166. Men every where the same.-It would be a curious speculation, and perhaps as useful as curious, to consider how far the moral nature of man is affected by the organization of society; and to what degree his predominant qualities depend on the nature of the government under which he lives. The adage, That men are every where the same, though not wholly false, would doubtless be found to be true only in a limited sense. I love to indulge the belief, that it is true so far as to ensure permanency to institutions that are good; but not so far as to discourage us from attempting to reform those that are bad. To consider it it as true in an unlimited sense, would be to serve the purposes of despotism; for which this, like a thousand other maxims, has been invented and employed. It would teach us to sit down with a gloomy satisfaction on the state of human affairs, to pronounce the race of man emphatically "fated to be curst," a community of self-tormentors and mutual assassins, bound down by the irresistible destiny of their nature to be robbed of their reason by priests, and plundered of their property by kings. It would teach us to join with Soame Jenyns, and furnish new weapons to the oppressors, by our manner of pitying the misfortunes of the oppressed.

In confirmation of this adage, and as an apology for the existing despotisms, it is said, That all men are by nature tyrants, and will exercise their tyrannies, whenever they find opportunity. Allowing this assertion to be true, it is surely cited by the wrong party. It is an apology for equal, and not for unequal governments; and the weapon belongs to those who contend for the republican principle. If government be founded on the vices of mankind, its business is to restrain these vices in all, rather than to foster them in a few. The disposition to tyrannize is effectually restrained under the exercise of the equality of rights; while it is not only rewarded in the few, but invigorated in the many, under all other forms of the social connexion. Barlow's Advice to the Privileged Orders.

167. Utilitarianism. The principle most at war with aristocratical abuses, and which, of course, excites the greatest hatred on the part of the aristocratical confederacy, is that which sets up, as the standard of political excellence, the utility of the whole; or as it is sometimes more aptly worded, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Against this principle, all whose interests are opposed to those of the public, are leagued by an indissoluble tie.-Westminster Review.

168.-An Argument against a Monarchy.-That people must needs be mad, or strangely infatuated, who build the chief hope of their common happiness or safety, on a single person; who, if he happens to be good, can do no more than another man; if to be bad, hath in his hands the power to do more evil without check, than millions of other men.--Milton.

169. Reason is the best leader for all sects; it would, ultimately, lead to the closest union, and sects would be no more,-Zimmerman.

170. Sophists. Of all human forms and characters, none is less improveable, none more intolerable, and oppressive, than the race of sophists. They are intolerable against all nature, against all that is called general, demonstrated truth; they attempt to demolish the most solid and magnificent fabric with a grain of sand, picked from off its stones. Such knaves, whom to tolerate exceeds almost the bounds of human toleration, avoid like serpents. If you once engage with them, there is no end of wrangling.

Lavater's Aphorisms.

171. Anecdote of Whiston.-The late King being very fond of Mr Whiston, celebrated for his various strictures on religion, happened to be walking with him one day in Hampton Court gardens, during the heat of his persecution. As they were talking upon this subject, his Majesty observed, "That however right he might be in his opinions, it would be better if he kept them to himself." Is your Majesty really serious in your advice?" answered the old man.- I really am," replied the King."Why then," says Whiston, "had Martin Luther been of this way of thinking, where would your Majesty have been at this time?"

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Elegant Anecdotes.

172. Christian Philosophy.-A Pagan made this reflection when he saw a girl cry as if she had been torturing on the rack over a broken pitcher; and a woman with her hair loose, her hands lifted up to heaven, her eyes swoln with crying, and her discourse nothing but despair for the loss of a little infant. Well, after all these Christians talk of heaven, and their hopes of eternal life, 'tis certain there can be no philosophy in their religion, or else they are very ignorant of it: they must be very silly people, that hav'nt taught their children to know that pitchers would break; and their women, that little children will die.—Zimmerman.

If it be

173. Obedience to Laws. It is truly hard and sufficiently to be regretted, that any part of society should be obliged to yield obedience to laws to which they have not literally and personally consented. Such is the state of things; it is necessary that a majority should govern. an evil to obey a law to which we have not consented, it is at least a necessary evil; but to compel a compliance with orders which are unknown, is carrying injustice beyond the bounds of necessity; it is absurd and even impossible. Laws in this case may be avenged, but cannot be obeyed; they may inspire terror, but can never command respect.

Barlow's Advice to the Privileged Orders.

174. Neighbours. It concerns us materially, that our neighbours should be as wise as ourselves.-Zimmerman.

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175. The Error of regarding Belief as Voluntary. In attempting to account for the error of regarding belief as voluntary, it is important to remark, that it may have arisen, in some degree, from the circumstance of many people having no real conception of the truth or falsehood of those opinions which they profess. They adopt an opinion according to their interest or their passions; or, in other words, they undertake to assert some particular doctrine, and regard as adversaries all who oppose it. Without any reference to its import, they look upon it as a thing to be maintained, a post to be defended. In this sense, and with such people, opinions may be said to be voluntary, and being mere professions, forming a sort of party badge, and having no dependence on the understanding, they may be assumed and discarded at pleasure

It may perhaps be asserted with truth, that in regard to some subjects or other, all mankind are in this predicament; and opinions thus taken up are often maintained with more violence than such as are founded on the most thorough conviction. They are maintained, not for the sake of truth, nor from the desire natural to man of impressing upon others what he sincerely believes, but for the support of that interest, or the gratification of that passion, on account of which they were originally adopted. By thus defending opinions of which they have no clear conviction, people often succeed in imposing on themselves as well as on others. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is nevertheless true, that they are not always aware of the exact state of their own minds; they frequently imagine themselves to believe more than they are actually convinced of. On many questions they are not able to form any definite decision, and yet, from the necessity of professing some opinion, or joining some party, and from the habit of making assertions, and even arguing in favour of what they are thus pledged to support, they come to regard themselves as entertaining positive sentiments on points about which they are really in doubt.

