intervention is that it would have relieved England from the responsibility of intervening. It has been shown in the course of this narrative that, in the early stages of the proceedings, the policy of the two Western Powers, which was guided by the anti-Turkish sentiments prevalent in France, was not of a nature to invite or encourage Turkish co-operation. At a later period, the shortsightedness of the Sultan was such as to cause the Porte to commit political suicide in so far as decisive Turkish action was concerned. Perhaps it was well that it did so, for it is highly probable that armed Turkish intervention in Egypt, accompanied, as it might well have been, by misgovernment, paltry intrigue, corruption, and administrative and financial confusion, would only have been the prelude to further, and possibly more serious international complications. By a process of exhausting all other expedients, we arrive at the conclusion that armed British intervention was, under the special circumstances of the case, the only possible solution of the difficulties which existed in 1882. Probably also it was the best solution. The arguments against British intervention, indeed, were sufficiently obvious. It was easy to foresee that, with a British garrison in Egypt, it would be difficult that the relations of England either with France or Turkey should be cordial. With France especially, there would be a danger that our relations might become seriously strained. Moreover, we lost the advantages of our insular position. The occupation of Egypt necessarily dragged England to a certain extent within the arena of Continental politics. In the event of war, the presence of a British garrison in Egypt would possibly be a source of weakness rather than of strength. Our position in Egypt placed us in a disadvantageous diplomatic position, for any Power, with whom we had a difference of opinion about some non-Egyptian question, was at one time able to retaliate by opposing our Egyptian policy. The complicated rights and privileges possessed by the various Powers of Europe in Egypt facilitated action of this nature. There can be no doubt of the force of these arguments. The answer to them is that it was impossible for Great Britain to allow the troops of any other European Power to occupy Egypt. When it became apparent that some foreign occupation was necessary, that the Sultan would not act save under conditions which were impossible of acceptance, and that neither French nor Italian co-operation could be secured, the British Government acted with promptitude and vigour. A great nation cannot throw off the responsibilities which its past history and its position in the world have imposed upon it. English history affords other examples of the Government and people of England drifting by accident into doing what was not only right but was also most in accordance with British interests. Δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν μὲν καὶ πράττειν ἀεὶ τὰ δίκαια, συμπαρατηρεῖν δ ̓ ὅπως ἅμα καὶ συμφέροντα ἔσται ταῦτα. Such was the advice Demosthenes gave to his fellow-countrymen. In spite of some mistakes of detail, it was on this sound principle that, broadly speaking, the British Government acted in dealing with Egyptian affairs in 1882. 1 Oration For the Megalopolitans. CHAPTER XVIII THE DUFFERIN MISSION SEPTEMBER 1882-AUGUST 1883. British policy-Trial of Arábi-Resignation of Riaz Pasha-Exile of political prisoners-Courts-martial-The Alexandria Indemnities The abolition of the Dual Control-Rupture of the AngloFrench understanding-Lord Dufferin's Report-My arrival in Egypt. KINGLAKE'S prophecy was that the Englishman would plant his foot firmly in the valley of the Nile. It had so far been fulfilled that the Englishman had planted his foot, but he had not planted it firmly. Hardly, indeed, had his foot been planted when, fearful of what he had done, he struggled to withdraw it. A few hours after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir had been fought, Sir Edward Malet was instructed to send to London "as soon as possible, suggestions as to army, finance, and administration for the future." Lord Dufferin was, at the same time, informed that "Her Majesty's Government contemplated shortly commencing the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt. The British Government were, at a subsequent period, blamed for not having at once proclaimed a Protectorate. A petition signed by 2600 Europeans residing at Alexandria was presented to Lord Dufferin in favour of a permanent British occupation of Egypt. The Egyptians generally also viewed British intervention with unmixed satisfaction. It cannot be doubted that if the position of the British Government had been more strongly asserted directly after the occupation, many of the obstacles which have stood in the path of the reformer would have been swept away. On the other hand, the adoption of a policy of this sort would have constituted a breach of faith with Europe. It is extremely doubtful whether it would have met with adequate support in England. It may be said, therefore, that the execution of this policy was, for all practical purposes, both undesirable and impossible. Moreover, it is to be observed that the mere proclamation of a Protectorate would not in any degree have impaired the rights and privileges of Europeans resident in Egypt,' and it was these which so much hampered the progress of reform in the early days of the occupation. In order to ensure this result, annexation, either permanent or temporary, would have been necessary. At the same time, it must be admitted that the situation in Egypt was misunderstood both by the British Government and by British public opinion of 1 The French Government established a Protectorate over Tunis in 1884, but subsequent negotiations with the Powers were necessary before the régime of the Capitulations could be modified. The difficulties which the existence of the Capitulations threw in the way of the French administration of Tunis have been described by a very competent authority, who wrote under the pseudonym of P.H.X., in the following terms:-"Les difficultés que devait faire cesser l'organisation de la réforme financière et de notre contrôle sont relativement peu de chose auprès des complications inextricables et des abus que la multiplicité comme la toute-puissance des juridictions Européennes en Tunisie avaient fait naître. Sous prétexte de protéger les Européens contre l'arbitraire et le désordre du Gouvernement Beylical, les Capitulations leur assuraient des privilèges qui s'étaient étendus démesurément à mesure que l'autorité locale s'affaiblissait; ce qui n'était à l'origine qu'une exception était devenue plus fort que la règle, en sorte que l'administration indigène, eût-elle été animée des meilleures intentions du monde, s'était trouvée peu à peu complètement paralysée" (La Politique Française en Tunisie, p. 360). the time. Moreover, party politics cast their baneful spell over the English proceedings, and obscured the real issues at stake. Two alternative policies were open to the British Government. These were, first, the policy of speedy evacuation; and, secondly, the policy of reform. It was not sufficiently understood that the adoption of one of these policies was wholly destructive of the other. The withdrawal of the British troops connoted severity in the treatment of the rebels, the establishment of some rough prætorian guard composed of foreigners, who would have quelled all disturbance with a high hand, the re-establishment of an arbitrary rule, and the abandonment of all attempts to introduce the various reforms which follow in the train of European civilisation. On the other hand, the adoption of a policy of reform connoted an indefinite prolongation of the British occupation, and an increase of European interference, without which no progress was possible. It was natural and praiseworthy that public opinion in England should have been opposed to handing the Egyptians over to the uncontrolled rule of the Turkish Pashas, but it was characteristic of the want of consistency, which so often distinguishes English politics, that the same people who cried out most loudly for control over the Pashas, were also those who most strenuously opposed the adoption of the only method by which Pashas could be effectively controlled. They wished to withdraw the British troops, and, at the same time, to secure all those advantages which could only be obtained by their continued presence in the country. Party politicians had not failed to dwell constantly and in condemnatory terms on the number of Europeans employed in Egypt. It was a good ad captandum cry, for at the time the British public did not appreciate the extent 1 |