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REVIEW.

In what senses is man superior to the brute?
What inference is drawn from this?
What do congruity and propriety imply?
Among what objects is there no congruity?
Among what objects does it exist?

Is the perception of congruity and propriety natural?
To what is congruity proportioned?

How is it distinguished from beauty?

How from propriety?

What relation furnishes many examples of congruity?
Give examples.

Does congruity regulate the kind of ornament?

Give examples.

Where do we require the strictest conformity?

What is affectation?

How is a gross impropriety punished?

How slighter ones?

To what is the epithet ridiculous applied?
What are the uses of the sense of impropriety?

CHAPTER XI.

Dignity and Grace.

DIGNITY and meanness are terms applied to man in point of character, sentiment and behavior, and are never applicable to inanimate objects: a palace may be lofty or grand, but it is not said to have dignity; a shrub is little, but not mean. Human actions are grand or little, as they appear in different lights: with respect to their author, they are proper or improper; with respect to those affected by them, just or unjust; and they are further distinguished by dignity or meanness; the former coincides with grandeur, the latter with littleness. The difference will be evident, upon reflecting that an action may be grand without being virtuous, and little without being faulty; but that we never attribute dignity to any action but what is virtuous, nor meanness to any but what is faulty. Every action of dignity creates respect and esteem for the

author; and a mean action draws upon him contempt. A man is admired for a grand action, but frequently is neither loved nor esteemed for it; neither is a man always contemned for a low or little action. The action of Cæsar passing the Rubicon, was grand; but there was no dignity in it, considering that his purpose was to enslave his country: Cæsar, in a march, taking opportunity of a rivulet to quench his thirst, did a low action, but the action was not mean.

As it appears to me, dignity and meanness are founded on a natural principle not hitherto mentioned. Man is ́endowed with a SENSE of the worth and excellence of his nature: he deems it more perfect than that of the other beings around him; and he perceives, that the perfection of his nature consists in virtue, particularly in virtues of the highest rank. To express that sense, the term dignity is appropriated. Further, to behave with dignity, and to refrain from all mean actions, is felt to be, not a virtue only, but a duty: it is a duty every man owes to himself. By acting in that manner, he attracts love and esteem: by acting meanly, or below himself, he is disapproved and contemned.

Dignity and meanness are a species of impropriety, for actions may be proper or improper, to which dignity or meanness cannot be applied. There is no dignity in eating revenge fairly taken is improper, but not mean. Every action of dignity is proper; and every mean action is improper. The sense of dignity reaching to our pleasures and amusements, makes some manly, others childish. Corporeal pleasures are low; those of the eye and ear, rise to dignity where their objects are grand and elevated. Sympathy gives its owner dignity; gratitude animates the soul, but scarce rises to dignity. Joy bestows dignity where it proceeds from an elevated cause. Vanity is mean; shame and remorse are not mean; and pride bestows no dignity in the eye of a spectator.

The final cause may be resolved into this:-In point of dignity, the social emotions rise above the selfish,

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and much above those of the eye and ear: man is by his nature a social being; and to qualify him for society, it is wisely contrived, that he should value himself more for being social than selfish. The excellency of man is chiefly discernible in the great improvements: he is susceptible of in society; these, by perseverance, may be carried on progressively above any assignable limits; and, even abstracting from revelation, there is great probability, that the progress begun here, will be completed in some future state. Now, as all valuable improvements proceed from the exercise of our rational faculties, the Author of our nature, in order to excite us to a due use of these faculties, hath assigned a high rank to the pleasures of the understanding their utility, with respect to this life as well as a future, entitles them to that rank.

We proceed to analyze grace. Graceful is an attribute; grace and gracefulness express that attribute in the form of a noun. This attribute is agreeable: and as grace is displayed externally, it must be an object of one or other of our five senses. It is an object of sight and of hearing; for some music is graceful; sweet and easy; and grace, like beauty, makes its constant appearance in company with our own species. Grace is inseparable from motion, as opposed to rest, and comprehends speech, looks, gestures. Dignity alone, without motion, may produce a graceful appearance; but still more graceful with the aid of exalted qualities.

But this is not all. The most exalted virtues may be the lot of a person whose countenance has little expression such a person cannot be graceful. Therefore, to produce this appearance, we must add another circumstance, namely, an expressive countenance, displaying to every spectator of taste, with life and energy, every thing that passes in the mind. Collecting these circumstances together, grace may be defined, that agreeable appearance which arises from elegance of motion, and from a countenance expressive of dignity Expressions of other mental qualities are not

essential to that appearance, but they heighten it greatly.

Of all externá objects, a graceful person is the most agreeable. Dancing affords great opportunity for displaying grace, and haranguing still more. In vain will a person attempt to be graceful, who is deficient in amiable qualities. A man, it is true, may form an idea of qualities he is destitute of; and, by means of that idea, may endeavor to express these qualities by looks and gestures; but such studied expression will be too faint and obscure to be graceful.

REVIEW.

To what are the terms dignity and meanness applied?
With what do they coincide?

How does a difference appear?

Give examples.

To what sense is dignity appropriated?

Is it a duty to behave with dignity?

Distinguish between dignity and propriety.

Give examples.

How are selfish and social emotions ranked?

In what is the chief excellence of man discernible?
Of what is grace an object?

How is it defined?

What is most necessary in order to be graceful?

CHAPTER XII.

Ridicule.

A RISIBLE object produceth an emotion of laughter merely a ridiculous object is improper as well as risible, and produceth a mixed emoticn which is vented by a laugh of derision or scorn.†

Burlesque, a great engine of ridicule, is distinguishable into burlesque that excites laughter merely, and burlesque that provokes derision or ridicule. A grave † See Chap. X.

*See Chap. VII,

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subject in which there is no impropriety, may be brought down by a certain coloring so as to be risible; which is the case of Virgil Travestie ;* and also the case of the Secchia Rapita :† the authors laugh first in order to make their readers laugh. The Lutrin is a burlesque poem, laying hold of a low and trifling incident, to expose the luxury, indolence, and contentious spirit of a set of monks. Boileau, the author, gives a ridiculous air to the subject, by dressing it in the heroic style, and affecting to consider it as of the utmost dignity and importance. In a composition of this kind, no image professedly ludicrous ought to find quarter, because such images destroy the contrast; and, accordingly, the author shows always the grave face, and never once betrays a smile.

In burlesque that aims at ridicule, the poet ought to confine himself to such images as are lively, and readily apprehended: a strained elevation, soaring above an ordinary reach of fancy, makes not a pleasant impression: the reader, fatigued with being always upon the stretch, is soon disgusted: and if he persevere, becomes thoughtless and indifferent. Further, a fiction gives no pleasure unless it be painted in colors so lively as to produce some perception of reality; which never can be done effectually where the images are formed with labor or difficulty. For these reasons, I cannot avoid condemning the Batrachomuomachia, said to be the composition of Homer: it is beyond the power of imagination to form a clear and lively image of frogs and mice acting with the dignity of the highest of our species.

The Rape of the Lock, clearly distinguishable from those now mentioned, is not properly a burlesque performance, but a heroi-comical poem: it treats a gay and familiar subject with pleasantry, and with a moderate degree of dignity: the author puts not on a mask like Boileau, nor professes to make us laugh like Tas

* Scarron

† Tassoni.

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