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See also, Woodside v. Lippold, 113 Ga. 877, 30 S. E. 400, 84 Am. St. Rep.,267. When the Standard Scale Company purchased the property in controversy from Corley and paid off the mortgage to the bank, it did so with constructive, if not actual, notice that Ragan held another mortgage against the same property; and it is not contended that the scale company made any agreement with either the debtor or the creditor that it was to be sub- rogated to the rights and priorities of the - bank. Under the rule above announced, it - follows that the court erred in holding that the plaintiff was subrogated to the lien of the bank as against the mortgage held by Ragan. - Judgment reversed. All the Justices cono Cur.

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volved, to grant the injunction and adjudge the defendants in contempt of court.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Rabun County; J. J. Kimsey, Judge.

Action by the North Georgia Electric Company and others against S. E. White and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error. Reversed.

Brown & Randolph, J. J. Bowden, R. E. A. Hamby, and Spencer R. Atkinson, for plaintiffs in error, H. H. Dean, for defendants in error.

ATKINSON, J. 1, 2. As a general rule distinct and separate claims of or against different persons cannot be joined in the same action. Civ. Code 1895, §§ 4938, 4946. In equity, where there is a common right to be established by or against several, and one is asserting the right against many or many against one, equity will determine the whole matter in one action. Civ. Code 1895, § 4846. Equity is ancillary, but never antagonistic to the law. Civ. Code 1895, $ 3923. The sections of the Code above referred to are entirely in harmony. The claims are not separate and distinct where there is a common right to be established by several against one or more. The contrary is true if no common right is involved, and if there is no community of interest between the parties suing. The common right referred to may consist of a joint interest in the cause of action declared upon, or of separate interests in the particular subject-matter of the suit. An example of the first class would be a suit upon a promissory note payable to several persons instituted by the several payees because each has an interest in the note and is entitled to collect it. An example of the second class would be a suit by several creditors having distinct and separate claims against an insolvent debtor, instituted for the purpose of marshaling assets of the debtor. In such case there is no joint ownership of the several claims asserted against the insolvent debtor, but all are interested in the disposition to be made of his property. It may be said that where several sue jointly, if there be not a joint interest in the claim declared upon or a common right in the object sought, the claims

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“cover up,” in the names of the conspirators other than the defendant in execution, property which really belonged to him, and that, in pursuance of this object, various deeds had been executed purporting to convey specified parcels of realty to these conspirators, which in fact belonged to the judgment debtor; the particulars in each instance being set forth. The petition prayed for the cancellation of the various conveyances which were, for the reasons stated, alleged to be fraudulent; and for a judgment subjecting all the property to the petitioner's execution. Held, that this petition was not demurrable as failing to set forth an equitable cause of action, nor as being multifarious, nor for want of sufficient fullness in stating wherein the alleged fraudulent acts of the several defendants consisted.” So, also, in Van Dyke w. Van Dyke, 120 Ga. 984, 48 S. E. 3S0, the subject was considered. Mr. Justice Fish, again speaking for the court, said (page 988 of 120 Ga., and page 382 of 48 S. E.): “It is not true that since the passage of the uniform procedure act of 1887 multifariousness is no longer a ground of demurrer to an equitable petition. That act allows the joinder of equitable and legal causes of action in one suit, but an equitable petition that would have been demurrable for multifariousness in joining separate and distinct causes of action against different defendants, prior to the passage of that act, is still demurrable on such ground.” Numerous other illustrations of the “common-right” test may be found in the decisions on the subject of multifariousness cited in 9 Michie's Dig. Ga. R. 472—474. If there is a common right and the court of equity takes jurisdiction, there is no limit to which the court will go in order to do complete justice, but, where there is no common right, equity will not, for any purpose, entertain a suit wherein separate and distinct parties with separate and distinct claims unite against one or more parties. The statutes simply prohibit the joining of such claims in one suit. If a suit be defective because of such multifariousness, it is demurrable, and, if objected to by appropriate demurrer, it is error to grant an injunction and adjudge certain of the defendants in contempt of court for a violation of an older injunction. See, in this connection, Webb v. Parks, 110 Ga. 639, 36 S. E. 70; Moore v. Hill, 59 Ga. 760. 3. The case before us furnishes an example of multifariousness. After amendment the plaintiffs are the North Georgia Electric Company and Crisson, Poore, and Lockeby. The defendants are White, Magid, Prentiss, and De More. The plaintiffs Crisson, Poore, and Lockeby are not interested in any relief against any of the defendants, except De More. The only relief sought against him by Crisson, Poore, and Lockeby is an injunction to stay the prosecution of a certain forcible detainer proceeding, regularly sued out under the statute and pending in

