when done to others, raises my resentment to a higher degree. The desire, accordingly, included in this passion, is not satisfied with so slight a punishment as indignation or hatred; it is not fully gratified with retaliation; and the author must by my hand suffer mischief, as great at least as he has done to me. Neither can we be at any loss about the final cause of that higher degree of resentment; the whole vigor of the passion is required to secure individuals from the injustice and oppression of others.

A wicked or disgraceful action is disagreeable not only to others, but even to the delinquent himself; and raises in both a painful emotion, including a desire of punishment. The painful emotion felt by the delinquent, is distinguished by the name of remorse; which naturally excites him to punish himself. There cannot be imagined a better contrivance to deter us from vice; for remorse itself is a severe punishment. That passion, and the desire of self-punishment derived from it, are touched delicately by Otway.

Monimia. Let mischiefs multiply! let every hour
Of my loath'd life yield me increase of horror!

Oh, let the sun to these unhappy eyes

Ne'er shine again, but be eclips'd for ever!
May every thing I look on seem a prodigy,
To fill my soul with terror, till I quite
Forget I ever had humanity,

And grow a curser of the works of nature!

ORPHAN.-ACT IV.

Nothing can be more entertaining to a rational mind than the economy of the human passions, of which we have attempted to give some faint notion.

It must, however, be acknowledged, that our passions, when they happen to swell beyond proper limits, take on a less regular appearance: reason may proclaim our duty, but the will, influenced by passion, makes gratification always welcome. Hence the power of passion, which, when in excess, cannot be resisted but by the utmost fortitude of mind: it is bent upon gratification; and where proper objects are wanting, it clings to any object at hand without distinction.

E

REVIEW.

Do emotions sometimes resemble their causes?

Give an example.

Give examples of the effect of sound-of form-of attitude.
To what besides still life does the observation apply?
What is the effect of an instance of gratitude?

What other passions are infectious?

What determines the will?

What results from hence?

Are the passions created for the public and for private good? Why are some inanimate objects made agreeable?

What does this prove?

Why are other inanimate objects made disagreeable?

Why are certain objects called attractive?

Why are others called repulsive?

What effect is produced by an agreeable sensible being?
What principle is the origin of sympathy?

Does it afford gratification to the person that feels it?

What emotion is raised by the sight of vice and wickedness?— what desire?

For what is the principle of personal resentment implanted with in us?

What is the origin of remorse?

What is its use?

What results from passion which has passed the proper limits?

CHAPTER III.

·Beauty.

BEAUTY, the most noted of all the qualities that belong to single objects, is a term which, in its native signification, is appropriated to objects of sight.

A tree, the simplest object of external sense, presents to us color, figure, size, and sometimes motion. The beauty of the human figure is extraordinary, being a composition of numberless beauties, arising from the parts and qualities of the objects; various colors, various motions, figures, size, &c. all unite in one complex object, and strike the eye with combined force. Hence it is, that beauty, a quality so remarkable in visible objects, lends its name to express every thing

that is eminently agreeable: thus, by a figure of speech, we say a beautiful sound, a beautiful thought or expression, a beautiful theorem, a beautiful event, a beautiful discovery in art or science. But, as figurative expression is the subject of a following chapter, this chapter is confined to beauty in its proper signifi

cation.

It is natural to suppose, that a perception so various as that of beauty, comprehending sometimes many particulars, sometimes few, should occasion emotions equally various; and yet all the various emotions of beauty maintain one common character, that of sweetness and gaiety.

Considering attentively the beauty of visible objects, we discover two kinds: first, intrinsic beauty, because it is discovered in a single object viewed apart without relation to any other: the examples above given are of that kind. The other, relative beauty, being founded on the relation of objects. The purposed distribution would lead me to handle these beauties separately; but they are frequently so intimately connected, that, for the sake of connexion, I am forced to vary the plan, and to bring them both into the same chapter. Intrinsic beauty is an object of sense merely: to perceive the beauty of a spreading oak, or of a flowing river, no more is required but singly an act of vision. The perception of relative beauty, is accompanied with an act of understanding and reflection, and of means relating to some good end or purpose. Intrinsic beauty is ultimate; and the beauty of effect is transferred to the cause. A subject void of beauty, appears beautiful from its utility, as an old gothic tower, considered as a defence against an enemy; a dwelling-house, from its conveniences. When these beauties coincide in any object, it appears delightful. The beauty of utility requires no illustration. The beauty of color is too familiar to need explanation.

Let us inquire into the beauty of figure, as arising

from regularity, uniformity, proportion, order and simplicity.

To inquire why an object, by means of these particulars, appears beautiful, would be a vain attempt: it seems that the nature of man was originally framed with a relish for them, to answer wise and good purposes. To explain these purposes or final causes, though a subject of great importance, has scarce been attempted by any writer. One thing is evident, that our relish for the particulars mentioned adds beauty to the objects that surround us, and tends to our happiness: and the Author of our nature has given many signal proofs that this final cause is not below his care. We may be confirmed in this thought upon reflecting, that our taste for these particulars is not accidental, but uniform and universal, making a branch of our nature. At the same time, it ought not to be overlooked, that regularity, uniformity, order and simplicity, contribute each of them to readiness of apprehension; enabling us to form more distinct images of objects, than can be done with the utmost attention where these particulars are not found. With respect to proportion, it is in some instances connected with a useful end, as in animals, where the best proportioned are the strongest and most active; but instances are still more numerous, where the proportions we relish have no connexion with utility. Writers on architecture insist much on the proportions of a column, and assign different proportions to the Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian; but no architect will maintain, that accurate proportions contribute more to use than several that are less accurate and less agreeable.

With respect to the beauty of figures, we confine ourselves to the simplest. A circle and a square are cast perfectly regular; yet a square is less beautiful than a circle, because a circle is a single object, and makes one entire impression, whereas a square is composed of four sides or objects.. A square is more

beautiful than a hexagon; though each is perfectly regular.

A square is more regular than a parallelogram, and its parts more uniform; and for these reasons it is more beautiful. But that holds with respect to intrinsic beauty only; for in many instances utility turns the scale on the side of the parallelogram: this figure for the doors and windows of a dwelling-house is preferred, because of utility; and here the beauty of utility prevails over that of regularity and uniformity.

A parallelogram again depends, for its beauty, on the proportion of its sides: a great inequality of sides annihilates its beauty. Approximation towards equality hath the same effect; for proportion there degenerates into imperfect uniformity, and the figure appears an unsuccessful attempt towards a square. And thus proportion contributes to beauty.

An equilateral triangle yields not to a square in regularity, nor in uniformity of parts, and it is more simple. But an equilateral triangle is less beautiful than a square, which must be owing to inferiority of order in the position of its parts; the sides of an equilateral triangle incline to each other in the same angle, being the most perfect order they are susceptible of; but this order is obscure, and far from being so perfect as the parallelism of the sides of a square. Thus order contributes to the beauty of visible objects, no less than simplicity, regularity, or proportion.

Uniformity is singular in one capital circumstance, that it is apt to disgust by excess: a number of things destined for the same use, such as windows, chairs, spoons, buttons, cannot be too uniform; for supposing their figure to be good, utility requires uniformity: but a scrupulous uniformity of parts in a large garden or field, is far from being agreeable. Uniformity among connected objects belongs not to the present subject: it is handled in the chapter of uniformity and variety. In all the works of Nature, simplicity makes an illustrious figure. It also makes a figure in works of