end in view; yet are there human actions not governed by reason, nor done with any view to consequences, as in the case of infants, who are mostly governed by instinct; and even of grown persons famishing with hunger, without regard to its salutary effects. The miser converts means into an end, in accumulating wealth without the least view of use.

An instinctive passion impels us to act blindly without any view to consequences; it is deliberative when subject to reason, and prompting with a view to an end. Desire to bring about an end is termed a motive with respect to its power of determining one to act. Passion is the cause of instinctive actions, which have no motive, because they are done without any view to consequences.

The gratification of desire is pleasant; the foresight of that pleasure becomes often an additional motive for acting. The child eats from the impulse of hunger; a young man has the additional pleasure of gratification; an old man, because eating contributes to health, has an additional motive.

These premises determine what passions and actions are selfish, and what social. The end ascertains the class to which they belong. Where the end in view is my own good, they are selfish; where the end in view is the good of another, they are social. Instinctive actions are neither social nor selfish; thus eating when prompted by nature, is neither social nor selfish; but add the motive that it will contribute to my health, and it becomes in a measure selfish. When affection moves me to act for my friend's happiness, without regard to my own gratification, the action is social; it my own happiness be consulted, it is partly selfish. A just action prompted by the principle of duty, is neither social nor selfish; performed with a view to the pleasure of gratification, it is selfish. Love and gratitude to a benefactor, are purely social. An action done to gratify my ambitious views, is selñsn. Resentment from the gratification of passion is selfish ;

it is dissocial when revenge aims at the destruction of the object. All motives to action do not then spring from self-love. Every one, however, has a direct perception of self.

Some circumstances make beings or things fit objects for desire, others not. A thing beyond our reach is not desired. No man desires to walk on the clouds, because the desire would be absurd. Where the prospect of attainment is faint, the object seldom raises strong desire. The beauty of a princess, rarely excites love in a peasant.

REVIEW.

To what do we give the name of passion or emotion?
With what arts are they connected?

What are the causes of emotion or passion?

Give examples of the causes of agreeable emotions.
By what means do they raise emotions?

Give examples of the causes of painful emotions.
How are actions qualified?

What degree of emotion is raised by recollection?

Does desire always follow emotion?

How does a passion differ from an emotion?

What is always the cause of action?

What is the object of passion?

What are appetites?

How are the actions of brutes directed? Of man?

What is the difference between an instinctive and a deliberative passion?

What is a motive?

What is the difference between selfish and social actions and passions? Between these and instinctive?

Illustrate this.

What circumstances are inconsistent with desire?

SECTION II.-The Power of Sounds to raise Emotions and Passions.

Of all external objects, rational beings have the most powerful influence in raising emotions and passions; and as speech is the most powerful of all the means by which one human being can display itself to another, the objects of the eye must yield preference to those of the ear. Sounds may raise terror or mirth,

Music in conjunction with words has a commanding influence over the mind. It commands a variety of emotions, and may be made to promote luxury and effeminacy. But with respect to its refined pleasures, music goes hand in hand with gardening and architecture, her sister arts, in humanizing and polishing the mind.

SECTION III.-Causes of the Emotions of Joy and Sorrow.

An emotion accompanied with desire is called a passion; when the desire is fulfilled, the passion is gratified; the gratification is pleasant, and affects us with joy. The exception is, a man stung with remorse, who desires to chastise and punish himself. The joy of gratification is called an emotion, because it makes us happy in our present situation; on the contrary, sorrow is the result of an event opposite to what we desired.

An event fortunate or unfortunate, that falls out by accident, and concerns us or our connexions, gives us joy or sorrow, according to its result. Joy arises to a great height upon the removal of any violent distress of mind or body; in no situation does sorrow rise to a greater height than upon the removal of what makes us happy. The sensibility of our nature accounts for these effects. The principle of contrast is another cause; joy arising upon the removal of pain is increased by contrast, when we reflect upon our former distress; an emotion of sorrow, upon being deprived of any good, is increased by contrast, when we reflect upon our former happiness.

Jaffier. There's not a wretch who lives on common charity
But's happier than me. For I have known
The luscious sweets of plenty; every night
Have slept with soft content about my head,
And never waked but to a joyful morning.
Yet now must fall like a full ear of corn,

Whose blossom 'scap'd, yet 's wither'd in the ripening

VENICE PRESERVED.-ACT I. Sc. 1

SECTION IV.-Sympathetic Emotion of Virtue, and its Cause.

A signal act of gratitude produces in the spectator or reader, love or esteem for the author, and a desire to perform acts of gratitude, without reference to any one object. In this state the mind, wonderfully bent upon an object, neglects no opportunity to vent itself. In such a state, favors are returned double.

A courageous action produces in the spectator the passion of admiration directed to the author, and also a separate feeling, which may be called an emotion of courage, because when under its influence, he is conscious of boldness and intrepidity, and longs for proper objects upon which to exert this emotion.

So full of valor, that they smote the air
For breathing in their faces.

TEMPEST.-Act IV. Sc. 1. The emotions raised by martial music are all of this nature: they have no object; so also the grief or pity raised by melancholy music is without an object. In this consists also the extreme delight every one has in the histories of conquerors and heroes.

This singular feeling we term the sympathetic emotion of virtue: it resembles the appetites of nature, hunger, thirst, animal love, and in no case is the mind more solicitous for a proper object, than when under the influence of any of these appetites. This feeling is raised in the mind only by virtuous actions. No man has a propensity to vice as such; a wicked deed disgusts us; and this abhorrence is a strong antidote against vice, as long as any impression remains of the wicked action. This emotion bestows upon good example the utmost influence by prompting us to imitate what we admire; and every exercise of virtue, mental or external, leads to habit. A disposition of the mind, like a limb of the body, becomes stronger by exercise. Every person may therefore acquire a settled habit of virtue. Intercourse with men of worth, histories of generous and disinterested actions,

and frequent meditation upon them, keep the sympathetic emotion in constant exercise, which, by degrees, introduces a habit and confirms the authority of virtue. With respect to education in particular, what a spacious and commodious avenue is here opened to the heart of a young person!

REVIEW.

What are the uses of music?

What kind of events afford the greatest joy? The greatest sorrow?

What are the causes of these effects?

Give an example?

Describe the effect of an act of gratitude? Of courage? Of martial music?

What is this feeling called? How is it raised? What are its effects?

How may a settled habit of virtue be acquired?

SECTION V.-In many instances one Emotion is productive of another. The same of Passions.

The relations by which things are connected have a remarkable influence in the production of emotions and passions. An agreeable object makes every thing connected with it appear agreeable. The mind, gliding sweetly and easily through related objects, carries along the agreeable properties it meets in its passage, and bestows them on the present object, which thereby appears more agreeable than when considered apart. This propensity is sometimes so vigorous as to convert defects into properties. The wry neck of Alexander was imitated by his courtiers as a real beauty, without intention to flatter. So did the satellites of Hotspur; for which see what the Lady Piercy saith of her lord.

The same communication of passion obtains in the relation of principal and accessory. Pride, of which self is the object, expands itself upon a house, a garden, servants, equipage, and every accessory. A lover addresses the glove belonging to his mistress as a Sweet ornament that decks a thing divine.