the justice's court. There were no parties to that proceeding except Crisson, Poore, and Lockeby as defendants, and De More as plaintiff. The right of no other person was involved in that litigation, and the result Obtained therein could not by any possibility have affected either the plaintiff the North Georgia Electric Company, or the defendants White, Magid, or Prentiss. If that proceed. ing could be enjoined, there were no other necessary or proper parties for the accomplishment of such a purpose than Crisson, Poore, and Lockeby as plaintiffs, and De More as defendant. With respect to that subjectmatter the North Georgia Electric Company may have been stricken from the pleadings, and all allegations relating to matters between the North Georgia Electric Company on the one hand, and White, Magid, and Prentiss on the other, may have been stricken, and a complete case would have been left for determination by the court, to wit, the application for injunction by Crisson, Poore, and Lockeby against De More. This claim between these parties was separate and distinct, and could not be joined in the same suit with another claim between other parties concerning a different subject-matter. The North Georgia Electric Company was not concerned with the injunction sought against the prosecution of the forcible detainer proceeding instituted by De More. It was wholly immaterial whether in that case De More should win or lose. The judgment would not affect that company in the least. Its claim was against White, Magid, Prentiss, and De More with respect to entirely different matters. Concerning this claim, it was alleged that the North Georgia Electric Company held title to certain land under a chain of title extending back to Bleckley et al.; that while the land was owned by Bleckley a controversy arose over the title between Bleckley and White, which resulted in the recovery of the land by Bleckley and the grant of a permanent injunction against White, enjoining all future interference with Bleckley's possession; that, in order to avoid the effect of the injunction, White sold to Magid and Magid sold to Prentiss, and that they had all combined and confederated for the purpose of defeating the injunction, and, so combining, had employed De More as a mere agent to go and enter upon the possession of the property. The prayer was for injunction against White, Magid, Prentiss, and De More, seeking to enjoin them from interfering with the possession of the North Georgia Electric Company, and likewise for a cancellation of the deed from White to Magid and the deed from Magid to Prentiss as clouds upon the title of the North Georgia Electric Company, and likewise to punish all for a contempt of court in violating the first injunction obtained by Bleckley against White, to which reference has already been made. In this claim there is no possibility by which Crisson, Poore, and Lockeby could have had any Interest. Whatever be the relief to which the North Georgia Electric Company may be entitled against White, Magid, Prentiss, or De More with respect to the subject-matters alleged, it was wholly separate and distinct from the injunction sought by Crisson, Poore, and Lockeby, and was entirely independent of Crisson, Poore, and Lockeby. If all reference to the claim for injunction sought by Crisson, Poore, and Lockeby were eliminated from the case, it would still leave pending in court all of the essentials of a case between the other parties, upon which the court could proceed. There would be the North Georgia Electric Company as plaintiff, and White, Magid, Prentiss, and De More as defendants, with a proper subjectmatter for adjudication by the court. In Other words, there would be another separate and distinct claim. It is thus seen that in this one suit there are two separate and distinct claims by separate and distinct parties without any common right. The court not Only granted the injunction, but also adjudged some of the defendants in contempt of Court for a violation of the injunction described in the plaintiff's petition. We have already seen that, if a suit is multifarious and is properly objected to upon that ground, the court should not in such suit grant an injunction and enter a judgment absolute upon a rule as for a contempt of court declared upOn in the suit. The suit in this case is multifarious, and the judgment of the court with respect to both matters should be reversed.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices conCllr.

