out cause; and is resolved to pass over thee in spite of thy insolence: with reason all men neglect to sacrifice to thee, because thou art both disagreeable and treacherous." Herodotus, B. 7.

Shakspeare exhibits beautiful examples of the irregular influence of passion in making us believe things to be otherwise than they are. King Lear, in his distress, personifies the rain, wind, and thunder; and, in order to justify his resentment, believes them to be taking part with his daughters:

Lear.
Spit, fire! spout, rain!
Nor rain, wind, thunder, fire, are my daughters.
I tax not you, you elements, with unkindness;
I never gave you kingdoms, call'd you children;
You owe me no subscription; why then let fall
Your horrible pleasure-Here I stand, your slave;
A poor, infirm, weak, and despis'd old man :-
But yet I call you servile ministers,
That have with two pernicious daughters join'd
Your high-engender'd battles 'gainst a head
So old and white as this. Oh! oh! 'tis foul!

ACT III. Sc. 2.

King Richard, full of indignation against his favorite horse for carrying Bolingbroke, is led into the conviction of his being rational:

Groom. O, how it yearn'd my heart, when I beheld
In London streets, that coronation-day,

When Bolingbroke rode on roan Barbary,
That horse that thou so often hast bestrid,

That horse that I so carefully have dress'd.

K. Rich. Rode he on Barbary? tell me, gentle friend, how went he under him?

Groom. So proudly as he had disdain'd the ground.

K. Rich. So proud that Bolingbroke was on his back!
That jade hath eat bread from my royal hand;
This hand hath made him proud with clapping him:
Would he not stumble? would he not fall down,
(Since pride must have a fall,) and break the neck
Of that proud man that did usurp his back?

RICHARD II.-ACT V Sc. 5.

REVIEW.

What are influenced by our passions?

Give examples.

What is the proper state of mind for criticism?
What disturbs this state of mind?

How does anger affect our judgment?

To what does anger sometimes force the mind?

Give an example.

What fine instance of the influence of passion does Shakspeare give in Lear?-in King Richard II.?

PART VI.

The resemblance of Emotions to their Causes.

That many emotions have some resemblance to their causes, is a truth that can be made clear by induction; though, as far as I know, the observation has not been made by any writer. Motion, in its different circumstances, is productive of feelings that resemble it: sluggish motion produces a languid feeling; slow motion, a calm feeling; brisk motion, a lively feeling. A large object swells the heart: an elevated object makes the spectator stand erect.

Sounds also produce emotions or feelings that resemble them; a low sound brings down the mind; a full tone communicates solemnity; a sharp sound elevates or swells the mind. A wall or pillar declining from the perpendicular produces a painful feeling; a column with a base looks firm, and though the cylinder is a more beautiful figure, yet the cube for a base is preferred; its angles being extended to a greater distance from the centre than the circumference of a cylinder. This excludes not a different reason, that the base, the shaft, and the capital of a pillar, ought, for the sake of variety, to differ from each other; if the shaft be round, the base and capital ought to be square.

A constrained posture, uneasy to the man himself, is disagreeable to the spectator; whence a rule in painting, that the drapery ought not to adhere to the body, but hang loose, that the figures may appear easy and free in their movements. The constrained posture of a French dancing-master in one of Hogarth's pieces, is for that reason disagreeable; and it is also

ridiculous, because the constraint is assumed as a grace.

The foregoing observation is not confined to emotions or feelings raised by still life: it holds also in what are raised by the qualities, actions, and passions, of a sensible being. Love inspired by a fine woman assumes her qualities: it is sublime, soft, tender, severe, or gay, according to its cause. This is still more remarkable in emotions raised by human actions: a signal instance of gratitude, beside procuring esteem for the author, raises in the spectator a vague emotion of gratitude, which disposes him to be grateful; and this vague emotion has a strong resemblance to its cause, the passion that produced the grateful action. Hence the choice of books and of company.

