sentiments in politics, literature, and philosophy, became widely known and adopted through the neighboring states. Low and degrading views of human nature were generally entertained. A regard to one's own interest was held to be the only rule of conduct, and the senses were the only source and avenue of knowledge. But such false and grovelling systems could not long retain their ascendency. A reaction took place, and a disposition to exaggerate the dignity and independence of human nature has been as conspicuous of late, as was the former tendency to vilify and degrade. A more accurate analysis of mind again disclosed the fact, which only the vaporings and puerilities of a miscalled philosophy had been able to conceal, that there is a moral principle in man, which rebukes his selfish inclinations, claims rightful and supreme authority over all his motives of action, and holds up an ideal standard of absolute right, as the only gage of merit and proper ground of selfapprobation. In like manner, a more searching examination of various processes of intellect proved, that although the cognitive faculty is first called into exercise by impressions received from the senses, still these sources were far from supplying all, or even the most important materials of knowledge; that other elements proceed wholly from ant internal fountain, and even those which first came from without are so modified by the original and self-acting powers of mind, as in their mature estate to present few traces of their material origin. The reestablishment,for thus it is more properly called than a discovery,— of these important truths respecting our moral and intellectual constitution, naturally led to higher views of our native capacities and power of self-reliance. Philosophers were tired of painting man as a demon, and now sought the means of representing him as a god. Especially has this disposition been manifested when treating of the nature and

functions of conscience, so that some persons have now become just as much fanatics, just as irrational, in regard to the moral principle, as were formerly the wildest sect of the Puritans in relation to religious faith. Reverence of their own nature seems to them quite as just and proper as reverence of the Deity, and a glowing, though vague conception of virtue takes the place of religion, as a guide of life. Nay, a sort of ecstatic contemplation of the mere ideas of duty and right, has, with many, usurped the place of a practical manifestation of these ideas in outward conduct, and thus a species of Antinomianism has been established on ethical grounds, quite as absurd and dangerous as the same theory is, when nominally founded on Scripture.

To consider entire self-dependence as the highest stage of moral advancement, to look upon all recourse to the teachings either of Natural or Revealed Religion as an evidence of weakness, as a defect that may both practically and theoretically be done away, and such is the ground assumed by Fichte, is a mode of thinking, which, fully carried out, can stop in nothing short of atheism. If the religious law is narrowed down to an entire identity with the moral, if revelation requires nothing more of us than what conscience alone would demand, then disappears, not merely all necessity for any direct and special intervention of the Deity in the course of human affairs, but also all sure ground for believing in his existence. Such an opinion may be held for a time, for it is flattering to the pride of human reason. But in many minds a reaction will be liable to occur, that will carry its subjects to the opposite extreme; and thus may be explained the sudden transitions, that are often witnessed, from a state of unbelief to a complex, exaggerated, and gloomy faith. Man is represented in this theory as standing by his own strength, as needing no support from above, or from any quarter, before he

can act out the part assigned to him, and satisfy all the demands of his rational and moral nature. But human nature is weak, and any attempt at entire Stoicism is soon subjected to severe trials. Though revelation may have no farther duties to impose, it may contain consolations, with which it is difficult to dispense. To obtain support in hours of despondency and actual suffering, man must recur to the formerly slighted faith. But if the doctrine contain no more than what he once ascribed to it, there is no reason for admitting it, and the desired aid cannot be obtained. But may not Revealed Religion be something more than a pure system of ethics? May not there be some meaning in the often repeated requisition of faith? Are there not doctrines which must be received, if at all, with the reverence and humility of a little child? May not even an entire denegation of human reason be the indispensable condition for obtaining spiritual aid? No sooner do these questions suggest themselves to the mind of the humbled Stoic, than he perceives that his confidence in the divine. origin of this message to man will be in direct proportion to the number and difficulty of the doctrines contained in it, and to the consequent self-abasement which is necessary for their reception. Formerly, the simplest theory of religion contained too much for his proud spirit; now, the most complex and difficult system has hardly enough to satisfy his thirst to believe. In such a frame of mind, he will be ready to confess, that his former conception of virtue was practically cold and dead as an icicle, though perhaps it was also as bright and clear.

Our remarks are already extended to such a length, that there is no space left for a critical examination of Fichte's theory. And perhaps the labor of such an examination is not needed, since the capital mistake in the application of the whole reasoning may be pointed out in a few words.

That error consists in entirely confounding the distinct provinces of moral and demonstrative reasoning. It is certainly improbable, we will not say with Fichte, impossible, - that the truth of a revelation should be demonstrated, that men should be convinced of its divine origin by the same intuitive perception or rigid mathematical deduction, that compels them to receive the axioms and primary theorems of arithmetic and geometry. Such an announcement of God to man would defeat its own end, which is the moral and religious improvement of those to whom it is addressed. Men would be compelled to believe, and the magnitude of the reward and punishment thus brought with absolute certainty before their eyes, would destroy at the same time the possibility of sin and the merit of obedience. Free agency would be practically done away, since compliance with a law proclaimed in this manner would be as involuntary, and as little a ground of merit, as the caution a person exercises in not putting his hand into the fire, or in turning out of his path to avoid a precipice. Now, Fichte's whole argument is directed against the demonstrative evidence of a revelation, and has neither force nor relevancy, when applied to the moral proofs. This appears at once from a consideration of his reasoning concerning miracles, the keystone of his whole system, where no reference whatever is made to the magnitude and importance of what is assumed to be a special display of divine agency, but the criticism cuts short such assumption in every conceivable case. Should the heavens be rolled together like a scroll, and the earth give up its dead, and the common conception of a final judgment be realized in its full extent, we could not even here demonstrate the suspension of nature's ordinary laws, or infer with logical certainty the immediate operation of the Infinite cause. But every one knows, that moral proof, though different in

kind, may still be accumulated and heightened, till it produce as full conviction as mathematical evidence. We no more hesitate to act on the presumption, that fire will burn and water drown, than on the belief that two and two make four. Indeed, facts of the former class, which rest only on moral evidence, on induction and testimony, form the basis of nearly all the rules by which we regulate our ordinary conduct. The argument of the Transcendentalist, therefore, proves nothing, because it proves too much. He attempts to prevent our recognising the authority of revela tion as a rule of life, by arguments which would lead us to reject the simplest maxim of prudence in the management of our ordinary concerns.

A story is told of one of the ancient Greek philosophers, that being wrecked with some companions on what was supposed to be a barren and uninhabited coast, he happened to find some geometrical diagrams drawn on the sand, and immediately called out, "Courage, my friends, I perceive the traces of men." It was certainly conceivable, that these figures should have been produced by fortuitous causes, by the action of the winds and waves upon the stones on the beach. Still, the inference, that civilized men had been there, was so just and obvious, that it would have argued insanity in the observers, had they doubted the fact for a moment. The case is precisely parallel to that of miracles alleged in support of a revelation. It is conceivable, that a moral teacher should heal the sick and raise the dead, though he had not received a special mission from the Deity. It is possible, that men who heard and saw these events should still refuse to credit the divine origin of the doctrine taught, as we know the Jews did with Jesus of Nazareth. But it was reserved for the ingenuity of modern philosophers to argue, that it was impossible to believe under such circumstances.