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CARRIERs—CARRIAGE of PAsseNGERs—WRoNG

FUL ExPULSION.

... A passenger on a railway train who had paid his fare to a given city, which was under quarantine regulations, and who, when near the tnd of his journey, left the train at a station On the railway line, in obedience to the order of à quarantine or health officer, who told him that he would not be allowed to ride on the train into the city, but must leave it at that station, has no cause of action against the railway company for a wrongful expulsion from Its train, although the conductor pointed him Olt to the health officer, and, after knowledge of such officer's order to the passenger, did not interfere to prevent its execution.

|Ed. Note—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. Vol. 9, Carriers, $ 1411.]

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pany to recover damages. The petition made the following allegations: In September, 1905, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant, in the city of Albany, Ga., a ticket entitling him to ride on its passenger train from that city to Columbus, Ga. He boarded defendant's train at Albany, and the conductor thereof accepted his ticket for his transportation to Columbus. When the train approached Sulphur Springs, in Chattahoochee county, an agent of the defendant, who was riding on the train, notified the plaintiff that he must leave the train at that station, and that he would not be allowed to ride the remainder of the distance into Columbus; and, when the train arrived at Sulphur Springs, this agent of the defendant ordered him to leave the train, “and in obedience to said order he did so, and was not allowed by the defendant to ride any further on said train.” The conductor of the train “knew that said other agent of said defendant had ordered " * * petitioner to leave said train, and, in fact, pointed out [petitioner] to said agent as a person to be ejected from said train, and failed to interfere and prevent the said agent from ejecting" him. By reason of his ejection from the train, the petitioner was put to great inconvenience and trouble, and subjected to great personal annoyance, and was compelled to walk a long distance to another railroad for the purpose of getting to his destination. The expulsion of petitioner from the train was with the consent and approval of the conductor, who failed and refused to protect him, and such expulsion was without fault on the part of petitioner. When petitioner applied at the office of defendant in Albany for a ticket from that place to Columbus, Ga., he was notified by the ticket agent that, before purchasing a ticket, it would be necessary for him to have a health certificate. Petitioner thereupon “applied to the health officer in the city of Albany, and produced evidence to show that he was in good health, and had not been exposed during the 10 days preceding said date to the infection of yellow fever, and had not been in any infected or suspected locality for 10 days, and * * * procured from said health officer the certificate," which he alleges was in due form, and a copy of which he attaches to his petition. He exhibited this certificate to the ticket agent of defendant, and thereupon the agent sold him the ticket from Albany to Columbus. When he was approached “by the said officer who expelled him from said train, " * * and asked for a health certificate, he produced said certificate and exhibited the same to Said officer and to said conductor,” and “it was the duty of said conductor and said officer to have passed him on said certificate into the city of Columbus, and his expulsion from said train, as hereinbefore set forth, was wrongful and unjustifiable,” and he has thereby been injured and damaged in the sum of $2,000. A copy of the health certificate in question was set forth in petition. The petition was demurred to upon various grounds, and the petitioner thereupon, with leave of the court, amended it. The amendment alleged: The person who notified petitioner that he must leave the train at Sulphur Springs and that he would not be allowed to ride thereon into the city of Columbus, and who, when the train arrived at Sulphur Springs, ordered him to leave it, claimed to act as a quarantine officer, but was unknown to petitioner, who “does not admit” that this person was a quarantine officer. The person “claiming to act as a quarantine officer” ordered petitioner to leave the train, “notwithstanding the fact that [he] exhibited to said person and to said conductor his health certificate as set out in full” in the original petition, “which entitled him to ride on said train into the city of Columbus.” The “conductor negligently refused to interpose in any way to prevent * * * petitioner from being removed from said train by said person, but, on the contrary, pointed out * * * petitioner to said person and thereby assisted him in removing * * * petitioner from said train.” The conductor “made no effort whatever to protect * * * petitioner, or to induce said person not to remove *. * * petitioner from said train, as it was his duty to do under the circumstances, but allowed him to be ejected from the train, contrary to law.” After the allowance of this amendment the defendant renewed its original demurrer, and demurred upon other grounds. One of the grounds of the demurrer was that the allegations of the petition were insufficient to set forth a cause of action. Other grounds (which were but amplifications of the general demurrer) were: “Because it is apparent from said petition that the alleged ‘agent' or “officer' ordering plaintiff from the train was a quarantine agent or officer of said state, or some duly constituted municipal authority thereof, and was not an officer or agent of defendant, nor subject to its control or direction. * * * It appears, by reasonable inference, that the person alleged to have ordered plaintiff off the train was an officer of said state or some duly constituted municipality thereof, acting within the scope of his authority or apparent authority and independently of defendant and its agents, and that defendant and its agents were without power or authority to control or interfere with said officer.” The court Sustained the demurrers and dismissed the petition, and the plaintiff excepted. W. R. Hammond, for plaintiff in error. Goetchins & Chappell, for defendant in err0r.

