particular propositions to general ones. In an histori cal chain every event is particular; there is nothing to bias the mind from the order of nature. In science, many experiments come under one cause; many causes come under one more general. From particular effects to general causes, we feel an expansion of mind, more pleasing than what arises from following the order of nature. These observations furnish materials for instituting a comparison between the synthetic and analytic methods of reasoning. The synthetic, descending from principles to consequences, is more agreeable to the strictness of order; in the analytic we feel the pleasure of mounting upwards, which is very agreeable to the imagination.

We are framed by nature to relish order and connexion; and the influence of order greatly sways the mind of man. Grandeur makes a deep impression, and inclines us to proceed from small to great. But order prevails over that tendency, and affords pleasure as well as facility in passing from a whole to its parts, from a subject to its ornaments. Elevation touches the mind, which, in rising to elevated objects, derives pleasure. The course of nature has a greater influence than elevation; hence the pleasure of falling with rain and descending with a river prevails over that of mounting upward. The beauty of smoke ascending in a calm morning is delightful, because the course of nature is joined with elevation.

Every work of art conformable to the natural course of our ideas is so far agreeable; every work of art that reverses that order is so far disagreeable. In every such work, orderly arrangement and mutual connexion are requisite. As these prevail, the composition pleases us. Homer is defective in order and connexion, and Pindar more remarkably. In Horace there is no fault more conspicuous than want of connexion. Of Virgil's Georgics the parts are ill connected; the transitions are neither sweet nor easy; as, for example, the description of the five zones in Book I.

In the Lutrin, the goddess of Discord is introduced without any connexion. The two prefaces of Sallust will suit any subject as well as history.

Episodes in narrative poems demand some degree of union, as between principal and accessory. The descent of Æneas into Tartarus is neither necessary nor natural, for the principal action is too long suspended. The same objection lies against the elaborate description of Fame in the Eneid.

New objects introduced in description are made more or less welcome in proportion to the degree of their connexion with the principal subject. Relations make no capital figure in the mind, some being transitory, others trivial; they are links that unite perceptions and produce connexion of action. An original propensity provides for the regular, order of our actions; and order and connexion introduce method in the management of our affairs. For without them our conduct would be fluctuating and desultory, and we should be constantly at the mercy of chance.

REVIEW.

Of what are we conscious while awake?

What are some of the relations, by which things are connected in the mind?

What is regulated by these relations?

What does an external object suggest?

How far does our power over trains of ideas extend?

What sort of subject is always welcome?

Give examples?

What is the course of thoughts and circumstances, crowding upon each other in the mind?

What illustration is given?

Why cannot a man of accurate judgment have a flow of ideas. Why is wit incompatible with solid judgment?

What in the mind does the principle of order govern?

Give examples of this principle with regard to natural objects? With respect to science and history?

How are the synthetic and analytic methods of reasoning compared?

Give examples of the influence of order on the mind?

What works of art are agreeable, and what are disagreeable? What are requisite in every such work?

Give examples of the violation of this rule?

What is the rule concerning episodes?

Why do relations make no capital figure?

Why are order and connexion necessary in our affairs?

CHAPTER II.

Emotions and Passions.

WE give the names of passion and emotion to those feelings raised in us by external objects, which have addressed the eye or the ear. Hence the connexion of emotions and passions with the fine arts, which give pleasure to the eye and ear, and never once condescend to gratify any of the inferior senses. We shall now delineate that connexion, to ascertain what power the fine arts have to raise emotions and passions. To those who desire to excel in the fine arts, that branch of knowledge is indispensable: without it criticism is abandoned to chance. The principles of the fine arts open a direct avenue to the heart; they disclose its desires, motives, and actions. We shall divide the subject into several sections, for the sake of perspicuity.

PART I.

Causes unfolded of the Emotions and Passions.

SECTION I.-Difference between Emotion and Passion.— Causes most general and common.-Passion considered as productive of Action.

No emotion or passion springs up in the mind with out a cause. If I love a person, it is for good qualities or good offices; if I have resentment against any one, it must be for an injury he has done me; and I cannot pity one who is under no distress of body or of mind. These circumstances are not indifferent; the good qualities or good offices that attract my love, are an

tecedently agreeable; if an injury did not give unea siness, it would not occasion resentment against the author; nor would the passion of pity be raised by an object in distress, if that object did not give pain.

We love what is agreeable; we hate what is disagreeable. Certain external objects instantaneously give us pleasure or pain; a gently flowing river, a smooth extended plain, a spreading oak, a towering hill, are objects of sight that raise pleasant emotions; a barren heath, a dirty marsh, a rotten carcass, raise painful emotions. Of these emotions, thus produced, we inquire for no other cause, but merely the presence of the object. And these things raise emotions by means of their properties and qualities, as the size, force, fluency of a river.

The internal qualities, power, discernment, wit, mildness, sympathy, courage, benevolence, are agreeable in a high degree, and instantaneously excite pleasant emotions. The opposite qualities, dullness, peevishness, inhumanity, cowardice, occasion painful emotions. Graceful motion, genteel behavior, excite pleasant emotions instantaneously. This true character, intention, is discovered by reflection. A purse given in discharge of a debt excites less pleasure, than if given out of charity to relieve a virtuous family in want. Actions are qualified by intention, not by the event. Human actions are perceived to be right or wrong, and that perception qualifies the pleasure or pain resulting from them. Emotions also are raised in us by the feelings of our fellow-creatures. We share the pain of a man in distress; in joy we partake of our neighbor's pleasure.

The recollection of actions, whether pleasant or painful, excites in us correspondent emotions. We remember with pleasure a field laid out with taste, a generous action, a gracious speech; but in this case our emotion is fainter than in the former.

Desire follows some emotions, not others. We desire to reward or to imitate a virtuous action; a beautiful

garden, a magnificent building, may be viewed without being desired; and we long to punish the author of a wicked deed. Inanimate objects often raise emotions accompanied by desire, as the goods of fortune; and the desire, when immoderate, obtains the name of avarice. We desire to possess a picture exposed to sale, not that in the possession of a prince.

A passion differs from an emotion in this respect; passion follows desire, and emotion passes away without exciting any desire. By desire, we mean that internal act influencing the will, and in this respect it differs from a wish.

We proceed now to consider passion with respect to its power of producing action.

No man proceeds to action but by means of an antecedent desire or impulse; therefore, where there is no desire there is no action. This opens another distinction between emotions and passions. The former, being without desire, are in their nature quiescent; the desire included in the latter, prompts one to act in order to fulfil that desire, in other words, to gratify passion.

The object of passion is that which excites it; a man who injures me becomes the object of my resentment. An emotion may have a cause, but not an object.

The objects of our passions are either general or particular; fame, honor, &c. are general; a house, a garden, &c. are particular objects. The passions directed to general objects are termed appetites; directed to particular objects they retain their proper name: hence we say, an appetite for glory, the passion of friendship. A passion comes after its object has been presented, an appetite exists before it; thus the appetite of hunger is directed to food. We act calmly when moved without violent impulse; we hurry to action when inflamed by a strong impulse.

The actions of brutes are dictated by instinct, without any view to consequences: man is governed by reason; he acts with deliberation, his actions have an