an of

(1) 6 Cowen, 642; S. C., 9 id. 640. (g) 2 R. S. 590, § 1, et seq. (h) 4 Black. Com. 290. 1 Chit. Cr. L. 34, 35.

(i) See 4 Black. Com. 290. 1 Chit. Cr. L. 75.

(k) 2 R. S. 590, 591, 592.

(1) 4 John. Ch. R. 106. Laws of 1839, p. 32. The question, however, whether the state courts have the power to arrest and commit, or to deliver up, persons charged with having committed crimes in foreign countries, does not seem to be settled. In a recent case, four of the judges of the supreme court of the United States were of the opinion

that the power did not exist. See 14 Peters, 540. If justices have no authority in such cases, under the state laws, they probably have none under the laws of the United States; as the offence charged is not a "crime or offence against the United States," which it must be to give a justice any right to act under the laws of the United States. See post, 440. See also 1 Kent's Com. 37. 4 Taunt. 43. 2 Stra. 848. See 4 Black. Com. 292, note (12), and n. †. 2 Caines' R. 213.

(m) 5 Cowen, 273.

(n) See 2 R. S. 590, § 4, 5.

(0) Paley on Conv. 14. 4 T. R. 456.

fence less than a felony, in a county other than that in which the warrant was issued, if such person require to be brought before a justice of the county in which he was arrested, the officer is obliged to carry him before a magistrate of such county; who may take from the person arrested, a recognizance, with sufficient sureties, for his appearance at the next court having cognizance of the offence, to be held in the county where the offence shall be alleged to have been committed. (p) So if the justice issuing a warrant for the arrest of a criminal, be absent, or his office be vacant, the person arrested may be brought before the nearest magistrate in the same county, to whom the warrant, with a proper return endorsed thereon, shall be delivered. (q) These provisions of the statute, however, apply only to cases where the accused may be required to enter into a recognizance to appear at a court of criminal jurisdiction, or may be committed to jail, and do not extend to cases in which the justice has a summary jurisdiction to inquire into the facts and finally decide upon the guilt of the offender. Thus, a person arrested by warrant, on a charge of having violated the act to prevent the disturbance of religious meetings, cannot be taken by the arresting officer, before any magistrate other than the one who issued the process. (r) Where the accused is brought before the nearest magistrate, the officer making the arrest should state in his return the absence of the officer who issued the warrant.(s) And the general rule is, that persons arrested under any warrant, issued for any offence, shall, where no other provision is made, be brought before the magistrate who issued the warrant.(t) As the power vested in justices of the peace is of a special kind, it seems consistent with principle, that where any matter is referred to a particular description of justices, the authority of all others should be excluded by that express designation. And, therefore, where a statute refers the matter to the next justice, no other than the one answering that description has any authority.(u) It has been held, however, that in construing the acts which mention justices in or near the place where the offence was committed, any justice of the county may take cognizance of the matter.(v)

4th. Limitation of jurisdiction as to time.] The revised statutes contain a general provision that indictments for murder may be found at any time after the death of the person killed; and that in all other cases in

(p) 2 R. S. 707, §§ 7, 8.
(q) Id. 708, § 12.
(r) 17 Wend. 211.
(8) Id. ib.

2 R. S. 708, § 12.

(u) 1 Saund. 263. 2 Keb. 559. Paley on Conv. 10.

(v) Id. ib. 3 Keb. 283. Bac. Abr. tit. Just. P. E. 5.

dictments shall be found and filed in the proper court, within three years after the commission of the offence; but the time during which the defendant shall not have been an inhabitant of or usually resident within this state shall not constitute any part of the said limitation of three years.(w) This section, of course, determines the limit, in point of time, of a justice's jurisdiction in receiving complaints, issuing warrants, &c. for any offences which are indictable. And the same provision of the statute is applicable to the jurisdiction of justices of the peace as members of courts of special sessions. Besides this general provision, there are, in various parts of the statute, limitations of time, as regards the institution of proceedings in particular cases; which it is not necessary to notice more particularly here.(x) Where the period is fixed by statute, in any particular case, it is usually fixed either with reference to the time of commencing the prosecution, or to the time of conviction : and the following rules apply according as these different terms are made use of. Where the provision, as to time is, "that the offence be prosecuted, or that the party be prosecuted for the offence," within a stated time, it is sufficient if the complaint be made or proceedings instituted within that time, though the conviction do not take place until after the time limited. But if a statute authorize a conviction, "provided such conviction be made within months after the offence committed," it is not enough that the complaint was made, or the proceedings instituted within that period, but the conviction itself must take place within the limited time; otherwise it will be void. And it makes no difference that it was prevented by an adjournment at the request of the defendant himself. For after the time has expired for making the conviction, there is no authority existing for that purpose.(y)

As respects the mode of reckoning the time limited by any statute, it is provided that wherever the word "year" is used, it shall be taken to mean 365 days; and the word "month," to mean a calendar, and not a lunar month; unless otherwise expressed in the statute.(z) Where the time is limited from an act done, (or offence committed,) the day on which it was done is reckoned inclusive; but where it is from the day of doing the act, the day is excluded. (a)

(w) 2 R. S. 726, § 37.

(x) See 2 R. S. 676, § 49. 1 Id. 677, 3 East, 467.

§ 74.

(y) Paley on Conv. 16. 1 Salk. 383..
(z) 1 R. S. 606, §§ 3, 4.
(a) 10 Mod. 212. Doug. 465.