Grief, as well as joy, is infectious; so is fear, as in an army when struck with a sudden panic. Pity is similar to its cause; the anguish of remorse produces a harsh pity: if extreme, the pity is mixed with horror. Covetousness, cruelty, and treachery, raise no similar emotions in a spectator; they excite abhorrence, and fortify the beholder in his aversion to such actions.

PART VII.

Final Causes of the more frequent Emotions and Passions.

It is a law in our nature, that we never act but by the impulse of desire; which, in other words, is saying, that passion, by the desire included in it, is what determines the will. Hence in the conduct of life, it is of importance, that our passions be directed to proper objects, tend to just and rational ends, and, with relation to each other, be duly balanced. The beauty of contrivance, so conspicuous in the human frame, is not confined to the rational part of our nature, but is visible over the whole. Concerning the passions in particular, however irregular, headstrong, and per

verse, on a slight view, they may appear, they are by nature modelled and tempered with perfect wisdom, for the good of society as well as for private good. The subject, treated at large, would be too extensive for the present work; all there is room for, are a few general observations upon the sensitive part of our nature, without regarding that strange irregularity of passion discovered in some individuals. Such topical irregularities cannot fairly be held an objection to the present theory: we are frequently misled by inordinate passion; but less frequently by wrong judgment.

An agreeable cause produces a pleasant emotion; a disagreeable cause a painful emotion; and this law admits not a single exception. Many inanimate objects, considered as the causes of emotion, are made agreeable, to promote our happiness. This proves the benignity of the Deity, that we are placed among objects, for the most part agreeable, and the bulk of such objects are of real use in common life; hence they are agreeable to excite our industry. On the other hand, it is not easy to name a disagreeable object that is not hurtful; some are disagreeable because they are noxious; others, a dirty marsh for example, or a barren heath, are made disagreeable, in order, as above, to excite our industry. And with respect to the few things that are neither agreeable nor disagreeable, their being left indifferent is not a work of chance, but of wisdom; of such I shall have occasion to give several instances.

Because inanimate objects that are agreeable fix our attention, and draw us to them, they in that respect are termed attractive; such objects inspire pleasant emotions, which are gratified by adhering to the objects, and enjoying them. Because disagreeable objects of the same kind repel us from them, they in that respect are termed repulsive; and the painful emotions raised by such objects are gratified by flying from them. Thus, in general, with respect to things inanimate, the tendency of every pleasant emotion is to prolong the

pleasure; and the tendency of every painful emotion is to end the pain.

Sensible beings, considered as objects of passion, lead into a more complex theory. A sensible being that is agreeable by its attributes, inspires us with a pleasant emotion accompanied with desire; and such objects being of real use in life, are made agreeable in order to excite our industry. To the man of feeling every amiable being gives pleasure; every sensible being gives pleasure; and their happiness becomes the gratification of his desire.

Sensible beings in distress raise a painful emotion, and, were man purely a selfish being, he would desire to be relieved from that pain, by turning from the object. But the principle of benevolence gives an opposite direction to his desire: it makes him desire to afford relief; and by relieving the person from distress, his passion is gratified. The painful passion thus directed, is termed sympathy; which, though painful, is yet in its nature attractive. And, with respect to its final cause, we can be at no loss: it not only tends to relieve a fellow-creature from distress, but in its gratification is considerably more pleasant, than if it were repulsive.

We, in the last place, bring under consideration persons hateful by vice or wickedness. Imagine a wretch who has lately perpetrated some horrid crime: he is disagreeable to every spectator; and consequently raises in every spectator a painful passion. But a principle common to all, prompts us to punish those who do wrong; an envious, a malicious, or a cruel action, being disagreeable, raises in the spectator the painful emotion of resentment, which frequently swells into a passion; and the natural gratification of the desire included in that passion, is to punish the guilty person I must chastise the wretch by indignation at least, and hatred, if not more severely. Here the final cause is self-evident.

An injury done to myself, touching me more than