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FISH, C. J. (after stating the facts). We think the plaintiff's petition clearly indicates that at the time of the occurrence of which he complains quarantine regulations were in force with reference to travelers seeking

to enter the city of Columbus, at least as to such travelers coming from Albany, Ga. The petition shows that, before the plaintiff purchased his ticket, he was put on notice of the existence of such regulations by the agent of the defendant to whom he applied to purchase the ticket, as the agent notified him “that, before purchasing the same, it would be necessary for him to have a health certificate.” In order to procure such a cer. tificate from the Albany health officer, the plaintiff had to produce evidence to show that he had not within the past 10 days been exposed to the infection of yellow fever, nor been in any infected or suspected locality. As the train upon which he was riding approached the city of Columbus, an officer, claiming to be a quarantine officer, approached him and asked him for a health certificate, and plaintiff exhibited the one which he had procured in Albany to such officer, who told plaintiff that he would not be allowed to ride on the train into Columbus, but must leave it at Sulphur Springs. These facts alleged in the petition clearly indicate the existence of quarantine regulations; and when to them are added the allegations that plaintiff's health certificate “entitled him to ride on said train into the city of Columbus,” and that it was the duty of “said officer to have passed him on said certificate into the city of Columbus,” it seems impossible to fairly construe this petition without reaching the conclusion that there were such regulations in force relative to persons traveling from Albany to Columbus, Ga. The petition shows that, before the plaintiff purchased his ticket, he had every reason to suspect that ere he reached his journey's end he would encounter a quarantine officer, and that he relied both on his railroad ticket and his health certificate for his entry into the city of his destination. While in the amendment to the petition the plaintiff was careful to allege that he did not admit that the person who ordered him to leave the train at Sulphur Springs was what such person claimed to be, a quarantine officer, yet not only do the circumstances alleged in the petition strongly tend to indicate that this was true, but, as we have seen, the plaintiff himself alleges that it was the duty of “said officer to have passed him on said certificate into the city of Columbus.” The allegation that it was the duty of said officer to have passed the plaintist into the city of Columbus on the health certificate which he exhibited for the officer's inspection is equivalent to an admission that such officer was a quarantine officer. Unless he was a quarantine officer, how could it have been his duty to pass the plaintiff into the city of Columbus upon the evidence as to his right to enter that city afforded by the health certificate? The allegation here referred to was a direct admission that the person who ordered the plaintiff to leave the train was an “officer" of some kind, and an indirect admission that