To solve this apparent paradox it is necessary to reflect, that as it is impossible for us to have all the considerations on which our opinions are

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founded at once and all subjects present to the mind, our opinions are on most occasions simply objects of memory, results at which we recollect to have arrived without at the moment recollecting the process. In this way we believe propositions on the strength of our recollection, and perhaps the considerations on which they are founded present themselves only on occasions when it is necessary, for our own satisfaction or for the conviction of others, to retrace or restate them. Hence it is obviously possible for even an acute logician to be mistaken as to the opinions about which he has attained a decisive conviction, and not to find out his mistake till he is reduced to the necessity of recollecting, or rather repeating, the process through which he had originally gone. When he is thus driven back on the merits of the question, he finds and feels himself doubtful as to points on which he imagined his mind to have been previously satisfied. If men who are capable of estimating evidence, of pursuing a train of argument, and of reflecting on the operations of their own minds, are sometimes liable to this kind of deception, we need not wonder to find it common amongst such as have scarcely any definite notions, or any power of self-introspection.

To return to the remark which led to this digression, it may be observed, that the practice of adopting and maintaining opinions without any actual conviction must necessarily give them the appearance of depending on the will, and what is true of mere professions is naturally and easily transferred to opinions which have really possession of the understanding.

Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions.

176. Motives differ often from Pretexts.—The true motives of our actions, like the real pipes of an organ, are usually concealed. But the gilded and the hollow pretext is pompously placed in the front for show. The Rev. C. C. Colton.

177. Present time and the future may be considered as rivals; and he who solicits the one, must expect to be discountenanced by the other. Sir Joshua Reynolds.

178. Combinations of wickedness would overwhelm the world, by the advantage which licentious principles afford, did not those who have long practised perfidy grow faithless to each other.-Johnson.

179. The American Revolution.—As Mr Burke has written no “reflections on the revolution” in America, the people there have never yet been told that they had no right “to frame a government for themselves;" they have therefore done much of this business, without ever affixing to it the idea of "sacrilege" or "usurpation," or any other terin of rant to be found in that gentleman's vocabulary.

Barlow's Advice to the Privileged Orders.

180. A vine bears three grapes, the first of pleasure, the second of drunkenness, and the third of repentance.—Anacharsis.

181. Prospy

sity. Every man is rich or poor, according to the proportion between his desires and enjoyments. Of riches, as of every thing else, the hope is more than the enjoyment; while we consider them as the means to be used at some future time for the attainment of felicity, ardour after them secures us from weariness of ourselves, but no sooner do we sit down to enjoy our acquisitions than we find them insufficient to fill up the vacuities of life. Nature makes us poor only when we want necessaries, but custom gives the name of poverty to the want of superflui- . ties. It is the great privilege of poverty to be happy unenvied, to be healthy without physic, secure without a guard, and to obtain from the bounty of nature, what the great and wealthy are compelled to procure by the help of art. Adversity has ever been considered as the state in which a man most easily becomes acquainted with himself, particularly being free from flatterers. Prosperity is too apt to prevent us from examining our conduct, but as adversity leads us to think properly of our state, it is most beneficial to us.-Johnson.

182. Pride and Vanity.-No two qualities in the human mind are more essentially different, though often confounded, than pride and vanity: the proud man entertains the highest opinion of himself; the vain mind only strives to infuse such an opinion into the minds of others; the proud man thinks admiration his due: the vain man is satisfied if he can but obtain it: pride, by stateliness, demands respect; vanity, by little artifices, solicits applause: pride, therefore, makes men disagreeable, and vanity, ridiculous. Zimmerman's Reflections.

183. Books. He that will have no books but those that are scarce, evinces about as correct a taste in literature, as he would do in friendship, who would have no friends but those whom all the rest of the world have sent to coventry.-The Rev. C. C. Colton.

184. Anticipations. We are now in the transitive state; the mists of ignorance are fast clearing away, and the seeds of knowledge, extensively sown, are springing up amidst a clearer atmosphere. By and bye, we may reasonably expect, in communities, what we may now observe in individuals, just notions of their own and other people's rights, more accurate perception of the consequence of pursuing certain lines of conduct, and an enlightened preference of the right above the wrong.

Carpenter's Political Magazine.

185. Affectation.-All affectation is the vain and ridiculous attempt of poverty to appear rich.-Lavater's Aphorisms.

186. Comparison of good and evil.-The Pythagoreans make good to be certain and finite, and evil infinite and uncertain; there are a thousand ways to miss the white, there is only one to hit it.—Montaigne.