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he was a quarantine or health officer, else it could not have been his duty “to have passed" the plaintiff “into the city of Columbus" upon his health certificate. Against this clearly implied admission in the original petition, we have the allegation, in the amendment thereto, that plaintiff does not

admit that the person who ordered him from

the train was a quarantine officer; but he did not deny that such was the fact. The matter, then, stands thus: An officer, whose duty was such as to clearly indicate that he was a quarantine or health officer, ordered the plaintiff to leave the train, but the plaintiss neither expressly admits nor denies that such officer was a quarantine officer. As the rule is well established that pleadings are to be construed most strongly against

the admission is implied was not stricken from the original petition, the plaintiff could not escape its force and effect by merely al

logical deduction from such allegation. While, by an amendment to the original

an allegation previously made, he could not by an amendment place his own construction upon the facts which he had alleged. After all, however, it does not really make any difference by what particular name the officer who ordered the plaintiff to leave the train be called, if his duty was such as the plaintiff alleges it to have been. He must have been a health officer, clothed with authority to pass upon the sufficiency of health certificates to entitle the holders thereof to enter the city of Columbus, otherwise it could not have been his duty to pass the Maintiff into that city upon the health certificate which he exhibited for inspection. If he was not clothed with such authority, he owed the plaintiff simply the negative duty of moninterference with his liberty, and could Hot have owed him the positive duty of passing him into the city of Columbus because he had exhibited a proper health certificate. A health officer who had authority to pass upon the sufficiency of plaintiff's health certificate to entitle him to enter Columbus had also, by necessary implication, authority to pre

titate, under the health regulations in force, Was not such as to entitle him to do so. The tase, then, resolves itself into this question: Was it the duty of the conductor to interfere to prevent a health officer, clothed with such authority, from compelling the plaintiff to *ave the train before it reached the city of Columbus? Brunswick & Western Railroad

L. R. A. 713, 97 Am. St. Rep. 152, is a case which is directly in point here. There it was helū; "A railroad company is bound to use extraordinary diligence to protect a passenger while in transit from violence or injury by

the pleader and the allegation from which St. Rep. 672; Fetter on Carriers of Pas. §

leging that he did not admit the natural and

petition, the plaintiff could have withdrawn

went him from entering such city, if the cer

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third person; but, where the passenger is arrested by officers of the law, the company is under no duty to inquire into the legality of the arrest.” In the present case the conductor was not bound to contest with the health officer the propriety or legality of the exercise of his power and authority in the

particular instance; as the sufficiency of the

health certificate was a question for the

health officer, and not for the conductor. A

railroad conductor is not required, for the protection of one of his passengers, to enter into a contest with, or put himself in opposition to, an officer of the law, who is apparently acting within the scope of his authority. Brunswick & Western R. Co. v. Ponder, supra; Duggan v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 159 Pa. 248, 28 Atl. 182, 186, 39 Am.

101.

While the petition alleged that the conductor pointed the plaintiff out as a person to be ejected from the train, there is no averment that the conductor said why he pointed out the plaintiff to the health officer, or that he did anything whatever to indicate why he did so. As an allegation of fact, therefore, this statement simply amounts to an averment that the conductor pointed the plaintiff out to the officer who ordered him to leave the train; the alleged purpose of the conductor in pointing him out being a mere conclusion of the pleader. 'The conductor had a perfect right to point out to the health officer the passengers on the train who had boarded it at a given city or locality. For instance, if the health officer asked the conductor to indicate to him the passengers who had held tickets from Albany, and the conductor did so, he would not thereby render the railroad company responsible for the subsequent official conduct of such officer to such passengers, or any of them. He would be merely giving information to which the health officer, as a matter of public policy, was entitled. It was held in Owens v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad Co., 126 N. C. 139, 35 S. E. 250, 78 Am. St. Rep. 642, that “a railroad com. pany is not liable for the false arrest of a passenger on one of its trains where the conductor in charge of the train merely pointed out such passenger to a sheriff who had come to arrest him as a party suspected of a capital offense.” In that case the court said: “The defendant was wholly ignorant of the occurrence, and its conductor did not originate the cause or instigate or participate in the arrest. It would be vain and unreasonable to require him to resist an officer of the law, or the law itself. Whether the officer had authority or probable cause for making the arrest is immaterial.” In the case with which we are dealing the court properly dismissed the petition upon de

murrer, and the judgment is therefore af.

firmed. All the Justices concur.

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